Sejong Policy Briefs

(Brief 2026-03) International Law Assessment and Policy Implications of the U.S. Operation to Apprehend President Maduro

Date 2026-02-03 View 183 Writer Shin Beomchul

International Law Assessment and Policy Implications of the U.S. Operation to Apprehend President Maduro


 

Beomchul SHIN

bcshin@sejong.org

Principal Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

 

 

1. Overview of “Operation Absolute Resolve” and the matter of International Law


The “rule of law,” which constitutes the foundation of the modern international order, is facing a serious challenge today. On January 2, the United States apprehended and transferred Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro through “Operation Absolute Resolve,” an action that goes beyond a mere military operation and represents a major case in which international legal norms directly collide with the realpolitik of a great power.

 

The legal issues surrounding Operation Absolute Resolve can be broadly characterized by two features. First is the unilateral use of force without United Nations authorization. This operation was an independent military action conducted without approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By infiltrating the territory of another state and forcibly removing a sitting head of state exercising effective control, the operation runs counter to the principle of respect for sovereignty as stipulated in the UN Charter.

 

Second is the structural conflict between norms and reality. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which forms the core of the current international legal system, in principle prohibits the use of force by all member states. By contrast, the United States has asserted the legitimacy of its action based on domestic law enforcement, citing alleged criminal conduct by Maduro. This reflects a structural clash between the international law principle of respect for state sovereignty and the U.S. rationale of extraterritorial application of domestic law. As a result, concerns have been raised that the international order may regress toward a system governed by power rather than law.

 

 

2. Evolution of the Prohibition on the Use of Force in International Law and State Practice


The international community has sought to legally regulate the use of force in the aftermath of two world wars in the twentieth century, but state practice in real-world politics has not adhered strictly to UN norms, particularly when constrained by the strategic interests of major powers.

 

The UN Charter establishes the following principles regarding the use of force. First is the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4), which forbids member states from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Second is the right of self-defense under Article 51, which recognizes an inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack until the Security Council takes necessary measures. Third is the authority of the UN Security Council under Chapter VII, whereby the Council may decide on non-military measures (Article 41) or military measures (Article 42) in response to threats to peace. The relevant provisions read as follows.

 

■ Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

 

■ Article 51 of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…”

 

■ Article 39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

 

However, interpretations of the UN Charter have gradually expanded, with preventive self-defense being a representative example. The notion that self-defense may be permissible when a threat is imminent has evolved to reflect the realities of modern warfare. In particular, a UN High-Level Panel in 2004 offered a flexible interpretation, stating that the exercise of self-defense in cases of imminent threat and absence of alternative means would be difficult to deem illegal. This reflects a broader structural trend of adjusting strict legal norms to the realities of international politics.

 

At the same time, the limits of international law’s effectiveness in the face of great-power politics are evident. The veto power under Article 27(3) of the UN Charter functions as a lawful mechanism allowing major powers to evade international legal enforcement unfavorable to their interests. Although this was introduced as a safeguard to avoid the collapse experienced by the League of Nations following great-power withdrawal, it has resulted in an emphasis on balance of power among permanent members rather than the rule of law. This limitation was clearly demonstrated in the 1986 ICJ case Nicaragua v. United States, when the United States refused to comply with a judgment unfavorable to it.

 

 

3. U.S. Justification for Operation Absolute Resolve


Rather than engaging with the operation’s legality under international law, the United States has adopted a strategy of circumventing international legal constraints by emphasizing domestic legal justification. The United States has framed Maduro not as a head of state but as the leader of a “narco-terrorist organization,” advancing the logic of “judicial extraction” and “law enforcement operation.” Specifically, it argues that Maduro led the Cartel de los Soles in cocaine trafficking and that oil resources seized by the Maduro regime should be returned to the Venezuelan people.

 

In this context, President Trump stated that “the definition of international law depends on how you think about it” and that “the only thing that can stop me is my own morality,” explicitly declaring a posture unconstrained by international norms.

 

Meanwhile, under the U.S. Constitution, the president possesses inherent authority over the use of force, and the concept of “force short of war” also exists. Through the Commander-in-Chief powers under Article II of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution, the president may deploy military force for up to 90 days without congressional approval. By defining Operation Absolute Resolve as “force short of war,” that is, a short-term and limited use of force not amounting to war under international law, the U.S. administration can employ a rationale that avoids the prohibition on the use of force and justifies the president’s inherent authority. The administration’s restraint in offering international legal explanations for Operation Absolute Resolve appears to reflect its awareness of the operation’s inconsistency with international law, suggesting that the constraining or legitimizing role of international law, though limited, continues to operate to some extent.

 

 

4. International Reactions


International reactions have revealed a pattern of separating legality from legitimacy, depending on geopolitical interests. Russia, China, and Iran, among others, characterized the operation as “imperialist aggression” and a blatant violation of sovereignty, calling for Maduro’s immediate release. U.S. allies, by contrast, have sought to maintain a balance between political alignment and legal concern. German Chancellor Merz, for example, expressed sympathy with the restoration of democracy but warned that “international law principles must apply,” cautioning against setting a precedent for extraterritorial law enforcement. France’s Foreign Minister Barrot likewise condemned dictatorship but pointed out that the operation runs counter to the prohibition on the use of force and lacks a solid basis under international law. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara refrained from offering a direct legal assessment, citing the difficulty of fully ascertaining the facts, but nonetheless emphasized in general terms the importance of compliance with international law.

 

Meanwhile, UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed concern over the creation of a “dangerous precedent,” but the Security Council fell into deadlock due to divisions among the permanent members and was unable to adopt any substantive resolution. Such paralysis on the part of the UN is not unprecedented and has frequently occurred whenever the interests of major powers collide.

 

Taken together, these responses indicate that advanced industrialized countries are aware of the potentially unlawful elements of U.S. actions, yet are managing relations with Washington by invoking the “political legitimacy” derived from the illegitimacy of the Maduro regime. This is an approach that warrants consideration by South Korea.

 

 

5. Assessment of the South Korean Government’s Response


The South Korean government has maintained a cautious stance between the particular nature of the ROK–U.S. alliance and the universal value of respect for international law. With regard to Operation Absolute Resolve, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through a spokesperson’s statement, focused on regional de-escalation, the restoration of democracy, and the protection of nationals. The key elements were as follows.

 

■ First, a call for regional de-escalation. The government urged all parties, including both the United States and Venezuela, to “make every effort to reduce regional tensions,” emphasizing the need for the swift stabilization of the situation.

 

■ Second, the restoration of democracy. The government expressed its hope that “democracy will be restored” in a manner that respects the will of the Venezuelan people. This statement reflected consideration for the U.S. position while also conveying a critical view of the legitimacy deficit of the Maduro regime, which has faced allegations of electoral fraud following its prolonged rule since 2013.

 

■ Third, the protection of nationals. In the immediate aftermath of Operation Absolute Resolve, the government prioritized ensuring the safety of South Korean nationals residing in Venezuela.

 

This position can be assessed as a pragmatic choice reflecting complex security and economic considerations, including the unilateral tendencies of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, U.S.–China strategic competition, and ongoing tariff negotiations. Nevertheless, compared with Germany and France, which articulated clearer principled statements emphasizing respect for international law, South Korea’s rhetoric as a middle power defending universal values appears somewhat limited.

 

 

6. Policy Recommendations


In an era marked by a crisis of international law, the Republic of Korea must establish a sophisticated legal and diplomatic posture centered on national interests. First, South Korea’s national interest lies in an international environment in which the rule of law is respected. Sustained efforts to uphold respect for international law are therefore essential. The international legal order is currently under strain, and in the absence of effective means to restrain unilateral actions by major powers, an expansion of state egoism is likely to persist for some time. Under such conditions, South Korea will increasingly face difficult choices where international legal ideals collide with political realities. In such cases, South Korea must maintain a commitment to respect for international law alongside political judgment. Upholding international law enhances mutual respect among states and increases predictability in international relations. For a middle power such as South Korea, stability and mutual respect grounded in the rule of law serve national interests.

 

Second, South Korea must enhance its expertise in international law in the conduct of state actions. All state conduct may acquire legal significance as state practice. Accordingly, international law experts should be cultivated, and their advice and assessments should be incorporated into key foreign policy decision-making processes. Compared to the United States or the United Kingdom, the legal advisory infrastructure of South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains relatively weak. Institutionally, staffing levels within the Ministry’s International Legal Affairs Bureau should be reinforced, and consideration should be given to establishing a system of permanent legal advisers or deploying specialized legal personnel. At the same time, reforms to diplomatic training are needed to cultivate officials specializing in international law. At present, training and overseas study support are focused primarily on political and trade fields, with law school education effectively excluded. Even if limited in number, institutional reforms should allow for support of law school training.

 

Third, in interpreting and operationalizing international law, a legal realist perspective must accompany legal structuralism. The adage that “strong states make international law, while weak states follow it” continues to resonate. South Korea has largely adopted a structuralist approach focused on compliance with existing international law. Yet international relations are shaped by many variables beyond legal norms. Exceptional situations inevitably arise and must be anticipated. This requires recognition of the limits of international law and norms, particularly the reality that the UN Charter and international law are more strictly observed by weaker states, as well as acknowledgment that international law and institutions have not always delivered justice and accountability.

 

Fourth, based on these principles, should South Korea face a situation similar to the U.S. apprehension of Maduro in the future, it will be necessary to articulate respect for international law alongside consideration for alliance relations. In other words, in addition to messages supporting democracy and human rights in Venezuela, a separate and explicit reference to the need to respect international law should be made. Official government statements contribute to the formation of South Korea’s state practice, making it important to preserve such records. Beyond assessments of the legality of the use of force, a track record across various issue areas should be accumulated and referenced when similar situations arise. At the same time, past choices by South Korea can be understood as stemming from security dependence and alliance asymmetry, where reliance on security constrains diplomatic expression. Overcoming this constraint requires sustained efforts to strengthen national power, much as France was only able to secure an equal voice vis-à-vis the United States after acquiring nuclear capabilities.