WPK’s 8th Party Congress and the Analysis of Foreign Strategy

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HONG Sukhoon

Research Fellow,

Korea Institute for National Unification

hongsh626@gmail.com

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Executive Summary

■ Key Background

- This Policy Brief analyzes the contents of the foreign strategies discussed at the WPK’s 8th Party Congress which was held from

  January 5, 2021, identifies the North Korea’s stance on foreign strategy and the possibility of change, and forecast the state of affairs

  on the Korean peninsula.

■ Key Take-aways

- The main contents of this brief are: first, major issues related to the North Korea Kim Jong Un regime’s foreign strategy; second,
  analysis of North Korea’s foreign strategy mentioned through the 8th Party Congress; and third, evaluation of North Korea’s foreign

  strategy suggested by the 8th Party Congress.

■ Key Implications

- After the breakdown of the Summit between North Korea and U.S. at Hanoi in February 2019, difficulty in negotiation with the U.S.

  and strained inter-Korean relationship is intensifying the uncertainty of the situation on the Korean peninsula. The 8th Party Congress

  held in January 2021, at this time, is actually a beginning point of Chairman Kim Jong Un’s second period of foreign policy, and

  carries a significant meaning as this event could determine North Korea’s stance on the foreign strategy and its future policy

  directions.

- Though this Party Congress, North Korea emphasizes self-reliance to overcome economic crisis, proposes new national economic

  development five-year plan, focuses on strengthening national defense power for continuing its current system, emphasizes the

  withdrawal of the hostility of U.S. on North Korea, and the implementation of the “strong for strong” offensive foreign policy.

- Therefore, the analysis of the WPK 8th Party Congress foreign strategy is an extremely crucial for constructing the peace system on

  the Korean peninsula, and thus, raise the necessity to comprehensively analyze the affairs on the Korean peninsula utilizing for our

  government’s policy toward North Korea.

※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

※ This is a third party's unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.