The Biden administration's North East Asia strategy and South Korea's plan
Hong Hyun-ik
(hyunik@sejong.org)
Senior Research Fellow,
The Sejong Institute
■ Problem
○ There was an expectation for the
Biden administration, which sets a high value on cooperating with allies—unlike
Trump, for the launch of the new administration to serve as a turning point to
restore the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the peace process on the Korean
Peninsula.
○ Although the review of North Korea
policy was announced to focus on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, and
South Korea, the U.S., and Japan were asked to cooperate, continue to impose
sanctions on North Korea, and engage in open diplomacy, specific policies
toward North Korea still remain unknown. In other words, the Biden
administration has publicly discussed North Korea’s human rights issues in
order to keep North Korea in check—against North Korea’s provocations—instead
of actively resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Although President Moon
Jae In’s suggestion for the U.S. and North Korea to resume talking and
approaching a gradual step-by-step was well taken, the U.S. is still waiting
for North Korea to take action.
○ Restoration of peace on the Korean
Peninsula cannot be promised now, and a new cold war of South Korea, the U.S., and
Japan versus North Korea, China, and Russia may form again. There are concerns
that the ROK-U.S. alliance, which aims to curb North Korea's provocation and
ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, may actually function as a
tool to create a new Cold War structure.
■ The Biden administration’s
national security, foreign policy, and East Asia strategy
○ The Biden administration’s foreign
policy strategy emphasizes international cooperation over nationalism,
multilateralism over unilateralism, and mutual assistance over self-help, and
alliance over national security. However, China-bashing continues in aspects of
the system, human rights, Taiwan, and technological competition. The idea of
strengthening allies and cooperation seems like the U.S. is trying to include
South Korea to keep China in check; it is, therefore, another challenge to
South Korea.
○ The U.S. has criticized North
Korea’s human rights issues in its policy. After the review of North Korea
policy, the U.S. is welcoming dialogues with North Korea for the purpose of
‘complete denuclearization’; however, the U.S. still maintains a bottom-up
approach. The U.S. will take a step-by-step approach while maintaining current
sanctions for North Korea’s complete denuclearization. Whether the U.S. will
abide by the agreements made at the Singapore Summit was only discussed in an
informal interview with a White House official.
○ President Biden reinforced the
multilateral design to check China at the U.S.-Japan Summit.
■ South Korea’s position and the
tension between North Korea and the U.S.
○ The Biden administration regards
China as a hegemonic challenger and not only continues to strategically enclose
and block China but also compete in terms of ideology, system, human rights,
Taiwan, and technology, including semiconductor supply networks. Biden will
compete against Russia—unlike Trump. If Trump bashed China bilaterally, then
Biden is bashing China by mobilizing Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea
with the name of democracy and human rights in terms of military security,
economy, trade, and technology. The U.S. insists that China poses a security
threat to South Korea and hopes to add siege and restraint of China to the
function of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
○ We allowed THAAD deployment by
U.S. forces, which the Lee Myung-bak administration and the Park Geun-hye
administration had refused. China, then, lost its strategic deterrent against
the U.S. and retaliated against South Korea. However, the U.S. did not take any
measures to curb China's actions. We should learn a lesson from this history.
○ The U.S. says that it respects human rights
by taking issue with the sovereignty of the South China Sea. However, the U.S.
ignores the sovereignty of Dokdo and human rights in South Korea-Japan
relations. The U.S. only emphasizes South Korea-U.S.-Japan security
cooperation; it is a problem as the U.S. looks like it is taking Japan’s side.
○ In an interview with The New York
Times on April 21, President Moon Jae In recommended that North Korea and the
U.S. sit down, face to face, as soon as possible to find more realistic
solutions on the basis of the failed Hanoi Summit. Also, he stressed that North
Korea and the U.S. must make concessions and compensations at the same time and
gradually approach denuclearization, step-by-step. The key, as he added, is to
devise a road map that can be mutually trusted.
○ North Korea is opposed to the
results of the U.S. review of North Korea policy. However, it seems like North
Korea is still considering whether to provoke or to return to the negotiating
table. How the Biden administration restores nuclear agreement with Iran and
apply it to North Korea, whether the Tokyo Olympics will be held and North
Korea will participate, North Korea-China relation and the U.S.-China relation
will impact the U.S.- North Korea relation in the future.
■ South Korea’s plan
○ The Biden administration’s stance
is the ultimate key in re-inviting North Korea to the process of peacefully
resolving the nuclear issue. The South Korean government must persuade the U.S.
to bring North Korea to the negotiating table, suggest a feasible plan for
North Korea, and persuade the U.S. that progress can be made on the North
Korean nuclear issue only if North Korea can trust the U.S. As the U.S. has
lost credibility due to its issues with Iran and Ukraine, the U.S. must first
declare that it will abide by the joint declaration made at the Singapore
Summit, accept the declaration of the end of the war, and request North Korea
to temporarily suspend nuclear operations. In addition, persuasion through
imposing sanctions and introducing a snapback system is necessary to allow
North Korea to denuclearize in a step-by-step approach.
○ The South Korean government must
arrange in a way to ease the tension between the U.S. and China and do its best
to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully so that all can benefit,
even if competitions in certain areas must continue.
○ The U.S.’ China policy progress in
three directions of confrontation, competition, and cooperation. The South
Korean government must actively participate in cooperation, allow private
sectors to decide whether to compete, but compete for national interest, and
wisely wait until the situation unfolds in confrontational matters. If South
Korea has no choice but to join the Quad, then it will be wise to officially
set conditions for cooperation so that South Korea will not cooperate if third
countries are excluded.
○ South Korea’s diplomatic and
security autonomy can be enhanced only when it regains its wartime operational
control and therefore reduce its dependency on the U.S.
○ Currently, the terms of
transitioning wartime operational control depend on the will of the U.S.
However, since the U.S. wants to keep China in check through the ROK-U.S.
alliance, it is unlikely for the U.S. to transfer wartime operational control.
Therefore, South Korea’s national leadership must declare that it will push for
the separation of the Korean military from U.S. forces like the U.S.-Japan
forces. Then, the U.S. will lose its justification to use three-stage
implementation verification as a prerequisite for the transition and will have
to accept the transition. If the Moon Jae In administration is unable to
transition the control, then the next administration must make every effort to
shift in its first year.
○ If the transition only changes the
supreme commander as a Korean general like now, then the U.S. military will
continue to follow its doctrine, strategies, and tactics. The command will in
fact remain under the control of the U.S. military. Therefore, a transition
into a parallel command system like the Japan-U.S. alliance is necessary.
※ Translator’s note: This is a third party’s unofficial translation of the original paper that was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.