South Korea's Independent Nuclear Armament and Strategic Stability

Jungsup Kim

(jungsupkim@sejong.org)

Vice President of research and education

the Sejong Institute

Executive Summary

■ South Korea's Independent Nuclear Armament Theory and Overlooked Questions

- South Korea's independent nuclear weapons theory is based on three propositions. 1) Unreliable extended deterrence. 2) Possible to own nuclear weapons without serious international sanctions. 3) South Korea's nuclear armament creates a balance of fear on the Korean Peninsula.

- Discussions on nuclear possession can be discussed in depth only when the above three issues are reviewed, regardless of pros and cons. Which is, the reliability of extended deterrence, the necessity of possessing independent nuclear weapons, the cost and feasibility of possessing nuclear weapons, and the strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula after possessing nuclear weapons.

- Among these, the last proposition that nuclear armament brings balance of fear and strategic stability between the two Koreas tends to be considered without critical examination.

However, historical experience has shown that relations between nuclear adversaries have never resulted in a stable balance of terror.

- Therefore, it is necessary to critically examine the military and security effects of South Korea's independent nuclear armament, and through this, discussions on South Korea's nuclear possession will be conducted in a more comprehensive and balanced way.

■ Experiences of the US-Soviet Cold War and the South Asian nuclear arms race

​- Since it is difficult to expect additional military gains from nuclear weapons with formidable lethality at a certain stage, it can be inferred that the arms race will slow down, hence achieving strategic stability.

- However, when examining the nuclear weapons build-up of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the development of doctrine, and the nuclear action-reaction in India-Pakistan relations, it can be seen that the actual historical experience was very different from this optimistic reasoning.

- The East-West Cold War was marked by an endless arms race and numerous nuclear crises, and despite several attempts to alleviate the nuclear arms race, arms control efforts have often been thwarted by various limitations and barriers.

- In particular, the risk of accidental nuclear war due to misidentification, such as computer malfunctions and human manipulation mistakes, always existed. Also, misjudgment of the opponent's strategic intentions led to crises.

- In India-Pakistan relations after possessing nuclear weapons, neither an all-out war nor a nuclear war broke out. Rather, periodic crises such as conventional conflicts were brought about, and the arms race continued.

■ Strategic Situation on the Korean Peninsula after Independent Nuclear Armament

​- If South Korea possesses nuclear weapons, the phenomena that will appear between the two Koreas will have similar basic dynamics to the historical experiences of the US, Soviet Union, and South Asia during the Cold War.

- It is true that nuclear weapons deter an intended full-scale war, but they do not solve the security dilemma between adversaries.

- If South Korea acquires nuclear weapons, the issue of the effectiveness of deterrence against North Korea will change from 'will' (extended deterrence reliability) to 'capacity' (South Korea's nuclear weapons), which can further increase the pressure of the nuclear arms race and instability of the crisis.