Analysis and Implications of Xi Jinping's 3rd term leadership: Focusing on the selection of leadership and internal and external policy stance

Gyubeom Kim

Visiting Research Fellow

gbkim826@sejong.org

The Sejong Institute

1. Solidification of Xi Jinping's "One-Man Leadership"

❍ At the recent 20th Party Congress and "Two Sessions" of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping was inaugurated for the third time as the party's General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Committee, leading to Xi Jinping's 3rd Administration.

❍ President Xi's extension of power broke existing political practices, and a "charismatic" leader comparable to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping reappeared on the Chinese political stage.

❍ As the party's Central Committee Politburo, the Central Political Bureau, the State Council, and its subordinate department's leaders are replaced by President Xi's aides, the power division structure has collapsed and the collective leadership has been undermined.

❍ In the third Xi Jinping administration, it is expected that the concentration of power will make it more politically stable and that major policies will be carried out in unison. However, the low-level powers' awareness of the central leadership and the lack of a power succession system are evaluated as unstable factors.

2. Pursuing "Total National Security" Due to Increased Internal and External Threats.

❍ At the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and the Two Sessions, the change in the Chinese leadership's perception of the international situation was greatly highlighted. Although both opportunities and crisis were mentioned, the focus is on the crisis and shows a signal that China's internal and external policies will be established in the future in response to the crisis or strengthening national security in comprehensive measures.

❍ In the 'Two Session', the reformation of the State Council of China directly reflects the areas of critical concern of the Chinese government in terms of 'Total National Security,' and is interpreted as the party's willingness to directly manage and supervise the mentioned fields.

❍ In the future, the Chinese economy will continue to boost and open the market under the balance between Xi Jinping's 'Common Prosperity' and Li Qiang's market-friendly policies, and redistribution and balanced development policies are expected to be gradually pursued from a long-term perspective.

3. Active breakthrough against U.S. pressure on China and crisis management 

❍ With the end of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government filled the diplomatic vacuum during Covid-19, and actively engaged in summit diplomacy with neighboring countries to improve relations.

❍ In addition to strategic competition between the U.S. and China and expose of ideological differences between China and Western countries, China is making diplomatic progress against European countries.

❍ China announces new external strategic initiatives such as 'Global Security Initiatives' to drive a new multipolar international order. Specifically, it is to strengthen cooperation with traditional allies against the U.S., while also considering its status and justification in the international community.

❍ China does not hide its strong willingness to counter the U.S. offensives against China but is wary of the possibility of accidental armed conflicts. The recent message on the Taiwan issue seems to be in the same vein.

❍ Both Korea and China are concerned about the involvement of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait in a proxy war that results from the confrontation between the great powers. From this point of view, various organizations and personnel from both countries need to discuss the above awareness through various communication channels and form a broad consensus.​