Internal conditions and tasks to secure nuclear potential for Korea's own nuclear possession

Cheong Seong-Chang

softpower@sejong.org

 Director of Center for East Asian Cooperation

The Sejong Institute​

❍ Those experts who oppose Korea's independent nuclear armament argue the process of nuclear armament would destroy the Korean economy due to international sanctions and will force the Korean people to face economic difficulties poses the following problems

 - First, independent nuclear armament can have several stages, forms, paths, and methods, but such processes and arguments are neglected

 - Second, the worsening of the international security environment in the future and the possibility of the U.S. administration's foreign policy changes after the 2024 U.S. presidential election are also being neglected

 - Third, denial of nuclear armament ignores the cases of the nuclear armament of Israel, India, and Pakistan tolerated by the United States and only refers to the cases of nuclear armament in North Korea that the United States did not tolerate

❍ If North Korea conducts its seventh nuclear test with tactical nuclear warheads this year, interest in independent nuclear armament will increase in South Korean society

 - There have been many arguments for and against the need for its own nuclear armament, but it has been difficult to find specific discussions about the conditions that must be met domestically to pursue South Korea's nuclear armament

❍ The purpose of this brief is to expand the scope of the Korean government's policy options by reviewing factors that need to be considered in advance before the Korean government pursues independent nuclear armament in case of an emergency

 - And analysis in detail about the task to secure nuclear potential in a situation where it is difficult for the Korean government to move forward with its own nuclear armament in a short period of time

❍ If North Korea is willing to discuss the removal of its nuclear possession for the ease of sanctions against North Korea, the re-establishment of North Korea-U.S. relations, and peace agreements, there is no reason for South Korea's independent nuclear armament

 - However, it is difficult to expect Kim Jong-un's decision to give up his nuclear weapons as "completion of national nuclear weapons" is being promoted as the biggest achievement of Kim Jong-un in North Korea.

❍ If South Korea is to respond to North Korea's nuclear weapons with its own nuclear weapons, it will require extreme amounts of military expenditure, and even so, it is fundamentally impossible to respond effectively to North Korea's nuclear weapons

 - If it was possible to respond to nuclear weapons with conventional weapons, Japan would not have surrendered immediately after being bombed by two atomic bombs in 1945

❍ It is essential that South Korea strengthen extended deterrence without nuclear weapons with the U.S.

 - But even if North Korea attacks South Korea with nuclear weapons, it is very naive to believe that the U.S. will protect South Korea even at the risk of a nuclear attack on their mainland

 - Therefore, South Korea requires a determined political leader who can consistently persuade neighboring countries, especially the United States, through strong will and summit diplomacy along with independent nuclear armament

❍ In order for Korea to proceed with nuclear self-reliance in an emergency, a control tower is essential to carry out detailed preparations for this.

 - If the Office of National Security and the National Intelligence Service has detailed plans for swift nuclear armament, the Korean government will be able to carry out the nuclear armament in situations such as Japan's nuclear armament or national crisis without panic

❍ Unlike Japan, where opposition to nuclear armament prevails, it is likely to be supported by the majority if the president decides on the nuclear armament

 - The public's high approval rate will be a big boost to for independent nuclear armament, even if it faces sanctions and difficulties.

❍ Many of the experts who oppose Korea's independent nuclear armament support that Korea does require to pose nuclear potentials similar to Japan

 - In other words, the wide consensus within our society on posing nuclear potential, which can be pursued without leaving the NPT

❍ The current North Korean nuclear threat is significantly different from when South Korea and the U.S. agreed to a revision of the nuclear agreement in the first half of the 2010s, and with North Korea's capabilities to strike the mainland U.S., trust toward extended deterrence is constantly weakened.

 - Therefore, the Korean government requires to resume the revision of the nuclear agreement with the U.S. to aim for approval for nuclear reprocessing and enrichment of Uranium, similar to the level of the Japan-U.S. nuclear agreement.

 - Argument that public debate on securing nuclear potential will make it more difficult to secure nuclear potential, but if a broad consensus between the ruling and opposition parties and the public, the U.S. will not be able to reject the revision of the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement​