The Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons in the Ukraine War

Gwangjin Kim

kwangkai@gmail.com

Professor at Sookmyung Women’s University​ 

Raising the question

 - In the war in Ukraine, it is necessary to explain why Russia, a nuclear power, does not use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, a non-nuclear state that has no guarantee of extended deterrence.

 - It is also necessary to examine whether Russia's none use of nuclear weapons is related to the historical experience since World War II

 - Analysis is required whether a nuclear weapon has been replaced by conventional weapons, whether the threat of using a nuclear weapon is more effective, or whether the cost of using a nuclear weapon is too expensive

​ - ​This inclusion of nuclear weapons analysis in the Ukraine war not only broadens the understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the war, It will also be useful for developing measures toward the North Korean nuclear issue.

❍ Reviewing the Existing Discussions for the Analysis of Nuclear Weapons Effectiveness

 - Existing discussions on the purpose and type classification of nuclear weapons will be useful in assessing whether Russian conventional military forces can replace nuclear weapons amid changes in the war situation in Ukraine and subsequent changes in war objectives.

 - In addition, the existing discussion of coercive use of military forces containing its character of nuclear threat types will be useful to evaluate whether nuclear threat effects can replace conventional military effects or nuclear weapons use effects.

 - The existing discussion on the loss of nuclear weapons after their use and normative constraints in the theory of nuclear restraint will be useful for evaluating the cost of nuclear use in the war in Ukraine.

Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons in the War in Ukraine 

 - According to the explanation of Russia's decision to use nuclear weapons in each phase of the war, the possibility of replacing conventional military forces, the possibility of replacing nuclear threats, and the cost of using nuclear weapons could be evaluated.

 - First of all, as all the situations that Russia faced to consider nuclear use occurred at the limit of conventional military effects, it cannot be explained that conventional military force has replaced the role of nuclear weapons because Russia did not use nuclear weapons.

 - In addition, Russia's nuclear threats were limited to rhetorical threats throughout the war, and the United States and the West also responded with rhetorical threats, and pro-Russian neutral countries responded negatively, with little benefit from the nuclear threats in conventional military operations.

 - However, the cost of Russia's nuclear use was high, which could have triggered third-party intervention, such as NATO's military intervention, and the potential for de facto friendly countries such as China to break away from cooperation, and caused uncontrollable civilian damage at the Russian border.

Conclusion and implications to the Korean Peninsula

 - In the end, Russia did not use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine because conventional military forces replaced the role of nuclear weapons or because Russia chose nuclear threats instead of nuclear weapons, but the expected cost of using nuclear weapons was too high.

 - Russia's lack of nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine and its limited nuclear threat effects could reinforce its tradition of refraining from the use of nuclear weapons, and thus have a positive effect on international non-proliferation.

 - The phenomena in the war in Ukraine may also affect North Korea's perception of nuclear weapons, not only the negative impact on North Korea's denuclearization but might trigger North Korea's increase of conventional army and diversification of various types of nuclear weapons

 - There will be positive on extended deterrence for South Korea, but positive and negative effects will coexist in measures such as the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and possessing nuclear potential.​