North Korea's Nuclear Threat and South Korea's Security and Diplomatic Strategy

Hyunik Hong

Senior Research Fellow of the Sejong Institute

hyunik@sejong.org

■​ The Background

❍ South Korea's national security is currently in a very critical situation.

❍ The main reason for this is that North Korea has developed and deployed missiles and other delivery vehicles in addition to nuclear weapons, and has demonstrated its willingness to attack South Korea with nuclear weapons and cause mass destruction without delay if the "situation" arises.

❍ The North Korean regime has demonstrated a willingness to strike with nuclear weapons at the early stage of war, putting South Korea at risk of suffering catastrophic mass destruction from a nuclear missile that would be virtually impossible to deter.

❍ In this context, this paper aims to assess the reality of the North Korean nuclear threat and the Korean security at stake, examine response measures to deter a North Korean nuclear attack, propose reasonably supplemented security and diplomatic strategy to safeguard national security, as well as resume the stalled North Korean nuclear negotiations to resolve the issue through an agreement and secure peace on the Korean Peninsula.

■​ South Korea's National Security at Risk: The North Korean Nuclear Threat

❍ Recently, Kim Jong Un's hostility toward South Korea has escalated along with North Korea's use of nuclear weapons as a preemptive strike at any time has escalated in hostility toward South Korea.

❍ A significant number of U.S. experts consider the security situation on the Korean Peninsula to be extremely dangerous. 

❍ In particular, the growing hostility between North and South Korea and the breakdown of communication channels means that an accidental conflict could turn into a regional war, in which case a nuclear attack by North Korea cannot be ruled out.

❍ South Koreans are highly skeptical of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with a 60% rating.

❍ The operation of the Nuclear Consultative Group under the Trilateral System or the Washington Declaration, the expansion of U.S.-South Korea joint exercises, and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets are insufficient to serve as effective deterrence measures

■​ South Korea's security policy: a combination of promoting self-reliance, including the temporary and conditional redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, and shifting Wartime Operational Control.

❍ As a sovereign nation, South Korea is justified in developing nuclear weapons for self-defense because North Korea has developed and deployed nuclear weapons and threatens to launch a nuclear attack at any time. However, South Korea's nuclear program is considered to do more harm than good.

❍ The temporary and conditional redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea in 1991 would be a realistic and reasonable deterrence measure to North Korea.

❍ The first step would be to hold the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which North Korea has long since abandoned, until it dismantles its nuclear weapons. Also, the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Agreement should be revised to give South Korea the same autonomy as Japan in enrichment and reprocessing.

❍ The U.S. claims that it is technically possible to retaliate against North Korea from a distance without redeploying tactical nuclear weapons. However, in the event of an actual North Korean nuclear attack, the U.S. nuclear forces are not present on the Korean Peninsula or in the Asia-Pacific region, so nuclear retaliation would take a considerable amount of time, and in the meantime, there is a significant possibility that the U.S. nuclear retaliation would not occur due to the possibility of North Korean nuclear retaliation against the U.S., with or without communication. To proactively intercept and deter North Korea's willingness to launch a nuclear attack, redeployment within South Korean territory is deemed necessary.

❍ Given the expected strong resistance from China and Russia, as well as North Korea, it is prudent to have a logic for responding to it and to ensure that the purpose of the nuclear redeployment is to contribute decisively to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while ensuring nuclear deterrence.

- "Temporary" means that the deployment would be temporary, not permanent, to ensure the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

- 'Conditional' means that North Korea will be given a certain amount of time (about a year) to return to negotiations, and if it does not respond or does not show sincerity in negotiations, it will be redeployed, and if North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons, the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea will be withdrawn.

- In other words, South Korea's national security is under serious threat due to North Korea's violations, and the policy is not intended for nuclear proliferation, but to induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons and ultimately create a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

- The U.S. has argued that since it has disposed of all other forms of tactical nuclear weapons, leaving only air-to-ground tactical nuclear weapons, there is no need to relocate them because they need to be deployed at U.S. military airfields in Osan and Gunsan, which would only serve as targets for North Korea's preemptive strikes. However, this is believed to be a U.S. excuse for its reluctance to relocate nuclear weapons. If the surface-to-surface tactical nuclear weapon is not stationed, the Korean Government would be able to produce them at their expense.

❍ In the case of air-to-surface tactical nuclear missiles, South Korea and the U.S. conduct NATO-style nuclear sharing

❍ Miniaturized surface-to-surface tactical nukes could be deployed in multiple underground locations while maintaining confidentiality and avoiding local opposition to the deployment of tactical nukes.

❍ Hence, enhancing the ROK military's self-defense capabilities, including its intelligence and command capabilities to the fullest extent possible, while continuing to push forward with the transition of Wartime Operational Control since the Moon Administration has been promoting.

❍ It is also necessary to find and strengthen South Korea's security vulnerabilities from the North's point of view at all times and maintain an impeccable security posture against North Korea.

■​ Past Strategy for Nuclear Negotiation

❍ Thirty years of North Korean nuclear negotiations have failed. North Korea has succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, South Korea lives under the threat of a nuclear attack from North Korea, and the U.S.-led international nonproliferation strategy is in crisis.

❍ It is difficult to believe that the South Korean and U.S. governments are fulfilling their responsibilities when they make proposals that are unlikely to be accepted by North Korea and blame North Korea for the lack of negotiations or inter-Korean dialogue.

❍ In particular, there have already been several agreements and reconciliations between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the United States to dismantle North Korea's nuclear program, but in the end, the agreements failed to be implemented. Therefore, It is crucial to understand the reasons for this and resolve not to repeat it. It will be very difficult, but efforts to resume nuclear negotiations must be made.

❍ Even if this is not successful, the mere fact that South Korea and the United States are willing to negotiate will go a long way toward de-escalating and avoiding a head-on military confrontation with North Korea.

❍ It is currently impossible for the North Korean regime to resume dialogue or negotiations without a dramatic policy change.

❍ Even if negotiations do begin, time is running out to reach an agreement. The United States has shown little willingness to negotiate a denuclearization deal.

❍ Nevertheless, if the U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations are to resume in the future, and if a new agreement is to be reached in the resumed negotiations, the following options should be kept in mind

❍ It is unlikely that the U.S. administration will propose a forward-looking dialog without South Korea's eager engagement to resume negotiation; the party most directly affected by North Korea's nuclear development. Therefore, the South Korean government needs to convince the U.S. to take a more proactive approach to North Korea and propose dialogue to prevent North Korea's further nuclear advancement.

❍ Restarting North Korea-U.S. denuclearization negotiations will not be possible through working-level talks alone, but must be accompanied by at least high-level negotiations. The U.S. must demonstrate flexibility beyond sanction-based negotiation and take steps to ensure that North Korea can trust the U.S.

❍ To realize the conclusion and implementation of negotiations, the principles of denuclearization should be agreed upon and initiated comprehensively, but the resulting agreements should be phased and specific to avoid misunderstandings in the future, and should be based on the principles of reciprocity and simultaneous action.

❍ Set denuclearization as the end goal, but achieving all goals at once is unlikely to happen, so it is wise to take a three-step process.

- Must show a serious commitment to implement once an agreement is reached.

- Verification and inspections should be agreed upon and implemented gradually and in stages.

- Successful denuclearization depends on building mutual trust and making North Korea see the benefits of peaceful coexistence so that it will voluntarily comply with the agreement because it is to its detriment to deceive.

■​ Manage North Korea's motivations for provocation

❍ To maximize the national interests, any military conflict must be managed and contained in advance to prevent it from escalating into a serious crisis.

❍ Therefore, while steadily establishing a vigilant national security posture without drawing attention to it, it is wise to use rhetoric that fosters friendly relations between the two Koreas to the greatest extent possible and to insist that even if North Korea denies that we are the same people. Even if North Korea denies that we are related, we are still the same people, so it is wise to insist on peaceful coexistence and cooperation.

❍ While it is critical to establish a robust security posture and reassure the public, it is important to note that excessive statements that go beyond confidence can have the side effect of escalating North Korea's hostility toward South Korea.

❍ Prioritize the signing of a new agreement between the two Koreas that replaces the September 19 Military Agreement to prevent an accidental military conflict between the two sides, and restore communication links between the two Koreas to ensure it does not escalate into a regional or full-scale war.

❍ Continue to pursue a robust deterrence and superior military capability against North Korea and effective and flexible U.S.-ROK security cooperation, but policy leaders' rhetoric should emphasize the potential for reciprocal cooperation by continuing to propose peaceful coexistence, dialogue and negotiation, and humanitarian assistance for North Koreans and reunification of those separated families.

■​ Diplomatic cooperation with neighboring countries

❍ Under the Yoon Administration, security cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan has become stronger than under any previous administration, so he reemphasized the need for a temporary and conditional redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. 

❍ It should be noted that while ROK-Japan security cooperation contributes to the deterrence of North Korea and the deployment of U.S. and U.N. forces in the event of an emergency, it is geopolitically more beneficial to Japan's security than ours, so compensation for us is required. Hence it would be wise to conduct cooperation at a moderate level as it might provoke North Korea.

❍ Learn from the well-managed '2015 wooden-box mine incident' during the Park Administration, securing lateral support for peace on the Korean Peninsula from China and Russia must be obtained.

❍ China is frustrated by the Yoon Administration's U.S.-Japan-centric diplomacy, and Russia, which sees the supplement of artillery shells from South Korea to the U.S. military as military support for Ukraine, is concerned that South Korea has turned unfriendly with Russia and is blatantly siding with North Korea by receiving artillery shell supplies from North Korea.

❍ The administration could humbly but firmly explain to the Chinese and Russian governments that the temporary and conditional redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear forces is a step toward denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

❍ Explaining South Korea's security philosophy is based on self-reliance and cooperative security with its neighbor two countries, and that the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program is the reason for the expanded and strengthened alliance with the United States, primarily for nuclear deterrence, giving motivation to them to cooperate in the denuclearization of North Korea.

❍ While it is unlikely that the government will be able to make the ROK-China, and ROK-Russia relationship any friendlier or closer than it has been in the past, although the ROK-US relationship is important. The government must ensure that the ROK-China, ROK-Russia relationship is as friendly as possible.

❍ To this end, it is necessary to remain cautious when it comes to the vital interests of China and Russia.