Assessment of Changes in North Korea-China-Russia Relations After the 2025 China Victory Day Parade

Sung-Yoon Lee

sylee@sejong.org

Principal Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

1. Executive Summary

The joint appearance of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin at China’s 2025 Victory Day parade marked a defining symbolic moment in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia. It conveyed the impression of a consolidated authoritarian alignment opposed to the U.S.-led liberal international order. This symbolism had already been presented by the June 2024 DPRK–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which restored a formal alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow and significantly elevated North Korea’s strategic leverage vis-à-vis its primary adversaries, the Republic of Korea and the United States.

Beneath this appearance of unity, however, lie substantial asymmetries and divergent national interests. North Korea and Russia openly embrace a narrative of a “new Cold War” and multipolarity, while China remains cautious about institutionalizing confrontation with the United States. Beijing seeks to balance strategic competition with risk management, avoiding entanglement in Moscow’s war in Ukraine or Pyongyang’s destabilizing adventurism.

A critical shift is the disappearance of references to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” from recent DPRK–China joint statements. This omission signals China’s de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status and reflects broader erosion of the denuclearization framework. For the Republic of Korea, the emerging environment necessitates pragmatic diplomacy: reinforcing the ROK–U.S. alliance and trilateral cooperation with Japan while engaging with China and Russia to manage escalation of tensions. Arms control, phased risk reduction, and multilateral diplomacy are increasingly realistic approaches to preserving stability on a peninsula now deeply embedded in global great-power rivalry.

2. Strategic Context and Core Questions

On September 3, 2025, China commemorated the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan with its largest-ever military parade. The presence of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un together on the Tiananmen reviewing stand projected a powerful geopolitical narrative: the convergence of three authoritarian states increasingly aligned against the U.S. and its allies.

For Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin, the parade dramatized their shared vision of a multipolar world and an emerging systemic confrontation with the West. For China, however, the optics served narrower purposes—deterrence signaling and domestic legitimacy—rather than endorsement of a rigid anti-U.S. bloc. This divergence raises the central question addressed in this brief: to what extent does the North Korea–China–Russia alignment represent a durable strategic coalition, and how should South Korea respond?

North Korea has historically advanced its national interests by exploiting rivalries among the major powers. What distinguishes the current era is Pyongyang’s significantly enhanced bargaining position. Unlike during the Cold War, North Korea is now actively courted by both China and Russia, each seeking leverage against Washington. While China–Russia relations resemble a quasi-alliance and DPRK–Russia ties now constitute a de jure alliance, this triangular dynamic lacks institutional cohesion. Nevertheless, it complicates U.S. alliance management and intensifies pressure on the ROK–U.S.–Japan security framework.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 proved transformative. Much as the Korean War catalyzed Japan’s postwar recovery and integration into the U.S. alliance system, the Ukraine war has functioned as a strategic windfall for North Korea. By supplying weapons, ammunition, and manpower, Pyongyang restored its alliance with Moscow and enhanced its international standing. Putin’s presence at the parade sought deeper Chinese support, while Kim aimed to demonstrate that Beijing and Moscow now tacitly accept North Korea as a nuclear power.

3. DPRK-China Relations: Limits of Strategic Alignment

A. Prolonged Estrangement (2012-2017)

Following Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, DPRK–China relations entered a period of sustained coolness. Despite repeated nuclear and missile tests, no leader-level contact occurred between 2012 and early 2018. After North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013, Xi Jinping adopted a China-centered pressure strategy that combined participation in international sanctions with continued economic engagement.

Political trust deteriorated further after the December 2013 execution of Jang Song-thaek, Kim’s uncle and the principal advocate of economic cooperation with China. Jang’s removal severed key institutional channels, reinforcing Beijing’s perception of Pyongyang as an unreliable partner. Even as bilateral trade expanded, political relations stagnated.

B. Tactical Rapprochement and Renewed Distance (2018-2021)

The diplomatic stalemate ended abruptly in 2018. Kim Jong Un’s outreach to South Korea and his willingness to meet U.S. President Donald Trump raised Chinese concerns of strategic marginalization. Between March 2018 and June 2019, Kim Jong Un met Xi Jinping five times, coordinating positions ahead of summits with Washington and Seoul.

This rapprochement was tactical rather than strategic. After the collapse of the U.S.-North Korea Hanoi summit in February 2019, North Korea reverted to confrontation with the United States and South Korea. Missile testing resumed, and relations with China gradually cooled. Beijing remained North Korea’s primary economic lifeline but exercised limited political influence.

C. De Facto Acceptance of a Nuclear North Korea

The most consequential recent shift is China’s quiet retreat from denuclearization diplomacy. Unlike joint statements issued in 2018–2019, the September 2025 DPRK–China statement omitted references to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” This omission reflects Beijing’s judgment that denuclearization is unattainable and that continued emphasis only constrains bilateral cooperation.

4. DPRK-Russia Relations: From Marginality to Alliance

A. Reversal of Power Dynamics

Kim Jong Un’s first summit with Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in April 2019 highlighted North Korea’s marginal status. Putin treated Kim as a subordinate, departing early for Beijing the next day and underscoring Moscow’s limited interest in North Korea.

This dynamic reversed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. By the September 2023 Vostochny Cosmodrome summit, Putin’s dependence on North Korean artillery shells, missiles, and manpower was evident. The June 19, 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty institutionalized this dependence, introducing an automatic intervention clause and restoring a mutual defense alliance.

B. An Unequal but Enduring Partnership

North Korea has supplied Russia with weapons, ammunition, and troops valued at nearly $10 billion—over one-third of its estimated annual GDP. In return, Russia has provided food, fuel, and limited technical assistance, with few signs of large-scale transfers of advanced weapons systems.

This imbalance paradoxically strengthens the alliance. Russia now views North Korea as its most reliable battlefield partner, while Pyongyang anticipates long-term technological dividends, including missile, submarine, and satellite capabilities.

5. China-Russia Relations: Convergence with Guardrails

China and Russia have deepened diplomatic coordination since the Ukraine war. Beijing has supported Moscow rhetorically and economically while refraining from joining Western sanctions. Yet historical experience—including the near-war with the Soviet Union in 1969—has instilled caution toward formal alliances.

Beijing seeks to deter U.S.-led containment without being drawn into Moscow’s military adventurism or Pyongyang’s provocations. This caution explains China’s reluctance to institutionalize a trilateral alliance.

6. Trilateral Dynamics and the “New Cold War＂ Narrative

The Tiananmen optics suggested unity, but the DPRK–China–Russia alignment remains uneven. China has not endorsed the “new Cold War” narrative advanced by Moscow and Pyongyang, recognizing that such framing implies possible military confrontation with the United States.

By contrast, DPRK–Russia relations have reached unprecedented heights. North Korea has emerged as Russia’s most important battlefield ally. In return, North Korea reportedly receives missile, drone, and submarine-related assistance in return.

7. Implications for the U.S.-Led Alliance System

Washington increasingly frames China, Russia, and North Korea as revisionist powers challenging the liberal international order. In response, the United States has strengthened trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan, exemplified by the Washington Declaration and the Camp David Commitment to Consultations.

Despite progress, the ROK–U.S.–Japan framework remains constrained by historical sensitivities, particularly regarding Japanese military involvement on the Korean Peninsula.

8. Strategic Choices for the Republic of Korea

South Korea’s security depends on alliance solidarity with the United States and cooperation with Japan, balanced by pragmatic engagement with China and Russia. Given North Korea’s entrenched nuclear status, immediate denuclearization is unrealistic. Arms control, phased risk reduction, and confidence-building measures are more viable.

Key priorities include: deepening trilateral coordination, revitalizing shuttle diplomacy with Japan, engaging China through forums such as APEC, cautiously managing relations with Russia to limit excessive DPRK–Russia alignment, and exploring multilateral mechanisms such as a revival of the defunct Six-Party Talks framework.

9. Conclusion

China’s 2025 Victory Day parade symbolized the convergence of North Korea, China, and Russia. But it fell short of creating a cohesive strategic bloc. Instead, it exposed an asymmetric alignment shaped by war, rivalry, and strategic caution. For South Korea, navigating this environment requires balanced diplomacy that integrates deterrence, alliance management, and sustained engagement. Such pragmatism is essential to preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula amid the intensifying great-power tensions.