Alliances and the North Korean Nuclear Issue in North Korea-China Relations:

A Chinese Perspective

​

Yong-beom Kang

Sejong-KT&G China Fellow​

1. Introduction 

Former U.S. National Security Advisor Robert C. O'Brien referred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the “Hermit Kingdom.” The Rules of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the North Korean constitution define the basic ideals of the country’s foreign policy as “independence, peace, and friendship.” However, the reality is that North Korea’s foreign policy is more often than not characterized by mystery and ambiguity.

North Korea’s foreign policy has always had a strong “ideological orientation,” both during and after the Cold War. Moreover, the Juche ideology and military-first policy significantly influence the formation and implementation of the DPRK’s foreign policy. The fundamental goal of North Korea’s foreign policy is to ensure the state’s right to survival through all available diplomatic means and, in doing so, to expand and strengthen the country’s space for survival.

North Korea-China relations are at the heart of North Korea’s foreign policy, and constitute its most important bilateral relationship. During the Cold War, the two countries were perceived as having a special relationship akin to a “blood alliance” or being “as close as lips and teeth.” However, since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has fluctuated between estrangement and rapprochement, and it is now considered to be evolving into a more normal state-to-state relationship.

North Korea seeks to strategically manage and utilize its relationship with China to ensure regime stability, enhance its international political standing, and increase its bargaining power. China, in turn, has sought to reshape the relationship in a way that encompasses both the alliance relationship and normal relations, as well as the past and the future, while selectively pursuing balance in bilateral relations to maximize its national interests.

The North Korean nuclear issue is the most critical point of contention between North Korea and China and the biggest obstacle to developing stable, friendly, and cooperative relations. China strongly opposes North Korea’s policies and actions surrounding nuclear weapons development and has made consistent efforts to persuade North Korea to denuclearize. Amid speculation that North Korea may soon conduct its seventh nuclear test, attention is focused on how China’s perspective and stance on North Korea’s nuclear weapons might evolve.

As North Korea and Russia rapidly draw closer together in the context of the Ukraine war and with rumors of a “rift in North Korea-China relations” emerging, China’s policy toward North Korea is receiving significant attention. In particular, U.S.-China relations have already entered a “new Cold War” phase, causing instability in inter-Korean, South Korea-Russia, and South Korea-China relations. Given these development, China is facing increasing pressure to adjust its North Korea policy and its stance on the North Korean nuclear issue.

This brief first examines the internal and external factors that influence North Korea’s foreign policy and its key characteristics. It then analyzes the relationship in depth based on the “alliance security dilemma” theory, focusing on North Korea’s policy toward China and North Korea-China relations during the Kim Jong Un era. Finally, it explores China’s perspective and stance on the North Korean nuclear issue and, based on this analysis, proposes policy tasks for China’s future North Korea policy.

2. Key Characteristics of North Korea’s Foreign Policy

North Korea defines its foreign policy as “a policy implemented by one country to achieve specific political objectives in its relations with other countries.” The main characteristics of North Korea’s foreign policy can be described by the following four points.

First, as a key member of the socialist bloc, North Korea has consistently demonstrated a strong ideological orientation in the implementation and execution of its foreign policy, both during the Cold war and in the post-Cold War era.

Second, North Korea has pursued self-reliant diplomacy, which prioritizes its own national interests. By conducting so-called “balanced diplomacy” with China and the Soviet Union (now Russia), North Korea has received substantial aid and benefits from both of these countries, thereby maximizing its national interests.

Third, North Korea’s foreign policy has been highly realist, with the primary goal being the survival of the state (regime). North Korea has sought to maximize its own national interests based on self-reliance and balanced diplomacy.

Fourth, North Korean diplomacy prioritizes agility in responding to changes in the international environment. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the most important external factor influencing North Korea’s foreign policy, while in the post-Cold War era, this role has shifted to the United States.

Over the past 70 years, North Korean diplomacy has consistently adhered to the following principles and strategies.

First, during the Cold War, North Korea focused on maintaining and deepening cooperative relations with other socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, based on socialist ideology.

Second, North Korea has pursued its national interests through the strategy and tactic of “using the small to achieve the big (以小謀大).”

Third, under its “Supreme Leader (Suryeong)” system, North Korea has openly advanced its nuclear weapons program by promoting the Juche ideology and military-first policy, employing a pragmatic diplomatic strategy centered on its possession of nuclear weapons.

3. North Korea-China Relations in the Kim Jong Un Era and the Alliance Dilemma

After Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korea-China relations initially showed signs of improvement. However, the relationship rapidly deteriorated following North Korea’s four nuclear tests and hundreds of missile launches. China supported the UN Security Council’s sanctions against North Korea, and in response, North Korea accused China of “abandoning even elementary principles” and being a “puppet” of the United States.

In 2015, relations between North Korea and China showed some signs of easing, but North Korea’s 4th and 5th nuclear tests on January 6 and September 9 of 2016, followed by a 6th test on September 3 the following year, further deteriorated bilateral relations. China, acting like a responsible major power, responded with strong sanctions against North Korea, which led to even harsher criticism from Pyongyang. As a result, Kim Jong Un refused to meet Song Tao, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Liaison Department, when he visited North Korea in November 2017 as a special envoy for Xi Jinping. This marked the lowest point in North Korea-China relations.

However, the growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula eased significantly in February 2018 with the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Throughout 2018, a series of diplomatic events—Kim Jong Un’s three visits to China, the first-ever North Korea-U.S. summit, and three inter-Korean summits—opened possibilities for three simultaneous processes: “transitioning from the armistice to a peace treaty,” “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” and “inter-Korean reconciliation.” North Korea officially declared a suspension of its nuclear and ballistic missile tests and even dismantled a nuclear test site. These actions to implement the “nuclear freeze” signaled North Korea’s commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Along with this thaw in tensions, North Korea-China relations also began to recover to traditional friendly terms starting with Kim Jong Un’s fourth visit to China. In January 2019, which marked the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between North Korea and China, Kim Jong Un visited China, and in June, Xi Jinping made a state visit to Pyongyang. This was the first visit by the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China’s head of state in 14 years, and Xi’s first to North Korea since the 18th Party Congress. These developments opened a new chapter in North Korea-China relations.

On October 23, 2020, Xi Jinping emphasized the “great friendship forged in blood” between North Korea and China during a speech marking the “70th anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteers Entering the Korean War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.” On July 11, 2022, The People’s Daily published an article marking the 61st anniversary of the North Korea-China Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, stating, “(North Korea-China relations) are growing stronger with time and could not be changed for all the world. Let’s continue writing beautiful chapters together while we carry on our traditions and look toward the future.” Against this backdrop, China strongly urged the international community to ease sanctions and military pressure on North Korea, vetoing several UN Security Council sanctions resolutions.

On January 1, 2024, Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping exchanged New Year’s greetings, declaring 2024 "China-North Korea Friendship Year," and announced plans to expand bilateral exchanges. From April 11 to 13, Zhao Leji, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, visited North Korea to attend the opening ceremony for “China-North Korea Friendship Year.” This raised expectations of a possible visit by Kim Jong Un to China.

However, in the second half of 2024, rumors of a “rift” in DRPK-China relations began to circulate widely. In particular, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to North Korea in June, during which the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, further strengthened and developed North Korea-Russia relations across the board. In contrast, subtle signs of strain between North Korea and China were becoming increasingly evident. In particular, the cancellation of Chairman Kim’s anticipated visit to China reinforced suspicions of a “rift in North Korea-China relations.” However, given the historical pattern of fluctuations in North Korea-China relations since Kim Il Sung’s death, these “rift” rumors being raised in South Korea may not be as strange as they seem.

In essence, since the normalization of relations between South Korea and China, North Korea and China have found themselves in an “alliance dilemma.” While North Korea has accelerated its nuclear development due to fears of abandonment, China has actively opposed deterioration of the Korean peninsula’s security situation due to the North Korean nuclear issue, and it has sought to avoid being dragged into a conflict with South Korea. However, given the intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and the growing security concerns surrounding North Korea, it seems unlikely that the North Korea-China alliance treaty will be revised or terminated. China's ambiguous stance toward the alliance serves its broader strategic interests on the Korean peninsula.

4. China’s Perspective on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

The North Korean nuclear issue is a major obstacle in North Korea-China relations and negatively impacts the stable development of friendly and cooperative bilateral relations. Since the start of the Kim Jong Un regime, North Korea has carried out strategic provocations, such as nuclear missile tests, to operationalize its nuclear weapons despite the deterioration of North Korea-China relations. For Kim Jong Un, nuclear missiles are the most important strategic asset for guaranteeing regime survival and enhancing domestic cohesion, as well a “last resort” to deter external aggression.

However, from China’s perspective, North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a genuine security threat, and the regime’s continued nuclear tests directly impact the safety, stability, and economic development of China’s northeastern region. In particular, any potential radioactive leakage from North Korea’s nuclear testing could jeopardize the security of China’s three northeastern provinces—Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.

Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear armament could not only strengthen trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan and trigger a “nuclear domino” effect in Northeast Asia, it could also cause substantial harm to northeastern China. Therefore, the North Korean nuclear issue is a serious security threat for China as well.

China is strictly complying with UN Security Council resolutions while also supporting a political resolution to the Korean peninsula issue and providing humanitarian aid to North Korea. Although some criticize China for violating UN sanctions, China has previously enforced high-level sanctions against North Korea, even at the risk of damaging relations with Pyongyang. The recent speculations about a “rift in North Korea-China relations” may not be unrelated to China’s consistent enforcement of the sanctions against North Korea.

If North Korea proceeds with a seventh nuclear test, the U.S. is expected to deploy the mid-range missile launch system known as Typhon to South Korea. If Typhon is deployed, the consequences could far surpass the tensions caused by the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system. South Korean media speculate that the range of the Typhon system could “cover Beijing,” and Chinese experts are strongly warning that “if a situation similar to THAAD deployment occurs, the backlash will be even more severe.”

Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is a shared strategic interest for China, the U.S., and South Korea, and will require close communication and cooperation moving forward. In the future, China must recognize its role as a stakeholder in the North Korean nuclear issue and fulfill its corresponding responsibilities and obligations. First, China should be clearly warned that the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is closely tied to its own security interests. Second, if North Korea attempts to wield its “nuclear threat” against China, China could use the revision or even termination of the “alliance treaty,” as well as the suspension of economic aid, as leverage. Third, China should cooperate with the international community to exert pressure to strengthen sanctions against North Korea. Whether North Korea conducts a seventh nuclear test is expected to be the key factor in determining the future trajectory of North Korea-China relations.

5.Future Tasks for China’s North Korea Policy

The North Korea-China relationship is not merely a simple relationship between two countries but one that is intertwined with geopolitical factors and complex relationships between major powers. While some question the validity of the North Korea-China alliance treaty and the actual likelihood of Chinese military intervention in a crisis, North Korea remains China’s only formal ally and holds irreplaceable strategic value for China. From a geopolitical perspective, North Korea is the forward base for U.S. advances toward China. The geopolitical value of North Korea should not be underestimated–in the past, present, or future.

Going forward, China’s policy toward North Korea should be established and implemented based on the traditional three principles of “maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, achieving denuclearization, and resolving issues through dialogue and negotiation.”

First, China should deepen its political relationship with North Korea. Considering the unique characteristics of North Korea-China relations and changes in the international environment, China should use the “year of friendship” as an opportunity to invite Kim Jong Un for a summit and strengthen political trust. There are suspicions that Kim Jong Un, who has not visited China in nearly six years, is still playing the “nuclear card.” Reaffirming the alliance in response to the complex international developments and to prevent a seventh nuclear test is necessary. If the (military) alliance between China and North Korea is reaffirmed, it could somewhat reduce North Korea’s nuclear ambitions by assuring regime security. Additionally, while respecting North Korea’s cooperation with Russia as it is a matter of national sovereignty, China should remain wary of excessive closeness between North Korea and Russia, which could sideline China. China should also dispel the rumors of a “rift in North Korea-China relations” by strengthening ties with North Korea. This would help improve the transparency of China’s diplomacy. Furthermore, China should be cautious about participating in military cooperation with North Korea and Russia. The U.S. has already grouped the three countries together as a “new axis of evil” (as former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo termed it). Therefore, China should avoid becoming entangled in the confrontation between blocs that North Korea is attempting to create in Northeast Asia. Trilateral military cooperation with North Korea and Russia would contradict China’s previous criticisms of the U.S.’s alliance strategy and Cold War mentality.

Second, China should firmly commit to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the past, North Korea has complained about China’s support for UN sanctions against North Korea, while the U.S. and South Korea have accused China of siding with North Korea. So far, China has proposed “dual suspension” and “dual track” approaches, but these solutions remain theoretical and need to be fleshed out in the future. Chinese academics should move beyond theoretical discussions to analyze specific measures like roadmaps, timelines, step-by-step goals, rights and responsibilities of relevant countries, negotiation costs, and so on. At the same time, the Chinese government should quickly establish a “nuclear red line” for North Korea and persuade it to return to negotiations. If North Korea goes ahead with a seventh nuclear test, China should not take an approach of “ambiguity” but rather firmly express its opposition.

Third, China should increase its economic investments and aid to North Korea and help it become a strategic hub along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Due to the current UN sanctions on North Korea and the COVID-19 outbreak over the past few years, it was difficult for North Korea and China to engage in normal economic exchanges and cooperation. However, considering that the pandemic is largely over and that UN sanctions should not negatively impact the lives of North Korean people, China should do its part to contribute to North Korean economic stability and peace on the Korean peninsula by increasing flood relief and economic investments to North Korea. If necessary, China should also support Kim Jong Un’s “20×10 Regional Development Plan” and his large-scale apartment construction projects. It should not be overlooked that the cost of economic aid is much lower than the military expenditure required in the event of war, and it is a more effective approach.

Fourth, given the dim prospects for inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations, China should prepare for the possibility of a local conflict. The U.S. has a strategic interest in keeping the Korean peninsula in a controllable state as a “bridgehead” to contain China and moderately escalating the “crisis on the Korean peninsula.” Following Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia and Putin’s visit to North Korea, North Korea-Russia military cooperation has entered a practical phase. The U.S., South Korea, and Japan have strongly warned that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia poses a “serious concern and threat.” As the war in Ukraine drags on, further military cooperation between North Korea and Russia is expected, creating an atmosphere filled with the “smell of gunpowder” in Northeast Asia and making tensions on the Korean peninsula unavoidable. In recent years, the U.S. and South Korea have been upping the scale and intensity of their joint military exercises by including scenarios such as “targeted strikes” and “decapitation operations,” escalating tensions on the peninsula to dangerous levels. The inter-Korean conflict is also intensifying. North Korea defined South Korea as a “thoroughly hostile state” in its newly amended constitution, and, in his Armed Forces Day speech, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol warned that North Korea would face the “end of its regime” if it attempts to use nuclear weapons. If war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, China would inevitably have to intervene—not simply to protect Kim Jong Un’s regime but to ensure China’s own national security. However, China remains firmly opposed to war on the Korean peninsula.