Trends in China-North Korea Relations Since 2018 and an Analysis of the Suspected ‘Rift in Relations’

Gyubeom Kim

Visiting Research Fellow​

1. Introduction

Although China and North Korea have long emphasized their friendship as “forged in blood,” in reality, their relations have often been marked by sharp conflicts, driven by shifts in both the international landscape and their respective national interests. Between 2013 and 2017, in the years after Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un assumed leadership, North Korea conducted four nuclear tests. In response, China cooperated with the U.S. to pass a series of tough sanctions resolutions against North Korea, leading to a significant deterioration in bilateral relations.

However, in early 2018, Kim Jong Un shifted the regime’s strategic line from the “parallel path of economic and nuclear development”—also known as byungjin—to a policy of “concentrating all efforts on economic construction,” and entered into denuclearization talks. This marked a turning point in China-North Korea relations. However, by February 2019, following the so-called Hanoi “no deal,” the situation on the Korean peninsula had essentially returned to square one. Moreover, intensified conflicts between the U.S. and China, as well as the U.S. and Russia, combined with renewed inter-Korean tensions, led to a sharp deterioration in the regional security landscape. Despite these developments, North Korea and China have maintained “strategic communication and cooperation.”

However, economic cooperation between North Korea and China has progressed more slowly than expected, raising questions about the current state of their relations. In particular, the rapid development of Russia-North Korea relations has highlighted the relatively slow progress in China-North Korea relations, fueling speculation about a so-called “rift in China-North Korea relations.”

This brief examines the improvement and development of China-North Korea relations since 2018 and aims to provide a balanced analysis of the factors that strengthen strategic cooperation between the two countries, as well as those that limit the expansion of economic cooperation. Additionally, it seeks to analyze the recent speculation about a “rift in China-North Korea relations” and offer policy recommendations. This year, designated as a “year of friendship” between North Korea and China, marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries, with high-level exchanges scheduled for the latter half of the year. Therefore, this brief will also touch on key points of interest and future prospects for China-North Korea relations.

2. Improvement of China-North Korea Relations and Strengthening of Strategic Communication

Despite repeated warnings from China and the international community, North Korea proceeded with its sixth nuclear test in September 2017, followed by the test launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November. In response, China agreed to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2397 in December 2017, which included the "strongest sanctions" ever imposed on North Korea at that time. However, this period of conflict came to an abrupt end in early 2018 when Kim Jong Un announced a shift in his regime’s strategic line. He declared the end of the byungjin line—the parallel development of nuclear weapons and the economy—and introduced a new policy of “concentrating all efforts on economic construction,” while seeking improved relations with South Korea and the U.S. At the same time, North Korea temporarily suspended its nuclear and missile provocations, marking a turning point in North Korea–China relations.

In March 2018, Chairman Kim visited China, where he was warmly received. This event marked the resumption of China-North Korea summits after a seven-year hiatus. In March 2018, Chairman Kim visited China, where he was warmly received. This event marked the resumption of China-North Korea summits after a seven-year hiatus. Kim’s visit to China on March 25, 2018, was not only his first visit to China but also his first foreign trip since assuming power. Following this visit, Kim and Xi held five summits between 2018 and 2019. One of the most symbolic events in the recovery of China-North Korea relations was Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019. Xi praised Kim Jong Un’s decision to shift his strategic line and promised to carry on the tradition of friendly relations, strengthen strategic communication, and deepen cooperation in various areas. Xi’s visit to North Korea from June 20–21, 2019, came 14 years after Hu Jintao’s visit in October 2005. The visit was significant as it occurred immediately after the failed Hanoi summit between North Korea and the U.S. During the visit, both leaders agreed to maintain close strategic communication, carry on the tradition of high-level visits, and expand exchanges and cooperation in various areas.

After the Hanoi summit ended with “no deal” in February 2019, denuclearization talks on the Korean peninsula returned to square one, and the international situation worsened due to intensified U.S.-China competition and renewed inter-Korean tensions. Nevertheless, “strategic communication and cooperation” between North Korea and China has continued since 2018. Even while borders were closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the two countries actively exchanged congratulatory messages and letters on political events and important anniversaries, demonstrating their close cooperation. 

A key indicator of the stability of China-North Korea relations is the repeated use and emphasis of the term “strategic communication and cooperation (戰略溝通及協調)” in official documents, such as high-level exchanges and congratulatory messages. Since the term was first mentioned during a summit between President Hu Jintao and Chairman Kim Jeong Il in Changchun, China in August 2010, it has become a staple rhetorical term used in official communications between the two countries. The phrase reflects the will of both countries to continue cooperation through discussion and coordination despite differing opinions. Since the restoration of relations, China’s stance on sanctions against North Korea has softened. In September 2018, China proposed easing some sanctions against North Korea at the UN. Moreover, since March 2022, despite North Korea’s frequent missile tests, China has refrained from issuing condemnations and has opposed the passage of additional sanctions resolutions. In addition, China has begun to stress the role and responsibility of the U.S. in resolving the North Korea nuclear issue. At the UN General Assembly in June 2022, Zhang Jun, Permanent Representative of China to the UN, criticized the U.S. for not reciprocating despite North Korea’s denuclearization efforts in 2018, arguing that the U.S. needs “to take actions, not just talk about readiness for dialogue with no preconditions.”

North Korea has shown strong support for China in its conflicts with the U.S. and other countries. It has backed China on several issues, including blame for COVID-19, China’s pandemic control measures, and the diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics by the U.S. and other Western countries. North Korea has also released statements openly supporting China’s stance on Taiwan, which China considers the “core of its core interests.” North Korea strongly defended Xi Jinping’s third consecutive term, which attracted global criticism, and was the first country to send a congratulatory letter. On October 23, 2022, Chairman Kim also sent a congratulatory message to President Xi for his third term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, which was decided at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

3. North Korea and China's Differing Positions and Limitations on Cooperation

Since 2018, China and North Korea have maintained communication and cooperation within a framework of friendly relations. However, their circumstances and response strategies are not fully aligned, and there are significant differences in their perceptions and approaches to international affairs, including U.S.-China relations. With the escalation of U.S.-China strategic competition under both the Trump and Biden administrations, China recognizes that confrontation with the U.S. in the long-term is inevitable. However, China seeks to avoid a rapid deterioration in relations or direct confrontation with the U.S., aiming instead for the “stable management” of U.S.-China relations.

North Korea’s so-called “military adventurism,” including its nuclear and missile provocations, provides continued justification for additional deployments of U.S. strategic assets and the strengthening of military cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. This could lead to bloc confrontations in Northeast Asia, a risk that China perceives it must carefully manage. China's position on this issue has been repeatedly expressed in statements made by Chinese leadership, as well as in congratulatory messages and letters sent to North Korea over the past six years. In particular, since the restoration of bilateral relations, President Xi has consistently urged North Korea to suspend its provocations and maintain a peaceful environment. 

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China uses cautious and indirect language when referring to U.S.-China relations, and repeatedly uses phrases such as protecting and promoting the “peace, development, stability, and prosperity” of the region. Moreover, China has requested that North Korea maintain close strategic communication with China amid the changing international landscape and coordinate its position on various global issues.

The cracks in U.S.-China relations, coupled with the U.S.-Russia conflict, are giving North Korea more room to maneuver diplomatically. In his policy speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly in September 2021, Chairman Kim asserted that “the structure of international relations has transitioned toward a new cold war,” signaling North Korea’s intention to aggressively respond to and exploit the conflicts between major powers.

Since around 2021–2022, North Korea’s congratulatory messages and letters to China have included increasingly provocative language, referring to the “hostile policies,” “military threat,” and “frenzied anti-China confrontational tactics” of “the United States and its followers.” This appears to be an attempt to highlight the shared position of North Korea and China and strengthen the rationale for their cooperation. In addition to actively engaging with China through congratulatory messages and letters, North Korea is also indirectly calling for cooperation and support by reminding China of the previous five China-North Korea summits.

A clear divergence exists between China’s pursuit of stable management of U.S.-China relations and the security environment on the Korean peninsula, and North Korea’s strategy of exploiting major power conflicts to strengthen its diplomatic position. This fundamental difference serves as a limiting factor in bilateral cooperation.

Nevertheless, the long-standing friction between the two countries over North Korea’s military provocations has been relatively well managed. Since 2022, North Korea has refrained from conducting additional nuclear tests and has limited its provocations to missile tests. In return, China has softened its stance, refraining from criticizing North Korea and opposing further sanctions, while maintaining strategic communication and cooperation.

Currently, the key “bottleneck” in China-North Korea cooperation appears to be the expansion of economic cooperation. Because China needs to consider the possible responses from not only Korea and the United States, but also the international community, it remains reluctant to ease sanctions on North Korea or provide economic support. North Korea, on the other hand, has been calling on China—both directly and indirectly—for additional economic assistance and consideration. One significant example of these disagreements is the issue of North Korean workers in China. Reports suggest that North Korea hopes to send new workers once the contracts of current workers expire and they return home, but China is reluctant to allow this.

Moreover, the two countries appear to have a considerably different views on trade. For example, despite North Korea’s tourism industry—one of the Kim regime’s key development areas—being exempt from sanctions, China has not permitted Chinese tourists to enter North Korea even though two years have passed since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, fueling various speculations. Due to their differing positions on international affairs and response strategies, progress on economic cooperation between North Korea and China has been slow, and contentious incidents have occasionally occurred. These limiting factors can serve as critical variables affecting the development of the China-North Korea relations and require continued attention.

4. The Suspected “Rift in China-North Korea Relations” and Its Analysis

In June 2019, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea, the two countries agreed to cooperate in areas such as "culture, tourism, and people's wellbeing.” As a result, it was predicted that economic cooperation between North Korea and China would significantly expand after the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the reopening of the border and the recovery of trade between the two countries progressed more slowly than anticipated, and there have been no clear signs of expanded cooperation.

In June 2024, after North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russia, analysts suggested that China might be displeased with North Korea's actions. Around this time, there was a sharp increase in South Korean media reports about contentious incidents and developments between North Korea and China. In particular, it was being reported that there was growing disagreement between North Korea and China over the repatriation of North Korean workers in China, which fueled speculation about a so-called “rift in China-North Korea relations.”

In response, on July 9, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian(林劍) immediately dismissed the claims as "baseless speculation and exaggerated propaganda," directly criticizing the South Korean media. During a regular briefing on July 9, when asked whether Chinese authorities had requested that North Korean workers in China return to their home country, Lin Jian responded, "I haven't heard what you mentioned," and stated that China continues to maintain a "traditional friendship and cooperative ties" with North Korea.

The rapid development of Russia-North Korea relations, which became evident in the latter half of 2023 and reached a milestone with the signing of a new treaty in June 2024, was a key factor that sparked widespread speculation about a “rift in China-North Korea relations.” The fast pace of Russia-North Korea relations stands in stark contrast to the relatively slower progress in China-North Korea relations, further highlighting the differences between the two partnerships. Regarding the North Korea–Russia summit in June 2024 and the signing of the new treaty, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged the need for “engagement and cooperation” and “development of relations” between North Korea and Russia. However, China used some significant expressions, stating that it would determine its position and role based on "the merits of the matter itself (是非曲直)" and “in its own way." This phrase was used by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson on June 19, 2024, was interpreted as China taking a neutral stance on North Korea–Russia relations, subtly reflecting China’s discomfort with the situation.

In reality, the closer political and military ties between North Korea and Russia do not align with China’s foreign policy direction, which opposes the emergence of a confrontation between the U.S.-South Korea-Japan bloc and the China-North Korea-Russia bloc. Such a development could be a strategic burden for China. As a result, China has been maintaining separate bilateral, rather than trilateral, exchanges with Russia and North Korea.

It is true that the development of China-North Korea relations has lagged behind Russia-North Korea relations, and the recent tensions between North Korea and China could be seen as evidence of disagreement on certain issues, namely that there are bottlenecks in certain negotiation areas. However, alongside these widely reported tensions, there have also been numerous efforts by both countries to maintain friendly ties. For example, on July 26, in celebration of "Victory Day," Kim Jong Un visited the Friendship Tower, a symbol of China-North Korea friendship, and a photo of the visit was featured in Rodong Sinmun. This visit was particularly significant given that it occurred during the time when speculation about a “rift in China-North Korea relations” was gaining attention.

Meanwhile, since 2023, China-North Korea trade has been recovering rapidly. In 2023, the trade volume between North Korea and China reached $2.72 billion, fully recovering to pre-pandemic levels and accounting for an overwhelming 98.3% of North Korea’s foreign trade. This demonstrates the resilience and closeness of China-North Korea economic relations.

It may be too early to conclude that the strengthening of Russia-North Korea relations—a key reason for speculation about a "rift in China-North Korea relations”—will necessarily lead to the deterioration of relations between North Korea and China. Both North Korea and Russia still need China’s support, making it difficult for them to realistically strengthen their strategic cooperation without considering China’s strategic interests. Furthermore, given the complex international landscape, including U.S.-China strategic competition and the Russia-Ukraine war, China and Russia share important strategic interests at the global level, making it highly unlikely that their cooperation will break down over the North Korea issue.

In summary, despite some differences, North Korea and China have demonstrated their commitment to maintaining and managing their friendly relations. Therefore, at this point, rather than a fundamental deterioration in China-North Korea relations, the recent tensions could be seen as a tug-of-war or war of nerves over certain issues, namely China’s economic aid to North Korea or the terms of their trade relationship.

5. Outlook and Recommendation

Considering that there has been no significant strategic conflict between North Korea and China, and communication and cooperation between them has continued, at this point, it is difficult to conclude that relations have deteriorated. The recent tensions may instead reflect a long-standing war of nerves over the limitations of their cooperation, namely China’s economic assistance and trade conditions.  

This year marks the 75th anniversary of North Korea–China diplomatic relations, which both countries have designated as a “year of friendship.” High-level exchanges scheduled for the second half of the year may serve as a litmus test for progress in economic cooperation. Key points to watch include whether Kim Jong Un visits China, navigation of Chinese ships on the Tumen River and access to sea routes(出海口), the opening of the New Yalu River Bridge, and the resumption of tourism between the two countries.

There are both pros and cons concerning the expansion of economic cooperation between North Korea and China. With the U.S. presidential election in November and China focused on attracting foreign investment to counter its economic slowdown, China may act cautiously, especially considering its relationship with the United States. On the other hand, North Korea, which is heavily invested in its "20x10" rural development policy and striving to revive its tourism industry, may take a more proactive and forward-looking approach in negotiations.

Under these circumstances, the South Korean government should continue to closely monitor the trends in North Korea–China relations, and it is important to keep an open mind and analyze the situation objectively, avoiding any bias toward one particular viewpoint. Specifically, if South Korea prematurely assumes that China-North Korea relations have deteriorated and places excessive expectations on China’s role in sanctions and deterrence against North Korea, this could lead to a misjudgment of China’s true intentions. Such a miscalculation could adversely affect efforts to improve South Korea-China relations and hinder cooperation.

China remains opposed to North Korea's military adventurism, namely its nuclear and missile provocations. However, amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, China is likely to perceive cooperation with the U.S. on denuclearization as a difficult task. As a result, China may adopt a more passive approach, tolerating missile provocations while only preventing further nuclear tests. With this in mind, the South Korean government should prioritize enhancing communication with both China and Russia to prevent them from making additional strategic concessions to North Korea.​