North Korea's nuclear threat after the US presidential election and Korea's response

Jang-Won Jo

Visiting Research Fellow​

1. Introduction 

  In an interview with the Associated Press on September 26, Rafael Grossi, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated, “North Korea became a de facto nuclear weapon possessor state in 2006, and the world must recognize that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and pursue dialogue.“ Following this remark, along with concerns over the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, discussions emerged about the ineffectiveness of the North Korean denuclearization process and the idea of recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. In a related development, on September 12, North Korea unveiled a new uranium enrichment facility, with the Rodong Sinmun stating that ”Kim Jong Un has set forth important tasks for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.“ The unveiling of the uranium enrichment facility is believed to be an attempt by North Korea to draw attention to its nuclear capabilities in preparation for potential negotiations with the new U.S. administration following the November 5 presidential election on issues such as lifting sanctions and initiating disarmament talks. 

  Regardless of who wins the upcoming U.S. presidential election, North Korea is expected to pressure the new administration to seek negotiations by asserting that: (1) the denuclearization of North Korea can no longer be viewed as a realistic goal, (2) it is necessary to freeze North Korea’s nuclear capabilities at their current stage, and (3) arms reduction talks are required to eliminate North Korea’s existing nuclear warheads.

  Meanwhile, in the international community, there is growing acceptance of North Korea’s claims of tactical nuclear weapon possession and deployment as established facts. However, the purpose of this brief is to present an alternative assessment and propose response strategies based on that evaluation.

This brief examines the trends in North Korea’s nuclear threat activities since the initiation of tunnel restoration work at Punggye-ri in early 2022, and based on these trends, explores the anticipated developments, intentions, and implications of North Korea’s nuclear threat following the U.S. presidential election, while proposing potential response strategies.

2.  Key Developments in North Korea’s Tactical Nuclear Threat Since 2022

  In April 2018, North Korea announced that it would "stop nuclear tests and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and dismantle its northern nuclear test site." Following this statement, North Korea refrained from launching ICBM-class missiles or conducting nuclear tests for the next three years and nine months, until January 2022. Then, in January 2022, North Korea announced that “orders have been issued to relevant departments to reconsider the trust-building measures that we took on our own initiative after the North Korea-U.S. summit in Singapore and to promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporally-suspended activities.” At this time, North Korea appeared to be preparing to restore tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Then, beginning in early March, media outlets began reporting that “tunnel restoration activities are underway at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site,” and by June 2022, Tunnel No. 3 had reportedly been restored.

  Many experts in South Korea and around the world viewed North Korea’s tunnel restoration efforts as a sign of an impending “seventh nuclear test,” leading to heightened concerns over Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities. Likely observing these reactions, North Korea convened the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 9, the anniversary of the regime’s founding, and announced the adoption of its “nuclear force-building policy” into law. 

  Following the announcement of North Korea’s “nuclear forces policy law,” some domestic and international opinion leaders began to argue that “the time for discussing North Korea’s denuclearization is over“ and “it is time to recognize North Korea as a nuclear arms state,” treating North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons as an established fact. By adopting its “nuclear forces policy law,” North Korea achieved recognition for “advancing its nuclear capabilities“ without needing to prove these capabilities through testing. 

  Without conducting nuclear tests for tactical nuclear weapons development or demonstrating possession of dozens to hundreds of nuclear warheads that can be used in an actual war, North Korea presented itself as a de facto nuclear weapons state. North Korea announced its nuclear strategy related to nuclear weapons use, declaring it as law, and by merely proclaiming this law, North Korea achieved even more than its intended objective. In my assessment, these actions are part of a type of cognitive warfare intended to convince the international community that North Korea is capable of both possessing and using nuclear weapons. (Cognitive warfare is a broad concept that describes military operations that aim to defeat an opponent by using misinformation to cause the adversary’s leadership or populace to make irrational/wrong decisions based on false perceptions or to cause misjudgments/errors in formulating response strategies or military weapons operation strategies.) 

  In addition, in October 2022, North Korea reported that “tactical nuclear operations units of the Korean People’s Army staged military drills from September 25 to October 9 in order to check and assess the war deterrent and nuclear counterattack capability of the country.” They claimed that “tactical nuclear operations units” conducted drills for a preemptive nuclear strike mission and asserted that “frontline units could launch a nuclear attack from any location at any time.” However, despite calling the exercise a “tactical nuclear operation drill,” in reality, North Korea only conducted a missile launch drill, making this another act of “cognitive warfare” intended to reinforce the impression that North Korea’s “possession of tactical nuclear weapons” is an established fact. Stripping away the “tactical nuclear” terminology, this was “just another missile launch drill” and was no different from North Korea’s previous “repeated missile provocations.” However, North Korea’s claims to have carried out “practical training of tactical nuclear operations units” generated significant concern both in South Korea and internationally due to the possibility of North Korea integrating nuclear weapons into operational military units and launching preemptive tactical nuclear strikes on U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan. Many experts in South Korea and abroad treated North Korea’s claims of “forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons” as established facts, resulting in these claims beginning to become “facts.“

  In March 2023, North Korea unveiled ten tactical nuclear warheads. The photo published in the article had a poster on the wall displaying eight different delivery systems for the “Hwasan-31” tactical nuclear warhead (with “Hwasan” meaning “volcano” in Korean). With this unveiling, North Korea claimed to have completed the development of “miniaturized and lightweight” tactical nuclear weapons. (Generally, “tactical nuclear weapons” refer to nuclear weapons with yields in the range of tens of kilotons or less intended for use on relatively close, specific targets. Although there are various classifications for tactical nuclear yield sizes, the “tactical nuclear weapons” referenced in this brief denote the miniaturized and lightweight warheads that can be mounted on the eight delivery systems (KN-23/24/25, two types of cruise missiles, a mini SLBM, a CRBM, and a torpedo) denoted by North Korea when unveiling the Hwasan-31.)

  However, questions arose over whether the “Hwasan-31” nuclear warhead unveiled that day was a “real tactical nuclear warhead.“ During the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, Kim Jong Un outlined defense tasks, including miniaturizing nuclear weapons and making them tactical. However, since the sixth nuclear test in 2017, North Korea has yet to conduct another nuclear test. Therefore, the claim of developing a tactical nuclear warhead without actual testing remains questionable. This is because if the unveiled warhead was indeed a prototype, a testing phase would be necessary for performance verification before mass production. Regarding this, in a September 18 article for 38 North, Dr. Siegfried Hecker stated that ”in 2023, Kim showed off a room full of small tactical nuclear weapons (mockups, presumably) that are claimed to fit into eight different delivery platforms, but additional nuclear tests are needed to improve the performance of these warheads.“

Additionally, on September 12, 2024, North Korea unveiled a new uranium enrichment plant in Kangson, stating in the Rodong Sinmum that “Kim Jong Un presented important tasks for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.“ The unveiling of the uranium enrichment facility is believed to be an attempt to draw attention to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities ahead of the upcoming U.S. presidential election on November 5, with the aim of initiating negotiations with the next U.S. administration to lift sanctions against North Korea and arranging arms reduction talks to steer the situation on the Korean peninsula in a more favorable direction. Dr. Hecker also commented on this in the 38 North article, noting that ”all estimates of the unveiled facility’s enrichment capacity are highly uncertain, and  we have no independent confirmation of its production capacity.”

3. North Korea’s Expected Moves Following the U.S. Presidential Election

  In February 2019, during the so called “Hanoi no-deal,” the U.S. demanded that, in addition to dismantling its Yongbyon nuclear facility, North Korea also dismantle its other nuclear sites and biological and chemical weapons facilities, as well as address the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) issue. However, the talks reportedly broke down because North Korea was only willing to discuss the Yongbyon facility. Given this background, North Korea’s recent unveiling of the previously concealed Kangson facility is noteworthy as it suggests that North Korea is putting the Kangson facility, which the U.S. has previously mentioned as a target for negotiations, on the negotiating table and that North Korea could “restart nuclear talks” with the U.S. in the future. Some foreign analysts have occasionally mentioned the need to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state and the possibility of initiating arms reduction talks. North Korea is likely to leverage such statements to claim that: (1) denuclearization talks are no longer useful, (2) it possesses a large number of nuclear warheads, and (3) it possesses ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons. By spreading such perceptions, Pyongyang may attempt to push for nuclear arms reduction talks.

Meanwhile, Trump has highlighted his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un and boasted about resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. However, given Trump’s transactional approach and unpredictable nature, if he is elected, it could heighten uncertainty around resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. If a new Trump administration were to forgo CVID (i.e., the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program) and instead adopt an approach that sacrifices aspects of the ROK-U.S. alliance in return for North Korea freezing or reducing its nuclear capabilities, this could have highly negative consequences, potentially threatening the ROK-U.S. alliance and only strengthening North Korea’s global standing.

  Conversely, Harris has previously criticized a top-down approach involving personal exchanges and summits with Kim Jong Un. In the short term, her administration is likely to maintain the current Biden administration’s policies of extended deterrence and prioritizing the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, if Harris is elected, North Korea is expected to escalate its nuclear threat in an attempt to “shake up the new U.S. administration.” Such actions could prompt policy or strategy shifts and adjustments to manage the heightened threat from North Korea.

Regardless of who wins the upcoming U.S. presidential election, North Korea is expected to pressure the new administration to seek negotiations by asserting that: (1) the denuclearization of North Korea can no longer be viewed as a realistic goal, (2) it is necessary to freeze North Korea’s nuclear capabilities at their current stage, and (3) arms reduction talks are required to eliminate North Korea’s existing nuclear warheads.

  In the nuclear domain, North Korea’s claims of an exponential increase in nuclear weapons and mass production of nuclear materials suggest that it may have unveiled a large number of warheads (10 in total) in 2023 as a means to boast that it will possess “dozens to hundreds of nuclear warheads“ in the future. Furthermore, given the current development of North Korea-Russia relations due to the Russia-Ukraine war––which is aligned with North Korea’s interests—–and the uncertainty about China’s position if Pyongyang were to conduct a nuclear test due to the deterioration of North Korea-China relations, it would be more advantageous for North Korea to delay a nuclear test until after the U.S. presidential election. By first observing the North Korea policy direction under a Harris or Trump administration, North Korea could better decide whether to use a seventh nuclear test as a bargaining chip and, if so, the most favorable timing. Moreover, considering Russia’s violation of UN sanctions against North Korea by providing economic aid in exchange for North Korean weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war, along with North Korea’s recent dispatch of military personnel to Russia, which has provoked intense international criticism, if North Korea were to conduct a seventh nuclear test in the future and Russia opposed UN sanctions resolutions against North Korea, the international criticism and pressure on both countries would likely intensify even further, making the decision to pursue a seventh nuclear test a significant burden for North Korea and a difficult choice to make. 

  In the ICBM domain, North Korea is expected to start with low-intensity provocations. Specifically, it will likely first attempt a military reconnaissance satellite launch using an upgraded space launch vehicle that addresses the issues with the “liquid oxygen + petroleum engine” combination that led to the failed satellite launch on May 27. North Korea has previously conducted test launches of the Hwasong-17 (liquid-propellant) and Hwasong-18 (solid-propellant) missiles at high angles instead of standard trajectories. In the future, it may attempt a standard-trajectory launch over the Pacific to emphasize its capability to threaten the U.S. mainland. Additionally, North Korea claimed on June 26 that it had successfully tested a multiple-warhead system capable of striking several targets simultaneously. However, this appears to have been a very rudimentary test. Therefore, North Korea is expected to conduct further similar tests, through which it will likely assert that it “possesses multiple-warhead strike capability” capable of targeting several major U.S. cities simultaneously.

  Given these circumstances, after the U.S. presidential election on November 5, although North Korea is expected to adjust the speed and intensity of its provocations depending on whether Trump or Harris wins, it will likely feel out the possibility of negotiations or engagement with the U.S., including nuclear arms reduction talks, by (1) drawing attention to the North Korean nuclear/ICBM issue, (2) threatening a seventh nuclear test, and (3) threatening to amass a large stockpile of nuclear warheads. However, if the situation does not unfold as North Korea desires, there is a high likelihood that it will carry on with provocations by (1) launching a second reconnaissance satellite, (2) launching the Hwasong-17 (liquid-propellant) or Hwasong-18 (solid-propellant) missiles at a standard (non-lofted) trajectory, (3) unveiling a large number of nuclear warheads (including additional nuclear and missile facilities), and (4) conducting tests of multiple-warhead systems.

  If the U.S. agrees to engage in arms reduction talks or other negotiations with North Korea with the aim of freezing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials already in its possession, and improving relations with Pyongyang, North Korea is expected to propose conditions such as freezing or dismantling its Yongbyon and Kangson uranium enrichment facilities and destroying its nuclear warheads. In return, North Korea is likely to demand the lifting of sanctions, the suspension of U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, the discontinuation of U.S. strategic asset deployment to the Korean peninsula, and the dissolution of the United Nations (UN) Command. 

4. South Korea’s Response Strategies         

 [Delay Recognizing North Korea’s Tactical Nuclear Capabilities and Initiate a Verification Process] North Korea maintains ambiguity regarding the true extent of its nuclear capabilities. While it is reasonable to assume that North Korea possesses nuclear capabilities due to its six nuclear tests, controversy remains over whether it has completed development of miniaturized and lightweight tactical nuclear weapons or has the capacity for large-scale production. This is because North Korea’s claims made through enshrining its nuclear force policy in its constitution, conducting tactical nuclear strike drills (presuming mounting of tactical nuclear weapons), and unveiling uranium enrichment facilities seem more likely to be rhetorical or performative elements of “cognitive warfare” rather than definitive proof of its status as a “nuclear weapons state.“

  Therefore, instead of accepting North Korea’s claims of possessing advanced nuclear capabilities, including large-scale production and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and mass production of nuclear materials, as established facts, we must continually assert the need for proof and verification. This approach signals that the international community will not accept North Korea’s claims at face value.

Producing tactical nuclear weapons on a large scale requires multiple nuclear tests to confirm their reliability. Our strategy should focus on questioning the credibility of North Korea’s assertions that it possesses tactical nuclear weapons without conducting additional nuclear tests. North Korea should also be challenged to verify the operational readiness of its unveiled uranium enrichment facilities and confirm whether they have reached full operational capacity. In this way, since North Korea refuses to engage in a “denuclearization process,” the international community should be able to demand a “verification process for North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.”

[Implement Pressure to Counter North Korea’s Pursuit of Nuclear State Status] It is essential to reinforce the idea that North Korea has more to lose than gain by “pursuing nuclear state status“ through nuclear threats. First, we must make clear that each instance of nuclear provocation by North Korea will only strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance and further reinforce integrated extended deterrence measures and the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) framework. North Korea’s nuclear threats––including the unveiling of nuclear warheads, a seventh nuclear test, and stockpiling nuclear materials––will ultimately lead to increased military cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan and will boost the U.S.‘s power projection capabilities across the entire Korean peninsula, negatively impacting China’s U.S. and Northeast Asia strategies. We should emphasize this outcome to urge China to also apply pressure on North Korea. Second, Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, recently advocated for the creation of an “Asian NATO” to counter North Korea, China, and Russia. We should highlight that North Korea’s nuclear threats will only serve to strengthen U.S.-South Korea-Japan military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and deepen discussions on establishing an “Asian NATO,” a prospect feared by North Korea, China, and Russia.

  Third, we should also stress that North Korea’s actions could result in an expanded role and mission for the UN Command, another outcome North Korea would like to avoid. In this way, we must emphasize that North Korea's nuclear threats will produce the opposite of what it desires. 

  [Gain the Upper Hand through Offensive Rather Than Defensive Response Measures] Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022, Russia, the country with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, has been unable to utilize its nuclear weapons despite struggling in the conflict. It is suspected that Kim Jong Un, having observed this, has recognized that “nuclear weapons cannot be used.” Therefore, we should emphasize that, in the current global security environment and with an international community strongly oriented towards nuclear non-use and nuclear non-proliferation, North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons will never be tolerated. Even if North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, they will remain essentially “useless” as they cannot be deployed. 

  Second, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese leaders should take every opportunity to declare that “any nuclear attack by North Korea would trigger an overwhelming and decisive response from the allies, including the use of U.S. nuclear forces,” thereby deterring North Korea from even considering using its nuclear weapons.

  Third, we should leverage additional options to pressure North Korea, such as redeploying nuclear-armed submarines near the Korean peninsula and ensuring South Korea “secures the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.“

  [Convey the Unjustness of U.S.-North Korea Arms Reduction Talks to U.S. Policy Circles] As for the incoming U.S. administration, it is important to continue implementing a “North Korea denuclearization policy.” However, if North Korea refuses to participate in the denuclearization process, we should propose the introduction of a “North Korea nuclear capability verification process,” while highlighting that arms reduction talks (without verification) could harm the U.S.-ROK alliance. We should also point out that North Korea’s strategy may be to leverage the vague promise of nuclear warhead dismantlement to seek concessions, such as lifting sanctions, suspending joint U.S.-ROK military exercises, discontinuing the deployment of U.S. strategic assets on the Korean peninsula, and dismantling the UN Command.

  Meanwhile, if Trump, with his transactional approach, wins the presidential race, it could pose challenges for us. However, depending on our response, the situation may be to our advantage, creating an opportunity in disguise. During his previous term, Trump met with Kim Jong Un three times but did not grant Kim’s requests for sanctions relief or the withdrawal of hostile policies. If we leverage our role in the execution of U.S. policies toward China and North Korea to persuade Trump, it could create new opportunities for South Korea. Since nuclear capabilities are an area where North Korea holds a strategic advantage, attempting to counter nuclear power with nuclear power may put us at a disadvantage. Instead, by focusing on North Korea’s weakness (i.e., its economic vulnerabilities) and adjusting our approach accordingly, there may be room for discussions on resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in a way that benefits both North and South Korea. Therefore, when engaging with Trump, who seeks to achieve a tangible outcome in North Korea-U.S. relations by striking a deal with North Korea, we should proactively propose mutually beneficial and cooperative policy measures rather than confrontational ones, and actively explore practical incentive strategies to ensure these proposals are accepted.