Resumption of North Korea-U.S. Talks and Promotion of Four-Party Talks:

Lessons from the 1993 North Korea-U.S. Talks and the 1996 Four-Party Talks

Hyun-ik Hong

Senior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute

Summary

■ Raising the Issue

  ❍ Currently, the Korean Peninsula is experiencing a critical and worsening security situation, where the hostile confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism has a significant potential to escalate into military conflict. The deepening mistrust and hostility between the two Koreas, combined with extreme willingness for direct confrontation, along with actions such as the ballooning of anti-North Korea leaflets and North Korea's countermeasures, have led to a pattern of reciprocal provocations. This situation is ripe for an accidental clash, with a lack of escalation prevention mechanisms or political will, creating a worst-case scenario where a second Korean War could break out without much surprise.

  ❍ "Furthermore, North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly advancing and expanding quantitatively, which increases the security risks for South Korea. Since the 2019 Hanoi North-U.S. Summit, efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue have effectively stalled, and the ongoing sanctions from the South Korean and U.S. governments, along with the international community, have inadvertently allowed North Korea's weapons of mass destruction to continue advancing without adequate response or restraint."

  ❍ In this context, the need for dialogue with North Korea is recognized as a breakthrough for easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. This involves examining the process of the 1993 North-U.S. talks and the 1996 four-party talks between North and South Korea, the U.S., and China, and extracting lessons from those historical precedents. Based on this, as North-U.S. talks seem more likely to resume with the second term of the Trump administration, there is an urgent need for South Korea to formulate a response strategy to protect and enhance its national interests, ensuring that Korea is not sidelined in the process. One potential course of action is the parallel resumption of the four-party talks and inter-Korean dialogues, which must be pursued as part of the diplomatic and security agenda.

  ❍ The North-U.S. talks will focus on the nuclear issue, while the four-party talks should be centered on building a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula. Hence, it is necessary for the North-U.S. talks, four-party talks, and inter-Korean talks to be held separately. The resumption of the Six-Party Talks, which would address the North Korean nuclear issue, is excluded from the initial proposals since both North Korea and the U.S. prefer bilateral talks. While it might be possible to consider a three-party meeting involving North, South, and the U.S. to negotiate a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, there is a risk that such talks could end up involving North Korea, the U.S., and China, making South Korea's inclusion less certain. Therefore, South Korea may need to take the initiative and propose the four-party talks as the first step.

■ Reasons for the suspension of dialogue with North Korea

  ❍ In 2018, through the efforts of the Moon Jae-in government, the inter-Korean summit was held, leading to the Singapore summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump, resulting in a four-point agreement. However, while Kim Jong-un implemented some of the agreements, President Trump neglected to follow through on the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, in September 2018, during his visit to Pyongyang, President Moon proposed new agreements between North Korea and the U.S., aiming to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility and ease sanctions on North Korea. However, in the Hanoi summit of February 2019, President Trump demanded further concessions, which Kim Jong-un rejected, and the summit ended without results. Afterward, in late June, a trilateral summit between the leaders of South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. took place at Panmunjom, during which Kim Jong-un strongly demanded the suspension of the U.S.-South Korea joint military drills. Despite this, the joint drills resumed on August 5, 2019, and subsequently, inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea-U.S. talks were suspended.

  ❍ The Biden administration, from North Korea's perspective, did not offer a genuine proposal but only made superficial statements indicating that "the door for dialogue with North Korea remains open." As a result, no North Korea-U.S. talks were held under the Biden administration.

  ❍ The Yoon Administration presented the so-called "Bold Initiative," but since it was based on conditional support for North Korea under the precondition of denuclearization, North Korea ignored it. In such a situation, where it is difficult to resume inter-Korean dialogue, the re-election of the Trump administration is expected, raising the possibility that North Korea may come to the table for either bilateral or multilateral talks. In this context, the processes of initiating North Korea-U.S. bilateral talks in 1993 and the successful formation of the 4-party talks in 1996 are examined.

■ The Outbreak of the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1993 and the North-U.S. Negotiations

  ❍ President Trump met with Kim Jong-un three times, and over 27 letters were exchanged between them. During the 2024 U.S. presidential election period, Trump emphasized that direct dialogue with Kim Jong-un would be beneficial for U.S. national interests, suggesting a significant possibility of holding North-U.S. talks or a summit.

  ❍ In this context, the lesson from the breakdown of the 1991 inter-Korean détente and the eventual success of the 1993 North-U.S. talks is worth examining.

  ❍ First, the breakdown of the active inter-Korean dialogues in 1991-1992 teaches that without a firm intention and effort by the South Korean government for peace, coexistence, and dialogue, progress is difficult. It also teaches that when North Korea shows willingness for dialogue, South Korea should not hesitate and should seize the opportunity.

  ❍ In 1993, when North Korea withdrew from the NPT, it was employing a brinkmanship strategy. This indicates that when North Korea is cornered and finds it difficult to escape, it resorts to a path of risk-taking. Additionally, when North Korea comes out with a resolve to face the ultimate consequences, South Korea and the U.S., who enjoy freedom and prosperity, must step up to resolve the crisis. Therefore, when strategically pressuring North Korea, it is wise to leave a way out for them.

  ❍ The success of the 1993 North-U.S. bilateral talks teaches us that when North Korea resorts to brinkmanship or the nuclear issue becomes a major concern, inter-Korean talks become difficult, and North-U.S. talks are more likely to proceed smoothly. North Korea fundamentally avoids military talks with South Korea, as it lacks Wartime Operational Control (OPCON). Therefore, in order to hold inter-Korean military talks, South Korea must swiftly regain operational control.

  ❍ The 1994 North-U.S. Geneva Agreement shows that negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. without inter-Korean dialogue are insufficient to fully protect South Korea's national interests. While the U.S. took sole credit for restoring peace on the Korean Peninsula, preserving the NPT regime, and securing leadership over the Korean Peninsula situation, South Korea had no voice in the agreement and ended up paying most of the ancillary costs without any significant influence.

■ The 1996 Four-Party Talks

  ❍ If North-South dialogue is severed and only North-U.S. talks are held, South Korea risks being sidelined, potentially ending up in a position where it is excluded from critical discussions (a situation known as “Tongmi-bongnam”, meaning “going through the U.S. and bypassing South Korea”). To prevent this, South Korea must secure its participation by proposing the resumption of multilateral negotiations that include all parties, including South Korea.

  ❍ Given that South Korea is the main party to issues of war prevention, tension reduction, and the restoration and establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula, it can actively propose the Four-Party Talks involving the four countries that participated in the Korean War (South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and China) as a framework for international talks aimed at peace on the Peninsula.

  ❍ In this context, we look at the process leading to the 1996 Four-Party Talks. On April 16, 1996, during the Korea-U.S. summit in Jeju, President Kim Young-sam of South Korea and President Bill Clinton of the U.S. proposed the Four-Party Talks (South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and China) to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. This proposal was realized through diplomatic efforts.

  ❍ Initially, the Clinton administration recognized the need for cooperation with China to prevent a war on the Korean Peninsula, uphold the 1994 Geneva Agreement, freeze North Korea's nuclear program, and halt the development of long-range missiles. This required some compromises, and the U.S. sought China's cooperation while accepting North Korea’s intransigence (stubborn refusal). While bilateral negotiations were ongoing between North Korea and the U.S. on issues like the return of American military remains, bilateral peace negotiations to establish a peace regime were not feasible at the time. However, when the Kim Young-sam government proposed the Four-Party Talks, both sides embraced the idea.

  ❍ In the 1990s, the U.S. pursued a strategy of cooperation with China to integrate it into a U.S.-led international order, while China aimed to maintain a friendly relationship with the U.S. and opposed North Korea's nuclear development. As part of this strategy, China participated in efforts to persuade North Korea to join the Four-Party Talks.

  ❍ Specifically, China played a significant role in the Six-Party Talks after their reinitiation in 2003. As the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula escalated, the differences between the U.S. and North Korea made it clear that, without mediation, there was no possibility for dialogue. China responded by sending Vice Premier Chen Zhili to North Korea on March 8, where he met with Kim Jong Il to convince him to participate in multilateral talks. Following this, after the North-China-U.S. trilateral meeting, China facilitated the first North-U.S. bilateral meeting. Later, under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, South Korea accepted the trilateral format and hosted several Korea-U.S. and Korea-China summits, which contributed to the eventual launch of the Six-Party Talks in 2003. The Six-Party Talks continued to play a central role in diplomatic efforts to address nuclear issues and maintain peace on the Peninsula.

  ❍ Meanwhile in 1996, North Korea agreed to participate in the Four-Party Talks while also holding bilateral talks with the United States. Ultimately, North Korea sought U.S. security guarantees and food aid through these negotiations. While North Korea was grappling with an unprecedented food crisis, it was engaged in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. However, the U.S. demanded that South-North talks take place first, which made it difficult to reach an agreement on the peace regime between North-U.S. talks. The crucial breakthrough came when the South Korean and U.S. presidents agreed that the peace regime would be discussed within the context of the Four-Party Talks, while other issues could be addressed through ongoing North-U.S. dialogue channels. This arrangement proved effective.

  ❍ Finally, the Kim Young-sam administration experienced a form of “Tongmi-bongnam” (a situation where South Korea was sidelined in favor of direct U.S.-North Korea negotiations) following the Geneva Framework Agreement. As Japan showed signs of providing food aid to North Korea, and with North-U.S. talks on the return of U.S. military remains underway and missile talks scheduled, South Korea found itself in an uncomfortable position. In response, as the April 11, 1996 general elections were approaching, President Clinton, who had initially planned to visit Japan, was persuaded to first visit Jeju. This visit ultimately resulted in the 2+2 format (inter-Korean talks first, China and the U.S. joining afterwards) being converted into the Four-Party Talks, which was jointly proposed by South Korea and the U.S.. In other words, the change from a 2+2 meeting to the Four-Party Talks was driven by domestic political considerations.

■ Policy Recommendations: Preparing for U.S.-North Korea Talks and Advancing the Four-Party Talks

  ❍ Since both inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea talks were suspended in 2009, the Biden administration and the Yoon Suk-yeol administration have not seriously pursued dialogue with North Korea. During this period, North Korea has significantly advanced its nuclear capabilities and rapidly developed a range of long-range missiles. As a result, the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula has become nearly unattainable. In particular, North Korea has repeatedly emphasized that it has no intention of negotiating over denuclearization, and inter-Korean dialogue channels have been completely severed, with mutual hostility only intensifying.

  ❍ In a situation where the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue is difficult, the possibility of U.S.-North Korea negotiations, which President-elect Trump has mentioned several times, is emerging, and an alternative could be to envision a multilateral negotiation. It is necessary to find a way to minimize diplomatic and security risks while maximizing national interests for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea talks. The resumption of multilateral talks should be pursued through coordination, considering the strategies of the related countries, with the goal of maximizing South Korea's national interests.

  ❍ If U.S.-North Korea talks are held without South Korea's participation, it could lead to a situation where South Korea is sidelined. Therefore, efforts should be made to hold inter-Korean dialogue, as well as 4-party or 6-party talks, either concurrently or sequentially. In other words, if the security of the Korean Peninsula is left solely to the U.S.-North Korea talks, there is a high likelihood that a compromise will be reached and concluded with the freezing of further nuclear development, the suspension of long-range missile development or testing, the implicit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the easing or lifting of sanctions, and the initiation of normalization talks between North Korea and the U.S. As a result, South Korea may find itself in an undesirable security dilemma. Therefore, the ultimate goal should be to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, establish a peace regime, and move toward peaceful reunification.

  ❍ Thus, in addition to U.S.-North Korea talks, 4-party talks and inter-Korean negotiations should be pursued in parallel, to restore mutual trust, establish military balance on the Korean Peninsula, achieve the denuclearization of North Korea, sign a peace agreement for the Korean Peninsula, normalize North Korea-U.S. relations, and promote inter-Korean economic cooperation.

Government Policy for Maintaining Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

  ❍ Historically, when the responsibility for tensions lay with North Korea, a hardline policy toward the North was effective. However, that is no longer the case today. Therefore, while maintaining a flawless national security posture, the government must demonstrate a genuine desire for peaceful coexistence with North Korea. We should avoid actions that undermine the fundamental principles of inter-Korean relations or provoke North Korea. This includes halting the dissemination of leaflets to the North and discontinuing loudspeaker broadcasts.

  ❍ Additionally, South Korea must expand and strengthen cooperation with regional countries. In particular, it is crucial to refrain from providing military support to Ukraine and prioritize the normalization of South Korea-China relations as an urgent matter.

Response Plan for the Resumption of North–U.S. Dialogue

  ❍ Even if Trump assumes office, the likelihood of immediate North–U.S. dialogue seems low. However, contrary to expectations, there is a possibility that North–U.S. relations could resume sooner than anticipated, so preparations are necessary.

  ❍ Trump achieved a victory in the U.S. presidential election, secured control of both the House and the Senate, and built a foreign and security team loyal to him, further emphasizing his personal influence. Additionally, Trump, with ambitions to win the Nobel Prize, sees compromise with North Korea as a strategic move to counter China. He has appointed Alex Wong, who was involved in previous North Korea-U.S. summits, as Deputy National Security Advisor. While Trump prefers direct diplomacy, it is also possible that President Putin could play a friendly mediating role in the process of North Korean troop withdrawal from Russia. Ultimately, the speed of resuming talks will depend on what Trump and Kim Jong-un propose as their respective goals and trade-offs. If Trump pursues not the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles but merely a suspension of testing or freezing of program, talks could easily resume. Similarly, if Trump shows willingness to tolerate North Korea’s de facto possession of nuclear weapons, talks could also progress smoothly. Trump is likely to raise issues such as the relaxation or lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, as he did during the Hanoi summit. If Kim Jong-un agrees, the talks could move forward quickly, but if North Korea insists on resolving various U.S. sanctions, the discussions may face delays.

  ❍ In anticipation of resumed North Korea-U.S. talks, South Korea should also prepare to restart or pave the way for inter-Korean dialogue. Above all, to engage in dialogue with North Korea, South Korea’s policy stance must shift dramatically toward reconciliation and cooperation, while actively expressing a willingness for peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation.

  ❍ The aspect of the August 15 Unification Doctrine that promotes the aspirations of North Korean residents for freedom-based society unification has significant potential for interference in domestic affairs and should be abandoned. On the international front, efforts to secure global support for a freely unified Korea must also demonstrate that the approach is not aimed at absorption unification.

  ❍ The "Bold Initiative" proposes economic support for North Korea on the condition of its commitment to denuclearization. To gain North Korea's positive response, this should be revised to offer economic support without linking it to denuclearization. Lastly, the issue of North Korean human rights should not be addressed in a way that criticizes or humiliates North Korea. Instead, it should be approached through inter-Korean dialogue, where South Korea can confidently demand improvements while providing appropriate economic rewards as incentives for better human rights conditions.

  ❍ Close South Korea-U.S. coordination is essential to ensure that South Korea's national interests are reflected in North Korea-U.S. talks. Furthermore, North Korea-U.S. dialogue should be connected to inter-Korean dialogue. Even if the talks take the form of arms reduction negotiations, the South Korean government must ensure through coordination with the U.S. that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is explicitly stated as the final goal in any agreement reached between North-U.S. talks.

  ❍ Issues related to U.S. Forces in Korea and the South Korea-U.S. alliance must be closely coordinated between the two countries. If the U.S. seeks significant changes to the status of U.S. troops in Korea or the alliance, negotiations and agreements must include options such as the temporary and conditional redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or South Korea’s potential development of its own nuclear capabilities.

  ❍ If North Korea-U.S. talks progress, a joint South Korea-U.S. investment in North Korea’s coastal tourism industry—an area of mutual interest for President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un—could be proposed. This could be linked to inter-Korean negotiations. If successful, the second phase could involve South and North Korea working together, with U.S. support, to develop industrial complexes in areas like Kaesong, Wonsan, Hamhung, and Rason.

  ❍ Efforts must be made to establish inter-Korean military and security dialogue. To achieve this, the swift transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) is crucial.

Multilateral Talks Resumption Plan

  ❍ China’s Xi Jinping Government

     - Since China played a decisive role in hosting the Six-Party Talks in 2003, it is worth considering persuading China to take the diplomatic initiative and lead the resumption of Four-Party Talks. However, if the Trump administration strongly excludes China's participation, an alternative approach could be pursued: first, a trilateral declaration of the end of the Korean War involving South Korea, North Korea, and the United States, followed by a second phase involving Four-Party Talks to discuss the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

  ❍ Trump’s 2nd Administration

     - One of the biggest obstacles to hosting Four-Party Talks is that the core objective of the U.S.'s global strategy is to contain and restrain China. In particular, President Trump is likely to oppose involving China in resolving Korean Peninsula issues, as he prefers bilateral talks and prioritizes China containment in his foreign policy. Therefore, if the U.S. strongly opposes China's participation, the possibility of Three-Party Talks should also be kept open.

     - A joint proposal by South Korea and the U.S., as in 1996, would be more effective. To persuade North Korea to accept it, the final goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea should be confirmed, but a comprehensive and all-at-once resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue should not be insisted upon. Since achieving complete denuclearization in a single push is practically impossible, a more realistic approach would be to advocate for a dual-track negotiation system. North Korea and the U.S. would discuss phased denuclearization, sanctions relief, and normalization of relations, while Four-Party Talks would focus on reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, building trust, arms control, and establishing a peace regime.

     - The South Korean government should not insist solely on Four-Party Talks. If it proves unfeasible, it should be prepared to leverage the momentum of resumed North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations to restart inter-Korean dialogue, negotiations, and economic cooperation.

  ❍ North Korea’s Kim Jong-un Regime

     - The South Korean government should persuade North Korea that South and North Korea continue to foster distrust, confrontation, and hostility between them, it will inevitably accelerate the strengthening of South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, increase the frequency of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises, and lead to more frequent deployments of U.S. strategic assets. This approach could even risk an accidental conflict escalating into a full-scale war between the two Koreas. Therefore, efforts should focus on reducing inter-Korean tensions, building mutual trust, achieving peaceful coexistence, and promoting mutually beneficial economic cooperation, which would also be in the interests of the North Korean regime.

     - Given that North Korea violated the Korean Peninsula denuclearization declaration by developing nuclear weapons, South Korea must strengthen extended deterrence through cooperation with the U.S. This necessity should be explained to North Korea. At the same time, North Korea can be persuaded to freeze further nuclear development, reduce mutual threats, and pursue mutual trust-building, as well as a balance of nuclear and conventional forces on the Korean Peninsula. Under this framework, it would be possible to resume North Korea-U.S. negotiations, Four-Party Talks, and inter-Korean dialogue.

  ❍ South Korea’s Yoon Administration

     - To persuade both the U.S. and North Korea to resume Four-Party Talks, it is ultimately realistic for South Korea to move away from the idealistic approach of achieving swift denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through a comprehensive and all-at-once resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Instead, a phased and comprehensive approach with intermediate steps should be adopted.

     - In North Korea-U.S. talks, the focus should be on freezing North Korea’s nuclear program and establishing a verification mechanism, while the U.S. eases UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea and begins normalizing U.S.-North Korea relations. Simultaneously, Four-Party Talks should aim to resume discussions on trust-building, arms control, and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korea-U.S. negotiations should incorporate a snapback clause to ensure North Korea’s compliance, allowing conditional easing of UN sanctions and fostering a peaceful atmosphere. South and North Korea should also reopen communication channels and resume dialogue and negotiations.

     - In North Korea-U.S. talks, the goal should advance toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, dismantling North Korea’s nuclear weapons, lifting sanctions on North Korea, and normalizing U.S.-North Korea relations. Four-Party Talks would focus on concluding a peace treaty. Concurrently, South and North Korea, in coordination with the U.S., should work toward a military balance agreement on the Korean Peninsula. This would go beyond peaceful coexistence, fostering mutually beneficial economic cooperation and forming a South-North economic community.​