Evaluation of North Korea-Russia Relations Following Chairman Kim Jong Un's Visit to Russia in 2023: Focus on Non-Military Sectors

Eun-ju Choi

Research Fellow, Sejong Institute​

Summary 

  ❍ The increasingly close relationship between North Korea and Russia, which began to gain visibility in 2023, was formalized in June 2024 when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea for the first time in 24 years. During this visit, a summit was held, and the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation" (hereafter referred to as the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty") was signed. The treaty includes plans and directions for cooperation not only in the military sector but also in various fields such as economics, science and technology, and socio-cultural exchange, indicating that comprehensive collaboration across all sectors between North Korea and Russia is expected.

  ❍ This extensive cooperation reflects the mutual interests of both countries. From Russia's perspective, strengthening ties with North Korea based on shared perceptions of international affairs could help construct a multipolar world order and expand its influence in Northeast Asia. Economically, cooperation with North Korea is also seen as beneficial for advancing the development of Russia's Far East region and implementing post-war economic policies, suggesting that collaboration will not be limited to military matters. For North Korea, closer ties with Russia provide an opportunity to pursue a new survival strategy following the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit 2019. It also creates conditions for breaking out of prolonged political, diplomatic, and economic isolation. As such, North Korea is expected to actively pursue comprehensive cooperation with Russia across various domains.

■ Elevation to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

  ❍ A notable highlight of the 2024 summit was the elevation of North Korea-Russia relations. During the summit, the "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation" signed in 2000 was replaced with the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty", thereby upgrading their relationship from friendly neighborliness to a comprehensive strategic partnership. This transformation in relations was foreshadowed by a column written by President Vladimir Putin, published in North Korean media before his visit, as well as an editorial welcoming Putin's visit published by North Korea. In his column, President Putin described the historical trajectory of North Korea-Russia relations and emphasized that the two countries are currently working to actively develop an "all-encompassing partnership." Similarly, the editorial in Rodong Sinmun, welcoming Putin’s visit, underscored the significance of transforming the "North Korea-Russia good neighborly friendship" into a higher-level relationship.

  ❍ This strengthening of ties is rooted in shared perceptions of and aspirations for the international situation, suggesting that it is less a reaction to short-term geopolitical shifts and more a foundation for a long-term cooperative relationship. From North Korea's perspective, the international order is clearly transitioning into a "new Cold War" with an accelerated trend toward multipolarity. As a result, its foreign policy is increasingly focused on deepening ties with its traditional allies, China and Russia. Meanwhile, Russia, in its pursuit of establishing a multipolar world order, is strengthening relations with non-Western countries, including North Korea, as part of its broader diplomatic strategy.

  ❍ The depth of this relationship is also reflected in the content of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. The treaty states that the new relationship between North Korea and Russia stems from a “shared aspiration to build future-oriented, inter-state relations for a new era” and confirms a “commitment to establish a multipolar international system.” Furthermore, Article 2 of the treaty explicitly stipulates that the two countries will maintain close communication through high-level summits and other dialogues and negotiations, while enhancing strategic and tactical cooperation. This provision institutionalizes communication channels, ensuring a robust mechanism for future collaboration.

■ Institutionalization of North Korea-Russia Exchange and Cooperation Projects

  ❍ While previous treaties and joint declarations between North Korea and Russia have stated intentions to pursue exchange and cooperation in various sectors, these agreements remained largely at a general level. In contrast, the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty" specifically outlines areas for cooperation in greater detail. This is further reflected in President Vladimir Putin’s article in Rodong Sinmun, where he emphasized the importance of activating exchanges in sectors such as science, tourism, culture, education, youth engagement, sports, and trade, indicating that sector-specific discussions had been conducted in advance. Since July 2023, personnel exchanges between North Korea and Russia have expanded significantly, encompassing not only the military sector but also areas such as economics, sports, local governance, youth engagement, culture, education, healthcare, and science and technology. It is believed that the general framework for these exchanges was included in the 2024-2025 Exchange Plan signed during the North Korea-Russia Foreign Ministers’ meeting in October 2023. The subsequent 10th Meeting of the Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation Commission likely further detailed sector-specific project plans, as outlined in the protocol signed at the meeting.

  ❍ The economic cooperation projects included in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty appear to reflect North Korea’s focus on economic recovery. Following the collapse of the North Korea-U.S. summit in Hanoi in 2019, North Korea announced a "frontal breakthrough strategy," signaling a shift away from relying on the normalization of U.S.-North Korea relations and the easing of international sanctions. Instead, North Korea declared its intent to overcome challenges independently. However, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, along with strict border closures, compounded the impact of existing sanctions, plunging North Korea’s economy into a three-year stagnation. Amid this search for solutions, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 prompted North Korea to strengthen its alignment with Russia. By doing so, North Korea sought to leverage partnerships with nations advocating for a multipolar world order, using this alignment as a foundation for economic recovery and growth.

  ❍ Although North Korea claimed significant economic achievements in 2023, the growing scope of its economic policies underscored the necessity of expanding external economic relations to sustain progress. Against this backdrop, the inclusion of commitments to broaden exchange and cooperation in the treaty reflects the alignment between Russia’s geopolitical interests and North Korea’s urgent need for economic recovery and development.

■ Expansion of North Korea-Russia Cooperation Projects and the Potential Undermining of UN Sanctions

  ❍ The exchange and cooperation projects that North Korea and Russia are expected to pursue in the future can be examined in five main aspects. First, there is a high likelihood of increased trade between North Korea and Russia. Although neither North Korea nor Russia currently publishes trade statistics, analysis from foreign institutions and statements from key Russian figures suggest that the scale of trade is showing signs of recovery. While trade between North Korea and Russia remains minimal compared to China, an expansion focusing on food and energy could play a significant role in North Korea's economic management.

  ❍ Second, infrastructure development projects are expected to proceed. In this regard, North Korea and Russia have signed an agreement to construct a bridge over the Tumen River, starting with building basic infrastructure necessary for expanded trade. Another notable aspect is the utilization of "peaceful nuclear energy" mentioned in the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty." At the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2021, North Korea announced plans to establish a nuclear power industry to address energy issues. Furthermore, during the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly held in January this year, Chairman Kim Jong Un mentioned the role of nuclear power plants as one of the solutions to energy problems in his policy speech. Therefore, there is a high likelihood of future discussions on nuclear energy cooperation with Russia in the power sector.

  ❍ Third, personnel exchanges, particularly the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia, are expected to increase. For North Korea, securing foreign currency is crucial for importing various goods under sanctions, and sending workers abroad is one of its primary methods of earning foreign currency. The international community has targeted this practice as a key focus of sanctions. For Russia, there is expected to be a growing demand for construction workers, not only for existing Far East development projects but also for post-war reconstruction projects. Moreover, due to labor shortages in the manufacturing sector caused by troop losses in the war with Ukraine, the demand for North Korean workers in Russia is likely to grow and diversify. If North Korea uses Russia as a channel to procure sanctioned materials and secure foreign currency through labor dispatch, the effectiveness of UN sanctions will inevitably be further weakened.

  ❍ Fourth, North Korea and Russia are likely to advance cooperation in science and technology. Since Kim Jong Un came to power, North Korea has emphasized "building a strong science and technology nation," focusing on advancements in cutting-edge science and technology across all sectors, especially the economy. While it has encouraged scientific and technological exchanges in foreign economic relations, sanctions have hindered tangible results. The treaty specifically mentions fields for exchange and joint research, such as space, biotechnology, and information technology, with space development being particularly noteworthy. Before the September 2023 summit, Russian President Putin expressed his active support for North Korea's space development projects. North Korea, for its part, has identified the launch and possession of military reconnaissance and practical satellites as immediate tasks, suggesting that cooperation in this area could proceed first.

  ❍ Fifth, participation in international and regional organizations has become more likely. The "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty" states that North Korea and Russia will support and cooperate with each other in joining international and regional organizations in which the other is a member. Recently, North Korea has consistently participated in international conferences and forums held in Russia. North Korea will likely join international organizations in which Russia is actively involved. Notable organizations include the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In 2024, North Korea attended the BRICS+ Sports Ministers’ Meeting at Russia's invitation, while Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui delivered speeches at the 4th Eurasian Women’s Forum and the 1st BRICS Women’s Forum. This indicates that North Korea may leverage participation in multilateral organizations to build networks in the international community. Furthermore, considering that BRICS has recently expanded its scope to address urgent global issues under a multilateral framework and approved the admission of Iran, a sanctioned country, the possibility of North Korea joining such organizations cannot be ruled out. If these developments materialize, North Korea could use strengthened cooperation with Russia as a means to procure sanctioned materials and secure foreign currency, thereby further weakening the impact of UN sanctions.

  ❍ In addition, exchanges between North Korea and regional areas, particularly Russia's Primorsky Krai, are expected to increase. Cooperation in the healthcare sector is also anticipated under the "Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Health, Medical Education, and Science", signed immediately after the June 2024 summit. Considering the healthcare situations in North Korea and Russia, it is likely that this cooperation will take the form of Russian support for North Korea’s healthcare sector.

  ❍ The issue lies in the fact that most of these cooperative projects violate international sanctions against North Korea. In terms of economic cooperation, exporting prohibited equipment or parts to North Korea, or supplying crude oil and refined oil products beyond set limits, are all considered violations of UN sanctions. Similarly, scientific and technological cooperation, with the exception of healthcare, is entirely banned when it involves North Korean entities. Consequently, the scope and scale of North Korea-Russia exchanges will likely depend on Russia's stance regarding international sanctions against North Korea.

  ❍ Russia's position on UN sanctions against North Korea has shown signs of change. Following the North Korea-Russia summit in September 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that cooperation with North Korea would proceed within the framework of international obligations and established rules, emphasizing adherence to UN sanctions. However, in an article published in Rodong Sinmun ahead of his 2024 visit to North Korea, Putin indicated plans to develop trade and mutual settlement systems outside Western control and jointly oppose unilateral and unlawful restrictions. This implies a potential willingness to challenge international sanctions on North Korea. While Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is unlikely to officially disregard UN sanctions, it is expected to adopt a more lenient approach compared to the past. This shift in Russia's stance could create more room for North Korea-Russia cooperation, even in areas that risk violating international sanctions.

■ Prospects for North Korea-Russia Relations through Exchange and Cooperation Projects

  ❍ From North Korea's perspective, the deepening ties with Russia should not only showcase military achievements internationally but also contribute substantially to addressing the country's pressing economic challenges domestically. Military achievements alone cannot lead to the "improvement in quality of life" for its citizens, which the regime consistently emphasizes. If North Korea and Russia expand economic exchange and cooperation beyond the limited levels dictated by international sanctions, North Korea could achieve significant economic outcomes. 

  ❍ The treaty specifically addresses critical issues such as food, energy, climate change, natural disasters, and healthcare, all of which have posed substantial challenges to North Korea’s economy in recent years. Concrete cooperation with Russia in these areas could open pathways for resolving fundamental economic issues. In the short term, such cooperation could help stabilize the economy and secure resources essential for implementing economic policies. For instance, North Korea might procure materials and equipment necessary for its Five-Year Economic Development Plan (2021-2025) and its "maintenance and reinforcement strategy." If these resources are secured, it could mark the first successful completion of an economic development plan under Kim Jong Un’s leadership.

  ❍ However, the critical question remains whether the treaty's contents will be effectively implemented. Since renaming the "North Korea-Russia Economic Joint Committee" to the "North Korea-Russia Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation Committee" in 1992, the two countries have held ten meetings up to November 2023, discussing and deciding on various cooperative projects. Nonetheless, many of the agreed projects have not been realized due to North Korea's nuclear issues, international sanctions, and delays in Russia’s Far East development projects.

  ❍ Despite this precedent, several factors suggest that the likelihood of implementation has improved compared to the past. Changes in international political dynamics, shared strategic interests, and advanced discussions leading up to the treaty indicate stronger feasibility. Furthermore, many of the projects included in the treaty had already been under discussion between North Korea and Russia since last year, marking a departure from past practices. The treaty also includes conditions for suspension but is set to remain in force indefinitely, signaling a greater commitment than previous agreements.

  ❍ For sustained development of economic cooperation, participating economic actors must have strong expectations of financial gains. However, given the relatively non-complementary economic structures of North Korea and Russia, voluntary participation by companies and institutions may face limitations. This underscores the need for proactive governmental support from both sides to lay the groundwork for economic activities and cooperation.

  ❍ While the prospects for North Korea-Russia cooperation are more promising than in the past, unresolved constraints remain. For early successes in cooperation, active support from both governments is essential. Moreover, as international political dynamics and the interests of North Korea and Russia evolve, the level and scope of their exchange and cooperation may be subject to adjustment.

■ Possibility of Deepening North Korea-China-Russia Relations

  ❍ The growing closeness between North Korea and Russia has raised questions about the stance of China, a key diplomatic partner for both nations. Opinions are divided: some argue that China may not welcome the strengthening of North Korea-Russia ties, while others believe that the current trend of bloc formation could lead to enhanced North Korea-China-Russia cooperation. From China’s perspective, closer North Korea-Russia relations could be burdensome. However, some aspects could ease China’s burden. In May, following a summit, China and Russia issued a joint statement agreeing to deepen their strategic partnership, underscoring a focus on cooperation rather than competition. This indicates that China is likely to tolerate closer ties between North Korea and Russia as long as these relations do not trigger a regional crisis. Additionally, due to the constraints imposed by UN sanctions on North Korea, China has faced challenges in expanding exchange and cooperation projects with North Korea to the level that Pyongyang desires. In this context, an increase in North Korea-Russia exchange and cooperation activities could serve to alleviate some of China’s burden.

  ❍ Meanwhile, reports in Chinese and Japanese media have highlighted references in the China-Russia joint statement to Chinese vessels navigating the Tumen River, as well as Russia’s expression of support for constructive discussions between China and North Korea on related issues. Given these developments, economic cooperation projects among North Korea, China, and Russia—centered on border regions and aligned with shared interests—appear increasingly likely, at least at a preliminary level. In essence, as long as such cooperative efforts remain within the boundaries of international sanctions, North Korea, China, and Russia may pursue loose but mutually beneficial consultations and collaborative initiatives reflecting their shared interests.​