North Korean Labor Dispatch to Russia: Current Issues and Prospects

Andrei Lankov

andreilankov@gmail.com

Visiting Research Fellow

Sejong Institute

1. Introduction

In 2024, relations between Russia and North Korea entered an unprecedented phase of cooperation. The renewal of their military alliance treaty, the dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia, and Pyongyang’s large-scale arms sales dramatically reshaped both the geopolitical landscape and the character of bilateral relations. These developments fueled widespread speculation that economic cooperation—previously minimal—might be revived and significantly expanded.

Yet historical experience suggests caution. For more than seventy years, North Korea and Russia have rarely been natural trading partners. Their bilateral trade has generally been sustained only when Moscow was willing to provide subsidies for political or strategic reasons. The DPRK produces few goods of genuine interest to the Russian market, and in the absence of such subsidies, most ventures have quickly collapsed.

One notable exception to the generally limited economic interaction has been the dispatch of North Korean labor. Since 1946, hundreds of thousands of DPRK citizens have worked in the Soviet Union and, later, in Russia—primarily in logging and construction. This arrangement has proven uniquely durable because it generates mutual benefits without the need for subsidies. Russia secures a steady supply of inexpensive and disciplined labor; the DPRK acquires much-needed hard-currency revenues; and the workers themselves, despite being subject to exploitation, earn incomes far exceeding those available domestically.

In the current context, characterized by wartime labor shortages in Russia, tough Western sanctions, and deteriorating ties with traditional migrant-sending Muslim states in Central Asia, demand for North Korean labor is rapidly increasing. Pyongyang, despite concerns about potential ideological “contamination,” appears prepared to expand dispatch to levels unprecedented in decades. Such an expansion carries significant implications: reinforcing the Kim regime’s financial base, reshaping labor dynamics within Russia, and complicating South Korea’s long-term strategic considerations.

2. Historical Evolution of Dispatch

Early Period (1946–1965): fishing, individual recruitment

The first North Korean workers were dispatched to the Soviet Union in 1946, prior to the formal establishment of the DPRK. Recruitment during this early stage was conducted on a voluntary basis: individuals applied directly through Soviet offices operating in North Korean cities. Once in the USSR, these workers received wages equivalent to those of Soviet citizens and were under no obligation to remit part of their income to Pyongyang.

This early cohort enjoyed considerable autonomy. They lived in dormitories alongside Soviet workers, frequently changed employers, and in some cases even secured housing privately. In practice, they were regarded less as “foreign laborers” than as part of the broader Soviet workforce. Although dispatches during the 1950s were modest in scale and irregular in frequency, they nonetheless established a precedent for a practice that would, in subsequent decades, become highly institutionalized and tightly controlled by the North Korean state.

Centralized System (1966–1990): logging camps

In 1966, Moscow and Pyongyang signed a new agreement that reshaped the system. The DPRK government assumed full control over worker selection and monitoring, and thousands were dispatched to logging camps across Siberia and the Russian Far East. These camps were states-within-state, under the full control of the North Korean authorities, known for strict surveillance.

At any given time, between 15,000 and 30,000 North Koreans were employed in the Soviet Union, almost exclusively in the logging industry. Although wages were officially paid in rubles, they were channeled through Pyongyang, leaving workers with only 20–30 percent of what their Soviet counterparts received. Even so, these earnings remained far higher than what could be obtained in the DPRK, making such positions highly sought after.

This model transformed labor dispatch into a reliable source of foreign exchange for the DPRK, while providing Moscow with much-needed manpower in its most remote and sparsely populated regions.

Post-Soviet Transformation (1990s–2010s): contract system and construction

The collapse of the USSR destroyed most forms of bilateral economic cooperation, but labor dispatch persisted. As the Russian Far East rapidly depopulated after 1991, demand for foreign workers grew stronger. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the end of Soviet aid and the severe economic crisis of the 1990s made overseas remittances more important than ever.

By the mid-2010s, more than 30,000 DPRK citizens were working in Russia. Unlike the Soviet-era focus on logging, most were now employed in construction (about 80%), with smaller numbers in manufacturing and logging. Women also began participating, particularly in factory work—a striking departure from earlier DPRK restrictions on female overseas employment.

During this period, the “contract system” emerged. Instead of state-run camps, small brigades of five to twenty workers, led by a foreman, contracted directly with Russian employers. These brigades negotiated wages, arranged their own housing, and managed food and clothing independently.

This semi-autonomous model provided workers with more flexibility and greater earnings potential. However, they were still required to remit monthly quotas (“plan funds”) to DPRK authorities. Initially about one-third of income, by the late 2010s these quotas often consumed half of expected earnings. While the system incentivized productivity, it also encouraged chronic overwork and heightened risks of industrial accidents.

3. The Economics of Dispatch

Workers’ Incomes and Use of Savings

Workers typically remain abroad for three to five years, though longer stays are possible. While they are entitled to unpaid home leave, few can afford the lost income or travel expenses, so most continue working without interruption until their contracts expire.

In the 2010s, North Korean workers generally saved around $1,500 per year. With recent wartime wage inflation in Russia, this figure has likely increased. On average, returnees accumulate $5,000–6,000 after three to four years of work—enough to launch a small business.

Upon returning to North Korea, workers frequently invest their savings in entrepreneurial ventures such as market stalls, kiosks, restaurants, or fishing boats. For families of ordinary social background, overseas employment is one of the few available paths into the country’s emerging entrepreneurial class. Savings are also commonly used for healthcare expenses, children’s education, or real estate purchases.

State Revenues

For the North Korean government, monthly obligatory payments represent the most important source of revenue from labor dispatch. Documents from 2022 indicated that workers were required to remit $6,500 over an eight-month period, implying annual obligations of roughly $9,000–10,000 per person.

According to UN Security Council reports, North Korea’s overseas labor exports generate more than $500 million annually. Of the estimated 100,000 workers abroad, some 30,000 were based in Russia before sanctions were tightened.

If Russia were to host 100,000 North Korean workers, Pyongyang’s revenues could exceed $1 billion each year. Indirect contributions are also significant: workers’ personal savings, when repatriated and reinvested domestically, could add another $200 million or more to the national economy.

4. Political Dimensions of Dispatch

Recruitment and Bribery

Being selected as a worker is highly competitive. Candidates must be deemed politically reliable, and priority is usually given to married men with children—since families left behind serve as a form of hostage to discourage defection. Residents of Pyongyang also enjoy preferential access.

Medical and technical examinations are mandatory, but in practice bribes often determine the outcome. In the 2010s, the average bribe was about $400 for a posting to Russia, compared to $200 for China and $500 for Middle Eastern countries. These payments were distributed among managers, security officials, and examiners involved in the selection process.

Worker Experiences and Consciousness

The Russian experience profoundly alters the worldview of North Korean workers. They observe:

- A country that abandoned socialism yet achieved prosperity under market conditions.

- Living standards that far surpass the claims of DPRK propaganda.

- A level of personal freedom greater than in China or North Korea, despite Russia’s own drift toward harsher authoritarian control.

Many workers secretly purchase smartphones, even though it is explicitly forbidden. Typically, they keep a basic phone for use under the supervision of North Korean overseers and a second device for private internet access, including South Korean news sites and television programs. Although Pyongyang formally bans such activities, enforcement in Russia remains weak.

As a result, dispatched workers constitute one of the few groups in North Korea with sustained exposure to global realities. Their experiences generate a subtle but meaningful flow of outside information back into North Korean society.

Russian Authorities’ Views

Russian employers, officials, and the general public usually view DPRK laborers favorably. They are regarded as disciplined, non-violent, and temporary. Unlike many Central Asian migrants, they rarely contribute to social unrest or appear in crime statistics.

This perception intensified after several terrorist incidents involving Central Asian extremists, most notably the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, which killed 149 people. By contrast, North Koreans are considered politically safe.

Such a reputational advantage has reinforced their position as a preferred source of foreign labor in Russia.

5. Sanctions, War, and Revival of Dispatch

UN Ban and Early Compliance

UN Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017) required all DPRK workers abroad to return home by December 2019. Russia initially complied, reducing the number of workers to around 10,000.

Pandemic Disruptions

The COVID-19 pandemic soon disrupted this process. Pyongyang ordered all citizens to return home, but many were stranded abroad. Roughly 5,000 remained in Russia, where employers welcomed their continued presence.

Ukraine War and Strategic Reversal

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine fundamentally changed Moscow’s calculus. Confronted with Western sanctions and severe labor shortages, Russia deepened its ties with Pyongyang. By 2023, North Korean arms exports to Russia had become routine.

At the 2024 Putin–Kim summit, the two leaders signed a new treaty that included provisions for a military alliance. This, in turn, accelerated labor cooperation. North Korean workers no longer received official work visas but instead entered Russia on student visas. In 2024, nearly 8,000 arrived under this arrangement.

By mid-2025, the number of DPRK workers in Russia had risen to about 15,000. Reports indicated plans for an additional 5,000 construction troops and 1,000 deminers to be deployed in Kursk, tasked with rebuilding areas retaken from Ukraine.

Future Prospects

Russia’s demand for cheap, reliable labor is immense. In 2022–23, an estimated 3–3.5 million foreign workers were active in the country, accounting for roughly 4–4.5 percent of the total workforce.

Many of these migrants came from politically sensitive regions, above all, the Muslim states of Central Asia. This makes North Korean workers, obedient, non-political, non-violent an attractive substitute from Moscow’s perspective.

While North Korea cannot supply labor on the scale of millions, it could plausibly provide between 100,000 and 150,000 workers. Political loyalty screening and domestic labor demands will place limits on this number. Even so, such an expansion could generate around $1 billion annually for Pyongyang, cementing labor export as one of its most profitable sources of foreign exchange.

6. Implications for South Korea and the International Community

Negative Dimensions

- Financing the Regime: Labor dispatch provides a steady flow of hard currency, reinforcing regime stability and supporting nuclear weapons programs.
- Undermining Sanctions: Russia’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions erodes the UNSC authority and weakens broader non-proliferation efforts.
- Human Rights Abuses: Workers face coercion, surveillance, unsafe conditions —far removed from international labor standards. 

Positive Dimensions

- Information Inflows: Workers in Russia gain access to South Korean media and other outside sources. Amid tightened DPRK–China border controls, they may now represent the single most 

  important channel of external information into North Korea.
- Marketization: Workers’ savings, when reinvested in businesses upon return, help accelerate the spread of market-oriented practices within the DPRK.
- Increasing living standards: North Korean workers use money they earn overseas to significantly improve their and their families’ living standards.

Policy Recommendations for Seoul

- Human Rights Advocacy: Prioritize worker safety over narrow sanctions compliance, pressing Moscow to enforce its own labor laws and safety standards.

- Information Outreach: Use broadcasts, digital platforms, and indirect communication channels to reach DPRK workers inside Russia.

- Support for the Contract System: Encourage arrangements that allow workers greater autonomy and more opportunities for exposure to outside information.

7. Conclusion

Labor dispatch to Russia is one of the DPRK’s few consistently successful international economic ventures. Despite sanctions, pandemics, and political upheaval, it has persisted for nearly eight decades.

Russia’s wartime labor shortages and estrangement from the West guarantee growing demand for North Korean workers. Pyongyang, cautious but pragmatic, is likely to expand supply. For Moscow, DPRK laborers are politically safe and economically useful; for the Kim regime, they represent a billion-dollar annual lifeline; for workers, they provide rare opportunities for capital accumulation and exposure to the outside world.

For South Korea, this reality is double-edged. On one hand, dispatch finances the DPRK’s military and nuclear ambitions, undermining denuclearization. On the other, it seeds long-term social change by exposing tens of thousands of North Koreans to external information and market practices.