Sejong Policy Studies

Factors in determining Kim Jong-un's policy toward South Korea: Continuation and Change

Date 2021-12-08 View 890

The Kim Jong-un administration's policy toward South Korea has been affected by South Korea's policy toward North Korea and criticism of the North Korean regime, international sanctions against North Korea, relationship with the U.S., COVID-19, South Korea-U.S. joint exercises, and declaration of the end of the war. The biggest impact on North Korea's policy toward South Korea is whether North Korea will accept the advancement of its nuclear capabilities and denuclearize its nuclear program. The next biggest factor was North Korea's stance on joint military exercises with the U.S. and South Korea's military buildup.

 

Since the Kim Jong-un administration, North Korea's policy toward South Korea has fluctuated between hard-line and soft-line policies in a short period of time. Even during the Kim Jong Il era, South Korea's policies fluctuated between hard and soft policies, but they did not change as quickly as during the Kim Jong-un era. The Kim Jong-un administration changed from a hard-line policy to a super-soft policy, but now is pursuing a policy of neglect during the Moon Jae In administration, unlike the Park Geunhye administration. Although the Moon Jae In administration is not hostile to North Korea, it is considered to be disappointing that the Moon administration does not accept North Korea's demands or wishes (such as suspension of joint military exercises and arms buildup, and restart of the Kaesong Industrial Complex).

 

The Kim Jong-un administration regards the joint exercise as the most intensive expression of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea and a violation of the inter-Korean agreement. It has been demanded that the South Korean government stop the exercise. However, it is difficult for South Korea and the U.S. to accept the suspension of joint exercises without progress in denuclearization. If North Korea agrees to freeze its nuclear program and reduce its nuclear program in stages, South Korea and the U.S. will have to accept the suspension of joint exercises. Although the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise is said to be defensive, it is necessary to consider that South Korea ranks sixth in the world in military power without nuclear weapons and that North Korea ranks 28th according to Global Fire Power.

 

The South Korean government should actively promote a 4-party summit or high-level talks between the two Koreas, the U.S., and China to discuss freezing and denuclearizing North Korea's nuclear program, suspending joint military exercises, inter-Korean arms control, declaring the end of war, and establishing a peace regime. Therefore, comprehensive development of inter-Korean relations can only be achieved if North Korea denuclearizes and establishes a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

 

While pursuing dialogue with North Korea, the South Korean government should prepare for the failure of denuclearization negotiations and North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. The South Korean government should establish a strategic headquarters that integrates the command and operation of land, navy, and air force missiles to support the transfer of wartime operational control and establish strategies and systems that can effectively respond to North Korea's nuclear and missiles.

 

The COVID-19 pandemic has also become a major factor in the difficulty of resuming inter-Korean dialogue. Therefore, the South Korean government should cooperate with the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia to restore dialogue with North Korea by providing COVID-19 vaccines that can be inoculated at least twice, treatments, facilities, and diagnostic kits. Moreover, South Korea should persuade North Korea to accept video reunions and face-to-face reunions by cooperating with the North in confirming the lives of separated families and exchanging letters. If trust between the two Koreas and the U.S. is established in the process, it should be used as an opportunity for North Korea to participate in denuclearization negotiations again.