This paper seeks to examine whether the foreign strategy of the Yoon Suk-yeol government, which prioritizes values and ideology and differentiates its posture according to the systemic character of counterpart states, is more appropriate than a pragmatic diplomacy that, unconstrained by the system or ideology of counterpart states, focuses on achieving South Korea's core national interests such as national security, economic development, and peaceful reunification. To this end, the paper reviews and analyzes the foreign strategies of three major powers, namely the United States, China, and India, whose superior national capabilities relative to South Korea allow them to pursue their own objectives with comparatively greater ease, and uses this analysis to assess the orientation of South Korea's foreign strategy.

Under the newly emerging neo-Cold War international order that has taken shape following the outbreak of the Ukraine War, major powers have likewise pursued foreign policies aimed at maximizing the achievement of their diverse national strategic objectives. This paper examines the diplomatic strategies of the United States, China, and India, each of which holds a different understanding of the Ukraine War, is actively engaged in national strategic competition and cooperation, and presents itself as the leading power of one of the three constituent groupings of the international order, namely democratic states, authoritarian states, and Global South states. By studying these cases, the paper examines the foreign policies of these major states as they have pursued diverse and at times mutually contradictory foreign policy objectives, and draws implications for the orientation of South Korea's national foreign strategy.

Turning first to the Biden administration's strategy toward China, its core elements included strengthening alliances and mobilizing them as fully as possible to counterbalance China, investing in United States military power and economic resilience, pursuing international value-based solidarity to form supply chains that exclude China and other authoritarian states, imposing export controls on advanced technology to China, maintaining the position that United States national security is non-negotiable, and sustaining a G2 relationship favorable to the United States while communicating with China for the purposes of crisis management. On matters deemed essential for advancing the common interests of the United States and humanity, the two sides were to cooperate, while direct confrontation or conflict was to be avoided, potential crises managed in advance through communication, and China constrained to the maximum extent possible from keeping pace with the United States, with containment pursued in concert with value-sharing nations.

As the United States advanced the banner of democracy, freedom, and human rights in pursuing a value-based coalition to counterbalance China, China in turn raised the banner of global development, common security, and civilization as it set about building international solidarity. Where the United States has sought to divide the world into blocs and championed the advancement of technological and economic interests within the democratic camp alone, China has countered the United States global strategy by advancing the banner of shared human development, common security, and the promotion of civilization, while ultimately seeking to realize the Chinese Dream. The Xi Jinping government has characterized the United States global strategy as a divisive, Cold War style national egoism, while firmly maintaining its posture of unification with Taiwan, building a strategic partnership with Russia to counter United States assertiveness, and pursuing all-directional cooperative diplomacy to forge solidarity with friendly states and promote the construction of a multipolar world order, thereby focusing its efforts on creating an international environment conducive to the development of China's national power toward superpower status. China has also pursued a strategy of building strategic common ground with India and strengthening bilateral ties, while seeking at minimum to induce India to maintain strategic neutrality. 

India is pursuing a finely calibrated pragmatic diplomacy aimed at maximizing its national interests in order to emerge as the second or third most powerful state in the world by 2050. It has declined to participate in sanctions against Russia, purchasing large quantities of crude oil to stabilize domestic fuel prices and exporting the surplus for considerable economic gain, while participating in the Quad to enjoy preferential partner status and a range of benefits from the United States. Although India is engaged in competition with China, including border clashes, it promotes mutually beneficial economic interests, minimizes conflict with China through membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS and through trilateral diplomatic consultations among China, Russia, and India, and advances cooperation in areas where interests align, including the pursuit of a multipolar world order. Where the United States seeks to exclude China from the Indo-Pacific region, India aims to build inclusive regional institutions in which all states participate. India also maintains strategic autonomy, presents itself as the leading voice of Global South nations, and seeks to serve as a bridge between developing and developed countries. This may aptly be characterized as an all-directional pragmatic cooperative diplomacy.

Taken together, an overall assessment of the foreign strategies of the United States, China, and India reveals that these major powers pursue a balanced diplomacy of practical interest maximization, prioritizing national security above all else, seeking economic development and the enhancement of national power, mobilizing diverse diplomatic and security instruments, and at the same time advancing appropriate justifications to legitimize their policies and enhance their external persuasiveness, while minimizing the drain on national resources.

The United States leverages its overwhelming military power, overseas force projection capabilities, and diverse alliances to steer the global security order in a direction favorable to its own interests. It absorbs international criticism while utilizing the dollar based monetary system to overcome domestic economic crises, actively employs sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy, and pursues human rights centered diplomacy despite controversy over the application of double standards toward pro-American and anti-American states. When human rights and practical interests come into conflict, however, practical interests are generally accorded priority.

China refrains from projecting military power overseas and instead focuses on securing sea control in its near seas and blocking the approach of United States naval vessels, while simultaneously accelerating the construction of aircraft carriers and aspiring to build a blue water navy. In diplomacy, it cooperates with Russia, selectively utilizes its veto power in the United Nations, and mobilizes multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It has, however, drawn criticism from the West for wolf warrior diplomacy and sharp power influence operations. China in particular leverages its position as the world's leading trading nation, its status as the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and its possession of an enormous domestic market as instruments of diplomacy. Although it is a single party communist state, it exercises maximum restraint in proIndia avoids direct confrontation with China over territorial disputes and similar issues while devoting its full efforts to defending its territory, securing military superiority over Pakistan, and leveraging its traditional cooperative relationship with Russia to strengthen its defense capabilities. It also reinforces its status as a nuclear power by aligning with United States strategy and expanding defense industry cooperation. Through all-directional cooperative diplomacy, India is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, participating in the Quad, advancing cooperation with Japan and ASEAN, and seeking to counterbalance Pakistan and China. It avoids direct confrontation with China over territorial disputes while pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation in diplomacy and economics, including participation in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation led by China and Russia, and in trilateral summits and foreign ministerial meetings among China, India, and Russia, whenever such engagement serves the advancement of national interests. Drawing on its past role as the leading voice of the Non-Aligned Movement, India also seeks to enjoy a special status as an intermediary between developed and developing countries. Furthermore, leveraging its advantage as the world's most populous country and its enormous domestic market, India is making concerted efforts to attract Western capital departing from China. It also utilizes its strategic ties with the United States to maintain defense industry cooperation with Russia while importing large quantities of oil and coal at low prices and re-exporting a portion for economic gain.

Taken together, although strategic competition between the United States and China has intensified, the conflict between Russia and the West has sharpened as a result of the Ukraine War, and the Israel-Gaza war has heightened bloc-based confrontation and militarization within the global order, major powers continue to pursue national strategies aimed at advancing their practical interests. Biden's America may appear to be conducting values-centered diplomacy under the banner of freedom and human rights, communist China pragmatic diplomacy emphasizing regime security and economic interests, and India non-aligned all-directional friendly pragmatic diplomacy, but in reality pragmatic pursuit of national interest is the central axis of diplomacy for all three states. All three emphasize their respective values as normative justifications in diplomacy, but their actual conduct of foreign affairs seeks to maximize practical gains by pursuing interests as broadly and comprehensively as possible, maintaining balance rather than tilting in any single direction.

By contrast, the Yoon Suk-yeol government, since taking office, appears to have implemented values and ideology based diplomacy literally, as befitting its self-perception as a middle power, while neglecting the advancement of practical interests and conducting a diplomacy that has yielded little substantive benefit. In other words, the Yoon government's national strategy has placed excessive weight on ideology and values, neglected the importance of achieving national cohesion and self-strengthening domestically, disproportionately prioritized relations with the United States and Japan as like-minded value-sharing partners, engaged in frontal confrontation with North Korea at the cost of national resources, and worsened relations with China and Russia, thereby not merely failing to prevent the formation of a new Cold War structure around the Korean Peninsula but actively contributing to it. This raises the concern that South Korea is failing to maximize its national interests. If even the superpower United States and major states such as China and India conduct pragmatic diplomacy, it stands to reason that a South Korea on the threshold of advanced country status will find it difficult to effectively and efficiently pursue ideological diplomacy.

In particular, focusing exclusively on strengthening South Korea-U.S.-Japan security coordination rather than cultivating friendly relations with all neighboring states contributes to the reorganization of the regional environment around the Korean Peninsula into a new Cold War bloc confrontation structure, and risks reducing South Korea's strategic standing to that of a frontline outpost exposed to sacrifice at the vanguard of the new Cold War. The fact that a peninsular state can derive enormous benefit as a bridge state when continental and maritime powers are in a cooperative relationship, but risks becoming a proxy battleground between those powers when they are in an adversarial relationship, underscores the need to correct this bias. Furthermore, while the Yoon government improved Japan-South Korea relations through unilateral concessions, the Japanese government did not shift its position in a forward-looking direction on any pending issue, resulting in what effectively amounted to a one-sided diplomacy of unconditional give-away.

North Korea must be watched without the slightest lapse in vigilance, yet it is also capable of serving as a partner in mutually beneficial inter-Korean economic cooperation and as a counterpart in the pursuit of peaceful reunification. The Yoon government, however, has treated North Korea solely as a dictatorial regime that oppresses our compatriots and a hypothetical enemy capable of launching an all-out attack at any moment, criticizing and condemning the North Korean regime's misrule and emphasizing an adversarial confrontational posture above all else. As a result, even the possibility of normalizing or improving inter-Korean relations is disappearing, and North Korea has been reduced to nothing more than a target for security deterrence and retaliation against provocation. Drawing the implication from the United States, which cooperates with its hypothetical adversary China on matters where national interests align, maintains communication channels to prevent the emergence of crisis situations, and employs South Korea, Japan, AUKUS, U.S.-Japan-Philippines-Australia security cooperation, and the Quad as instruments of indirect counterbalancing rather than expending its own national power in direct confrontation, South Korea too should resume dialogue with North Korea, cooperate where cooperation is possible, and maintain a watertight security posture. It is wise to continue calling for dialogue and consistently expressing the willingness to provide humanitarian assistance in order to reduce North Korea's hostility toward the South and manage its incentives for provocation, and to pursue mutually beneficial inter-Korean economic cooperation to minimize the costs of division and advance the interests of South Korean enterprises. It is also urgently necessary to strengthen friendly relations with China and Russia, which serve as North Korea's patrons, in order to check excessive North Korean provocation or military adventurism.

With roughly half of its term remaining, the government should promptly restore a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy orientation in order to more reliably guarantee national security, advance economic development, and lay the groundwork for peaceful reunification.​India avoids direct confrontation with China over territorial disputes and similar issues while devoting its full efforts to defending its territory, securing military superiority over Pakistan, and leveraging its traditional cooperative relationship with Russia to strengthen its defense capabilities. It also reinforces its status as a nuclear power by aligning with United States strategy and expanding defense industry cooperation. Through all-directional cooperative diplomacy, India is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, participating in the Quad, advancing cooperation with Japan and ASEAN, and seeking to counterbalance Pakistan and China. It avoids direct confrontation with China over territorial disputes while pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation in diplomacy and economics, including participation in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation led by China and Russia, and in trilateral summits and foreign ministerial meetings among China, India, and Russia, whenever such engagement serves the advancement of national interests. Drawing on its past role as the leading voice of the Non-Aligned Movement, India also seeks to enjoy a special status as an intermediary between developed and developing countries. Furthermore, leveraging its advantage as the world's most populous country and its enormous domestic market, India is making concerted efforts to attract Western capital departing from China. It also utilizes its strategic ties with the United States to maintain defense industry cooperation with Russia while importing large quantities of oil and coal at low prices and re-exporting a portion for economic gain.

Taken together, although strategic competition between the United States and China has intensified, the conflict between Russia and the West has sharpened as a result of the Ukraine War, and the Israel-Gaza war has heightened bloc-based confrontation and militarization within the global order, major powers continue to pursue national strategies aimed at advancing their practical interests. Biden's America may appear to be conducting values-centered diplomacy under the banner of freedom and human rights, communist China pragmatic diplomacy emphasizing regime security and economic interests, and India non-aligned all-directional friendly pragmatic diplomacy, but in reality pragmatic pursuit of national interest is the central axis of diplomacy for all three states. All three emphasize their respective values as normative justifications in diplomacy, but their actual conduct of foreign affairs seeks to maximize practical gains by pursuing interests as broadly and comprehensively as possible, maintaining balance rather than tilting in any single direction.

By contrast, the Yoon Suk-yeol government, since taking office, appears to have implemented values and ideology based diplomacy literally, as befitting its self-perception as a middle power, while neglecting the advancement of practical interests and conducting a diplomacy that has yielded little substantive benefit. In other words, the Yoon government's national strategy has placed excessive weight on ideology and values, neglected the importance of achieving national cohesion and self-strengthening domestically, disproportionately prioritized relations with the United States and Japan as like-minded value-sharing partners, engaged in frontal confrontation with North Korea at the cost of national resources, and worsened relations with China and Russia, thereby not merely failing to prevent the formation of a new Cold War structure around the Korean Peninsula but actively contributing to it. This raises the concern that South Korea is failing to maximize its national interests. If even the superpower United States and major states such as China and India conduct pragmatic diplomacy, it stands to reason that a South Korea on the threshold of advanced country status will find it difficult to effectively and efficiently pursue ideological diplomacy.

In particular, focusing exclusively on strengthening South Korea-U.S.-Japan security coordination rather than cultivating friendly relations with all neighboring states contributes to the reorganization of the regional environment around the Korean Peninsula into a new Cold War bloc confrontation structure, and risks reducing South Korea's strategic standing to that of a frontline outpost exposed to sacrifice at the vanguard of the new Cold War. The fact that a peninsular state can derive enormous benefit as a bridge state when continental and maritime powers are in a cooperative relationship, but risks becoming a proxy battleground between those powers when they are in an adversarial relationship, underscores the need to correct this bias. Furthermore, while the Yoon government improved Japan-South Korea relations through unilateral concessions, the Japanese government did not shift its position in a forward-looking direction on any pending issue, resulting in what effectively amounted to a one-sided diplomacy of unconditional give-away.

North Korea must be watched without the slightest lapse in vigilance, yet it is also capable of serving as a partner in mutually beneficial inter-Korean economic cooperation and as a counterpart in the pursuit of peaceful reunification. The Yoon government, however, has treated North Korea solely as a dictatorial regime that oppresses our compatriots and a hypothetical enemy capable of launching an all-out attack at any moment, criticizing and condemning the North Korean regime's misrule and emphasizing an adversarial confrontational posture above all else. As a result, even the possibility of normalizing or improving inter-Korean relations is disappearing, and North Korea has been reduced to nothing more than a target for security deterrence and retaliation against provocation. Drawing the implication from the United States, which cooperates with its hypothetical adversary China on matters where national interests align, maintains communication channels to prevent the emergence of crisis situations, and employs South Korea, Japan, AUKUS, U.S.-Japan-Philippines-Australia security cooperation, and the Quad as instruments of indirect counterbalancing rather than expending its own national power in direct confrontation, South Korea too should resume dialogue with North Korea, cooperate where cooperation is possible, and maintain a watertight security posture. It is wise to continue calling for dialogue and consistently expressing the willingness to provide humanitarian assistance in order to reduce North Korea's hostility toward the South and manage its incentives for provocation, and to pursue mutually beneficial inter-Korean economic cooperation to minimize the costs of division and advance the interests of South Korean enterprises. It is also urgently necessary to strengthen friendly relations with China and Russia, which serve as North Korea's patrons, in order to check excessive North Korean provocation or military adventurism.

With roughly half of its term remaining, the government should promptly restore a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy orientation in order to more reliably guarantee national security, advance economic development, and lay the groundwork for peaceful reunification.​moting its own ideology and applying pressure on other states, and advances justifications centered on respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, shared development, cooperative security, and the advancement of civilization.