Changes in Korea's National Strategic Environment and Policy Suggestions after the Ukraine War

Hyunik Hong

Senior Research Fellow

hyunik@sejong.org

   The situation on the Korean Peninsula, which had been promised to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and establish peace during the Moon Administration, was slowed due to a lack of trust between North Korea and the United States, increased confrontation with China over the initiative in international order, weakened U.S. commitment to diplomatic resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue, and North Korea's refusal to engage in dialogue, adopting a self-reliant strategy, strengthening weapons of mass destruction, and continuing military provocations. In addition, Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, further facilitated the formation of a "new Cold War" around the globe and in the Korean Peninsula. Although this war is taking place on the other side of the Eurasian continent, Russia, which borders the Korean Peninsula, is a stakeholder, and the United States and China, which have a huge influence on Korea's national strategy, are also deeply involved in this, which promoted the reorganization of the international order into a new Cold War confrontation. In other words, this war strengthens South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation and solidarity between North Korea, China, and Russia, encouraging the interests of both sides to conflict and which, makes it difficult for South Korea to implement its national strategy to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue or build stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the war in Ukraine encouraged Kim Jong-un to abandon his lingering desires for negotiations with the United States and develop nuclear weapons and missiles for self-defense and gave North Korea time and space to act independently by overcoming political, diplomatic, and economic difficulties caused by international sanctions from international society such as the United States.

   Naturally, North Korea viewed the war in Ukraine as an opportunity for regime survival, strengthening ties with China and Russia, strengthening nuclear armament and missile capabilities, effectively possessing nuclear combat capabilities, adopting an offensive and preemptive nuclear doctrine, continuing to threaten South Korea, and even conducting a seventh nuclear test, aiming to secure advanced missile and long-range missile technology through the launch of various missiles and spy satellites. South Korea is in a precarious security situation facing the threat of a nuclear attack from North Korea without the ability to independently deter nuclear weapons under a new Cold War order and the deterioration of the overlapping external security environment caused by the US-China-Russia confrontation and strengthened trilateral alliance between North Korea, China and Russia.

   In this context, the Yoon Administration, launched in May 2022, proposed diplomacy aimed at becoming a "global pivotal state" and expanded the extension of the Moon Administration's New Southern Policy, along with the "India-Pacific Strategy of Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity" and the "Audacious Initiative" for North Korea policy. First of all, rather than seeking to promote Korea's self-reliance and autonomy, the "global central state" is developing into diplomacy that focuses on the South Korea-U.S. alliance and strengthening security cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, which is in line with the U.S. global strategy stance and values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In a situation where it is difficult to develop nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) was launched and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets was increased through the Washington Declaration between the leaders of South Korea and the U.S. in April 2023. However, in return, abandonment of nuclear development, reserved nuclear independence, and delayed the transfer of Wartime Operational Control, resulting in an increase in external dependence rather than self-reliance. In particular, the U.S. long-awaited normalization of Korea-Japan relations was pushed regardless of various Korea-Japan issues and strengthened trilateral security cooperation, which in turn drove the strengthening of solidarity between North Korea, China, and Russia

   The "Audacious Initiative" resembles the 'Co-Prosperity Policy" from Myung-bak Lee's Administration that advocates North Korea's commitment to denuclearization as a prerequisite but failed to hold inter-Korean dialogue due to its actual implementation of 'Non-nuclear, Open, 3000". So far, there is no chance of denuclearization talks between North Korea and the U.S. but inter-Korean talks will be held, but only an escalation of distrust, hostility, and confrontation between each other. It is difficult to expect a meeting and contact to create a foundation for peaceful unification for achieving national goals. Although it was explained that the Yoon Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy does not target a specific country, the term itself is used to surround and check China.

   In other words, the Yoon Administration focused on strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance, normalizing South Korean relations, developing South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and implementing a hard-line policy against North Korea based on principles, making the new Cold War confrontation on the Korean Peninsula clearer, causing difficulties to carry out South Korea's three major national strategic tasks: national security, economic development, and peaceful unification. Korea-Russo relation have already been damaged by South Korea's participation in sanctions against Russia, along with Korean relation being estranged, two Korean talks faces security risks leading to distrust hostility, and accidental military conflict at any time. In particular, when Korea-China and Korea-Russia relations were favorable, China and Russia moved to check North Korea's hostile moves for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula in case of inter-Korean conflicts, but now the situation possibility of escalation of small military conflict is likely to happen as we cannot expect both China and Russia's cooperation against North Korea.

   Economically, trade recorded a deficit for 15 consecutive months from March 2022 and then a surplus from June 2023 to a surplus of $3.7 billion in September. However, in terms of content, exports have declined for the 12th month compared to the same month last year, but imports also have decreased significantly, creating a recession trade surplus, which is not a relief at all. In addition, despite the government's diplomacy with the U.S., the U.S. is putting its own economy first policy, attracting huge investments in Korea's semiconductor, electric vehicles, and battery sectors through the Semiconductor Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, but checking Korea's industries under the excuse of checking Korea's industries, giving considerable disadvantages and holding controls in the future.

   In this context, for the Yoon Administration, which still has a considerable term in office, this paper proposes a foreign strategic plan that can contribute to promoting the interests of our people, the Republic of Korea, and human values.

   First, the current international order is a "new cold war with multi-dimensional multilateral order," so security confrontations, competition, and cooperation are progressing in parallel, and the status of the G2; U.S., and China, has relatively reduced influence compared to the past of the U.S. and USSR, and the proportion and role of the global South in the third world has increased. It is more reasonable to see it as a "New Cold War multilateral order" rather than just a new Cold War. The Yoon administration is implementing foreign policy on the premise that the new Cold War order has already been established, but the U.S. and China are implementing practical diplomacy to maximize national interest in terms of content, and most other countries are increasing their discretion while taking benefits between both the U.S. and China, compared to the U.S.-Soviet Cold War era. Therefore, it is not just a zero-sum game, but a complex game that is applied in the current international political order. Moreover, South Korea is a divided, non-nuclear country, and poses a security threat from North Korea which possesses nuclear weapons. In this context, South Korea's most important national goals are to deter North Korea, protect peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, resolution in the event of a sudden change in North Korea, and peaceful reunification should all be recognized and implemented without interference from China and Russia.

   Second, it is natural and desirable for the Yoon Administration to support and participate in the United States' advocacy of universal human values as a Global Pivotal State. However, it is not wise for South Korea to stand at the frontline other than Western countries, such as the United States, to advocate and implement such values. It is wise to promote cooperation between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan while conducting careful diplomacy to establish friendly relations with China as much as possible, hence laying a foundation for restoring relations with Russia as soon as possible after the War in Ukraine, furthermore create more active friendly cooperative relations with many Global South countries that does not participate in sanctions against Russia.

   Third, Kim Jong-un, who witnessed the U.S. and NATO refrain the supporting high-tech weapons, dispatching troops, and including the terrorism-sponsoring country is likely to misjudge that he can minimize U.S. intervention by using nuclear weapons while invading South Korea. Considering Hamas which caused thousands of casualties in October 2023 under the weakened influence of the U.S.; the supporting nuclear-possessing Israel, it is unlikely to withstand South Korea, a non-nuclear state's severe anti-North Korea policy. Although the Nuclear Consultation Group (NCG) was activated and the U.S. strategic nuclear submarine's call to Busan was made with the aim of integrating the nuclear operation system between South Korea and the U.S. with the Washington Declaration, the NCG has not yet been detailed with U.S. strategic nuclear submarine leaving after a few days, so it is hard to see nuclear deterrence working well against North Korea. The U.S. extended deterrence should be provided to give credibility enough to ensure North Korea will face severe retaliation if North Korea launches a nuclear strike on South Korea, hence providing safety to the general public and government to reduce the actual need for South Korea's will toward nuclear development. Before the U.S. presidential election in November 2024, NCG's permanent secretariat needs to be established and hold a regular meeting to set up major NCG tasks, including a list of information to be closely shared, joint planning guidelines, training and simulation exercises, summit consultation procedures in case of North Korean nuclear threats and imminent use, nuclear power deployment and along with strategic assets, an operation such as operation planning of nuclear operations, as well as strategic development between the two countries.

   Fourth, if North Korea engages in provocation or aggression, it will have to respond promptly and firmly enough to realize that it will suffer more damage only by provoking South Korea. For this, it is necessary to thoroughly supplement and prepare for any gaps in security even if North Korea continues to study and find loopholes in South Korea's security. In particular, Kim Jong-un can misjudge that North Korea's nuclear weapons can be used to minimize or restrain U.S. intervention, taking into account that South Korea is a non-nuclear country. Therefore, it is necessary to minimize dependence on the US military against North Korea's local provocations and conventional wars and cultivate and maintain sufficient independent capabilities with the determination Self-Defense of South Korea.

   Fifth, although the South Korean and U.S. governments leave an opportunity for dialogue with North Korea, both do not show much willingness to resume dialogue by finding and resolving the reasons for North Korea's absence. In particular, the war in Ukraine has shown Kim Jong-un's concerns that even if negotiations with the United States are concluded, giving up nuclear weapons could lead to an invasion. Hence as the Biden Administration proposed working-level talks, it is not attractive enough for North Korea to pay attention, leading to escalation of nuclear and missile advancement.

   Therefore, the government is required to persuade the U.S. administration to seek to resume dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. by shifting the current second "Strategic Patience" stance and preemptively taking friendly measures against North Korea, considering that President Trump ignored past agreements. If dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. resumes, inter-Korean dialogue will also be powered and tensions on the Korean Peninsula will be eased. In addition, the South Korean government should show its efforts to manage and control North Korea's provocation motives in parallel with efforts to strengthen national security posture by more actively showing its intention to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea and presenting its intention to engage in inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation in consideration of the North's security dilemma.

   Sixth, in order for the Yoon Administration to resolve humanitarian issues and improve North Korea's human rights in inter-Korean relations, it is believed that the way to achieve practical improvement in North Korea's human rights is to resume and persuade inter-Korean dialogue rather than unilaterally encouraging improvement in North Korea's human rights through sanctions and pressure in the international community.

   Seventh, it is necessary to fully prepare for a sudden change in North Korea, recognizing that if we do not respond quickly and properly, we may miss the opportunity for unification or lose part of our territory to foreign powers. The government is urged to normalize relations with China and Russia as soon as possible, even in this need.

   Eighth, it is not fair to boldly speak about issues related to the core interests of China and Russia, while appearing to remain silent on issues of South Korea's national interests that are related to the United States and Japan. The government should protect and promote Korea's national interest but point out U.S. is violating international norms, including the WTO, by itself, by gathering value-sharing countries to check China and taking care of its own economic interests, and penalizing these value-sharing countries protecting the rules-based international order.

   Since the essence of diplomacy lies in give and take between each other, it is a virtue to maximize what is gained while minimizing what is possible while maintaining and developing friendly relations. In particular, it is recognized as the best ability to give praise and praise and get the maximum practical benefit. It would be desirable for the government to review and improve diplomacy with the U.S. and Japan from this perspective.

   Finally, if we reform our foreign strategy direction to apply the principle of simultaneous action and reduce mutual threats between the two Korea, promote security cooperation between Korea, the U.S., and Japan through engagement, dialogue, and diplomatic efforts, and establish a friendly relationship with China and Russia, South Korea's diplomacy can be a virtuous circle of diplomacy that builds a path to stability, restoration, and settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula, promotion of mutually beneficial economic cooperation, and peaceful unification.​