National Strategy

National Strategy Vol. 31 No. 2 (Summer)

Date 2025-06-11 View 572

South Korea’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy Against the Advancement of Nuclear Capabilities in Neighboring Countries: Focusing on Variables by AlternativeYeoul Soo Kim

 

The purpose of this article is to suggest a nuclear deterrence strategy for South Korea amid the advancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea, China, and Russia and the collapse of nuclear arms control. To this end, I first examine the nuclear capabilities of North Korea, China, and Russia, and introduce the reality of the collapsing nuclear arms control. In particular, I critically examine the existing strategy for North Korea’s denuclearization, and suggest alternatives for North Korea’s nuclear deterrence. South Korea’s search for alternatives assumes that the Trump’s second term can seek a new strategy to simultaneously deter North Korea, China, and Russia. The alternatives that can be considered include extended deterrence, securing nuclear potential, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, Asian version of NATO-style nuclear sharing, and nuclear armament. I evaluate each alternative based on seven variables for five alternatives and suggest the most desirable alternative. The evaluation results show that South Korea needs to nuclear armament with the explicit or implicit consent of the United States while securing its nuclear potential. 

 

Keywords: North Korea, China, and Russia Nuclear Cluster, Nuclear Arms Control, Trump’s Second Term, Five Alternatives, Seven Variables 

 

 

 

North Korea's Nuclear Armament and Military Stability on the Korean Peninsula: Focusing on the Stability-Instability Paradox / Jaekyu Jang

 

The study argues that despite North Korea's nuclear armament, the stability-instability paradox did not operate on the Korean Peninsula, and military stability has actually increased compared to before. It emphasizes that for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, it is important to pursue not only military stability but also political stability. To evaluate the military stability of the Korean Peninsula, the study utilizes four theoretical elements of the stability-instability paradox: the structure of the paradox, the paradoxical relationship, the causal actor of tactical instability, and the interaction between nuclear forces and conventional forces. The evaluation focuses on two periods during which a structure of strategic stability was established on the Korean Peninsula: the period of U.S. tactical nuclear deployment and the period following North Korea's nuclear armament. The evaluation results showed that the stability-instability paradox operated properly during the U.S. tactical nuclear deployment period but did not operate after North Korea's nuclear armament. This allowed for the identification of theoretical limitations of the stability-instability paradox and an assessment of the military stability on the Korean Peninsula. The study proposed modifications to address the theoretical limitations and suggested three policy directions for South Korea to enhance stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula: enhancing strategic stability (strengthening extended deterrence), suppressing tactical instability (denial of surprise attacks and on-site resolution), and reducing risks (political stability). Therefore, the study contributes to the theoretical development of the stability-instability paradox and discussions on developing South Korea's policy towards North Korea.

 

Keywords: Korean Peninsula, North Korea's Nuclear Armament, Stability-Instability Paradox, North Korea's Localized Provocations, Extended Deterrence

 

 

U.S. Extended Deterrence and South Korea’s Nuclear Armament: Dual Deterrence and Alliance Dilemma / Inseok Yoo

 

The United States has pursued a policy of extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula aimed at simultaneously deterring North Korea’s nuclear threat and South Korea’s potential nuclear armament. However, the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and the growing discourse on nuclear armament within South Korea have exposed inherent limitations in the effectiveness and credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. This study seeks to identify the fundamental drivers behind the emergence of South Korea’s nuclear armament discourse by employing the U.S.’ strategy of dual deterrence as an analytical framework. It analyzes the interaction between changes in U.S. extended deterrence policy and South Korea’s strategic responses. The findings indicate that South Korea’s drive toward nuclear armament is more closely linked to its level of trust in U.S. security commitments than to the threat posed by North Korea itself. The U.S.’ extended deterrence strategy functions under the dual constraints of the security dilemma and the alliance dilemma, structurally limiting the strategic alignment between Seoul and Washington. As a result, in the context of North Korea’s growing nuclear threat, the credibility of extended deterrence is undermined, and rising demands for South Korea’s nuclear armament can be seen as driven by a combination of this weakening credibility and nationalist sentiments seeking greater autonomy and self-reliance. If this trajectory continues, the Korean Peninsula is more likely to evolve toward a condition of nuclear equilibrium rather than moving towards denuclearization or perpetuating a nuclear asymmetry.

 

Keywords: Extended Deterrence, Dual Deterrence, South Korea’s Nuclear Armament, Security Dilemma, Alliance Dilemma

 

 

 

U.S-China Artificial Intelligence Hegemony Competition and South Korea: The Transformation of International Relations and National Strategies of a Middle Power​ / Sangbae Kim

 

The development of AI technology has brought about significant changes, known as the 'AI transformation (AX),' which is also having a profound impact on the “transformation of International Relations.” In this process, the role of AI in future national strategies is becoming increasingly prominent. Today, the most representative example of “AI-based transformation of International Relations” is the U.S.-China AI hegemony competition. The U.S.-China AI hegemony competition is not just about leading in technology, but also about dominating standards, platforms, and ecosystems, as well as driving regulatory policies, security discourse, and the formation of international norms. Furthermore, it is a multi-dimensional competition aimed at winning in AI-based diplomacy and warfare. This paper analyzes the development and changes in the U.S.-China AI hegemony competition from three dimensions: technological and platform competition, regulatory and discourse competition, and diplomatic and military competition. It also examines the tasks for South Korea’s AI national strategy as a middle power responding to these developments.

 

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence(AI), United States, China, Hegemony Competition, South Korea, National Strategy, Middle Power 

 

 

 

The Military Definition of Korean-Style Space Security and the Development Direction of Space Capabilities / Hong-Cheol Kim

 

What is the proper direction for building space security capabilities that align with the definition and scope of Korea-specific space security? South Korea is advancing its private space development efforts, such as lunar landings and Mars exploration, while simultaneously pursuing national defense initiatives, including reconnaissance satellites and micro-satellite constellations. Considering South Korea’s space security environment, space development must ensure both economic feasibility and the capability to counter space threats posed by potential adversaries. To achieve this, it is essential to establish a consensus among public, private, and military sectors regarding the objectives and direction of space development. Additionally, defining and categorizing space security in a manner tailored to South Korea’s specific needs should be a priority. The military definition of Korea-specific space security is explained from three perspectives: space competition, space threats, and space capability development plans. The applicable range is limited to altitudes between 100 km and 40,000 km, where Korea’s space assets are expected to operate in the present and near future. For long-term enhancement of Korea’s space security capabilities, the study suggests establishing an integrated space capability management system, developing a space traffic management framework, and promoting an asymmetric enticing deterrence strategy based on space capabilities.

 

Keywords: South Korean-style Space Security, Space Security Application Range, Space Threats, Space Assets, Space Capabilities, Space Strategy