The Space-Based Integration of U.S. Missile Defense: An Explatory Study / Chansong Cameron Lee

U.S. missile defense itself has evolved from a retaliatory deterrence posture centered on missile warning toward a strategy of deterrence by denial built around the  full  sequence  of  missile  detection,  tracking,  and  interception.  Over  time, space-based  early-warning  capabilities  have  been  strengthened,  and  advances  in space technology, together with declining launch costs, have facilitated the devel- opment of missile-detection sensors and tracking systems led by the U.S. Space Force to provide fire-control-quality missile data. At the same time, efforts are un- derway to develop and deploy space-based interceptors and to integrate ground-, sea-, air-, and space-based missile defense systems. These developments point to the emergence of a layered, multifunctional, and integrated space-based deterrence architecture.  The  Golden  Dome  project,  announced  in  2025,  is  intended  to  ad- vance this broader vision. Real-time integration between space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and missile defense (MD) will be essential, with  artificial  intelligence  expected  to  perform  a  pivotal  enabling  role.  North Korea will likely explore a variety of countermeasures as its relative deterrent and coercive  leverage  vis-à-vis  the  United  States  weakens.  Its  principal  response  is likely to center on reinforcing its existing asymmetric deterrence strategy based on nuclear capabilities. For its part, the Republic of Korea should determine an appropriate  level  of  participation  in  the  U.S.-led  space-based  deterrence  archi- tecture by comprehensively weighing its security and economic interests as well as broader alliance considerations.

Keywo​rds: Missile Defense, Deterrence by Denial, Space-Based Deterrence, Architecture, Golden Dome Project

​Institutional Formation and Structural Paradoxes of U.S. Cyber Command: The Casual Cascade Structure from the Dual-Hat Arrangement to the Cyber Force Debate / Jong Jin Lee 

This  article  reconstructs  the  organizational  rationale  behind  U.S.  Cyber Command's  (USCYBERCOM)  present  institutional  form  ― established  in  2010 and elevated to a unified combatant command in 2018 ― through the lenses of securitization theory and bureaucratic politics theory, and shows that this rationale is itself laden with structural paradoxes. USCYBERCOM, in other words, is the product of a discursive project that defines cyberspace as a warfighting domain on par with land, sea, air, and space, combined with the bureaucratic-political dy- namics of inter-service competition for cyber capability. The article further argues that six such paradoxes are interlocked within this process, forming not a flat list but a single causal cascade. At their root lies the “dual-hat”  arrangement,  under  which  the  commander  simultaneously  serves  as Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). USCYBERCOM is legally an independent combatant command, yet in practice depends on NSA's infrastructure and personnel; even its signature achievement, “Hunt Forward” operations, stems from this cohabitation and is consequently difficult for other states to replicate. This  deep-seated  resource  dependency  radiates  into  a  centralization-decentral- ization tension between the unified command and persistent service-specific cyber components. It further extends into an ontological ambiguity between the official designation  of  “Defend  Forward”  and  Hunt  Forward  as  “purely  defensive”  and their  actual  conduct  ― an  ambiguity  that  spills  into  international-legal  disputes over the permissibility of collective countermeasures ― and sharpens where the secrecy of disruption operations collides with democratic accountability. The same resource  dependency  recurs  in  the  personnel  domain:  despite  the  language  of “status elevation” embodied in the recent CYBERCOM 2.0 reorganization ― new talent-management  institutions  and  meritocratic  rhetoric  ―  the  command's  ca- pacity to recruit and train personnel remains chronically fragile, leaving the mis- match between status and resources unresolved. Most significantly, this resource dependency rooted in the dual-hat arrange- ment, compounded by the mismatch between elevated status and constrained per- sonnel resources, is understood to form a direct causal chain driving the debate over establishing an independent Cyber Force ― a debate that has run since 2018 and  intensified  between  2024  and  2026.  In  sum,  these  six  paradoxes  appear  to constitute a causal-cascade structure rooted in cyberspace's dual character as both a physical and a cognitive-informational domain. Drawing on this analysis, the ar- ticle discusses implications for how the Republic of Korea might define the status of its own  Cyber Operations Command.

Keywords: Securitization, Bureaucratic Politics, Dual-hat Arrangement, Defend Forward, Hunt Forward, Cyber Force

The Korea-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and the U.S. Congress: Focusing on the 2015 Policy Hearing and the 2026 Senate Foreign Relations Committee / Jungkun Seo

This article examines the politics of revising the Korea-U.S. civil nuclear co- operation agreement through the institutional role of the U.S. Senate, with partic- ular attention to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although the agreement is negotiated by the executive branches of the two allies, its political boundaries are shaped by congressional oversight, hearings, reporting requirements, and non- proliferation concerns. This article first analyzes the 2015 Senate hearing on the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement, where senators raised questions about pyroprocess- ing, enrichment, reprocessing, regional proliferation risks, and the precedent such concessions might create for other countries. It then explores how these earlier de- bates continue to constrain current discussions in the 2020s, especially as new is- sues such as nuclear-powered submarines, spent fuel management, nuclear exports, shipbuilding  cooperation,  defense  supply  chains,  and  technological  competition with China have become linked to the agreement. By examining the composition and policy orientations of the 119th Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I argue that Korea faces a political environment that is generally favorable to alliance co- operation  but  conditional  on  credible  nonproliferation  safeguards.  The  central claim is that Korea should not frame revision as an alliance exception, but as in- stitutionally controlled cooperation that reconciles nonproliferation, alliance mod- ernization, industrial cooperation, and strategic competition.

Keywords: Korea-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, U.S. Senate, Nonproliferation, Nuclear-Powered Submarine, Strategic Competition with China​ 

An Assessment of the Strategic Coherence of the Korean Three-Axis System: Focusing on Offset Strategy and Defense Strategic Technologies / Jaekyu Jang

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This study aims to evaluate the strategic coherence of the Korean Three-Axis System in responding to North Korea’s nuclear threat. To this end, it employs the four  core  requirements  of  offset  strategy:  asymmetry,  technological  superiority, concept-organization integration, and innovative battlefield effects as an analytical framework,  and  conducts  a  stepwise  analysis  linking  the  strategic  and  techno- logical  levels.  In  particular,  the  study  systematically  assesses  the  Three-Axis System based on the linkage among strategy, operational capabilities, and techno- logical components. The findings indicate that the Three-Axis System secures a considerable degree of structural validity as an offset strategy by satisfying these four requirements in an integrated manner. Furthermore, by comparing the identi- fied technology requirement clusters derived from the system’s operational capa- bility needs with the 30 national defense strategic technologies, the analysis con- firms a high level of overall coherence. However, these relevant technologies are concentrated in approximately 50% of the total, revealing a structural pattern char- acterized by high coherence but limited concentration. Accordingly, the develop- ment of the Korean Three-Axis System should focus on refining an integrated op- erational concept, strengthening the coherence of operational structures, and pro- moting  selective and prioritized  investment in  core technologies.

Keywords: North Korean Nuclear Threat, Korean Three-Axis System, Strategic Coherence, Offset Strategy, Defense Strategic Technologies​

Rethinking South Korea’s Defense Exports: A Review of the International Arms Transfer and Arms Trade Literature / Jiseob Yun

​This study examines the extent to which South Korea’s defense exports can be understood through the literature on international arms transfers and arms trade. Existing  studies  have  understood  Cold  War  arms  transfers  mainly  in  terms  of great-power competition and supplier influence, while post-Cold War research has focused on the commercialization of the arms market, the globalization of defense industries, and the networked character of arms trade relations. South Korea was a major arms importer during the Cold War, but has grown into a middle-tier de- fense exporter through state-led industrial policy, foreign technology acquisition, and the accumulation of domestic defense-industrial capabilities. This study ana- lyzes  the  significance  of  the  South  Korean  case  for  existing  arms  transfer  and arms trade research and identifies theoretical and policy implications for the sus- tainable development of  South Korea’s defense  exports.

Keywords: Arms Transfer, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, South Korea’s Defense Exports​

Institutional Lock-In of Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy and the Ongoing Reproduction of Nuclear Latency: An Analysis Based on the Concept of Technological Entrapment / Jong-min Choi

​This study analyzes Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy and the nature of the nuclear latency sustained through it, using the concepts of institutional lock-in and technological entrapment. In South Korean security debates, Japan’s high level of nuclear latency has often been characterized as a case of strategic nuclear hedging. By tracing the evolution of Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle policy, however, this study finds that Japan’s nuclear latency has been sustained not by strategic success, but by  institutional  lock-in  generated  through  the  interaction  of  policy  responses  to nuclear  fuel  resource  constraints,  strategic  considerations  aimed  at  securing  nu- clear latency, bureaucratic momentum, and path dependence. Japan has faced poli- cy and economic inefficiencies because its fast breeder reactor cycle has not been realized and its commercial reprocessing plant has neither been completed nor en- tered normal operation. Nevertheless, sunk costs and the interests of multiple ac- tors   have   prevented   Japan   from   abandoning   its   nuclear   fuel   cycle   policy. Reprocessing and pluthermal programs—the use of MOX fuel in light-water re- actors—were  initially  pursued  as  instruments  of  security  and  energy  policy  but have undergone goal displacement and become ends in themselves. In this proc- ess, plutonium inventories and sensitive nuclear technologies associated with re- processing and MOX fuel have been maintained, thereby structurally reproducing Japan’s nuclear latency. Ultimately, the Japanese case demonstrates that a nuclear fuel  cycle  policy  justified  in  terms  of  peaceful  use  and  commercialization  can, through institutional lock-in and technological entrapment, impose substantial poli- cy  costs  while  perpetuating nuclear latency.

Keywords: Japan’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear Latency, Institutional Lock-In, Technological Entrapment, Path Dependence, Japan’s Nuclear Policy

A Study of Israel Air Force Military Strategy Against Iran: Focusing on Counter Air Operations and Strategic Strike Operations / Tae Uk Kim･KwanHaeng Cho･Soo Hun Lee

​This study analyzes Israel’s military strategy against Iran from the perpective of air power and air superiority, which play a decisive role in achieving victory in war. To this end, the paper evaluates Israel’s security environment in response to  Iran’s  military  threats,  analyzing  the  structure  and  nature  of  these  threats  in terms of triggering and immediate causes, as well as fundamental and permissive factors. Focusing on the Israeli Air Force’s “Rising Lion” operation—an airstrike against  Iran’s  nuclear  facilities—the  study  examines  Israel’s  air  superiority  and strategic  attack  operations.  The  key  lesson  derived  from  this  operation  is  that Israel’s  success  was  made  possible  by  achieving  complete  air  superiority  over Iran. Ultimately, the “Rising Lion” operation serves as an empirical case demon- strating that advanced air power can function not only as a deterrent but also as an effective means of eliminating real threats. It offers meaningful implications for the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) in transforming into an “offensive strategic  air  force”  capable  of  dominating  the  operational  environment  of  the Korean Peninsula amid asymmetric and complex  threats.

Keywords: Israel, Iran, Air Force, Air Power, Air Superiority​

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