National Strategy Vol. 29 No. 1 (Spring)
Abstract Summary
Assessment the Re-outbreak’s Probability of War in Korean Peninsula with the ‘Most different systems design(MDSD)’: Comparing the Korean War and Nuclear & Missile Conflict cases
Jeongki Kim
The Armistice system has still been activated in Korean peninsula during about 70 years. During 2017, North Korea(NK) and United States of America(USA) was conflicting with NK’s nuclear and missile tests, the high tensed words and actions were exchanged each other longer than a year. Though the conflict was pended from the Agreement of Singapore in 2018, worrying about nuclear wars in Korean peninsula is being with us now. This study comparatively analyzed Korean War(1950-1953) and Nuclear & Missile Conflict(2017-2018) with the most different systems design(MDSD). Choosing similar factors except for differences among independent variables was used to assess re-outbreak’s probability of war in Korean peninsula. The result of this analysis showed that the probability was at most 33% come from the similarities, confrontation structure between strong power states, and NK’s mobilization readiness to war. If differences in external supports, offensive capabilities, opponent’s weakness, and political desire were not changed, those could deter re-outbreak of wars. But, Republic of Korea(ROK) has to manage the different factors as well as similarities because there is no unchangeable things in this world and wars also can come from strategic choices and accidental events. Therefore, ROK should strengthen self-military power and keep close cooperation with PRC and Russia based on the strong alliance with USA. In addition, preventing war-again in Korea is not possible from only sanctions and pressure policy on NK without endeavor for dialogue and cooperation making Kim Jong un’s desire turning to economic development from nuclear and missile war.
Keywords: Korean Peninsula, War, Most different systems design(MDSD), Republic of Korea(ROK), North Korea
North Korea's Juche Military Thought and Nuclear First Military Policy
Taehyun Kim
The purpose of this paper was to explain the contradictory tension between the “people-centered theory” that North Korea's juche military thought ostensibly puts forward and the “nuclear-centered military policy” phenomenon that appears during the Kim Jong-un era. In this paper, it is noted that the people-centered military thought is essentially a “suryong-centered military idea” aimed at justifying the conservation of the leader and the leadership. People-centered theory is ‘reported’ as a philosophical principle of cultivating a ‘North Korean’ strategy suitable for the situation of weak countries, but it has turned into a political strategic logic that can function as a sufficient condition for war victory when it is led by an error-free existence called ‘suryong’. The suryong-centered theory, which has the logical structure of “leadership” and “leadership advocacy,” is the only leverage that can explain the tension between “nuclear priority” and “people-centered theory” during the Kim Jong-un era. In this case, Kim Jong-un's nuclear priority can be converged into the logic that “Kim Jong-un is a nuclear weapon” away from the dichotomous dilemma of “weapon or human.”
Keywords: Juche Military Thought, People-centered Theory, Surong-centered Theory, Nuclear-first Military Policy, Weaker States' Strategy
China's Space Domain Utilization and Military Innovation: Focusing on the Xi Jinping Period(2013-2021)
Jangkwon Moon
This article examines how China has recognized, interpreted, and utilized ”space“ after China's founding especially analyzing how China's use of space was projected into the ”military innovation“ of Xi Jinping's era. The military innovation of the Chinese military during the Xi Jinping period, presented concepts, Active Defense Strategy, to support national strategies, developed and utilized satellites, rockets, and space weapons in terms of military technology, and carried out such as enhancing control of the Central Military Commission, reorganizing theater level, and established strategic support units. In other words, it is argued that the military innovation being carried out in China during the Xi Jinping era is being more actively and integrated through the use of outer space. It is argued that such military innovation being carried out in China during the Xi Jinping period is taking place through the use of space. The implications of China's military innovation for the Korean military are, first, enhancing space war and cyber warfare capabilities in preparation for future wars, and second, it is necessary to analyze the scale, capabilities, and operation of Chinese military forces on the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency. Third, it is necessary to prepare a mechanism for cooperation between the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force to reach a common opinion on the use of space.
Keywords: Xi Jinping, Space Domain, Military Innovation, Strategy/Doctrine, Military Technology, Unit/Organization
The Outlook for the 3rd Xi Jinping Administration’s Foregin Policy: With Reference to the Political Report of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
Jeong Kyung Seo
This study predicts the foreign policy of the Xi Jinping’s 3rd term administration, with reference to the political report of President Xi Jinping at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. This study sheds light on the continuity and differences of ‘Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,’ by comparing the 20th political report with the 18th and 19th one. This study points out that despite the fact that Great Power Diplomacy has actually failed, it will not only be inherited because Xi succeeded in his third consecutive, but will express stronger ”Chinese characteristics“ in emphasizing the great checks from the West. The 3rd term of the Xi Jinping administration would especially focus on gathering allies including developing countries, emerging market economies around the world, with the discourse of the ”Community of Common Destiny for Mankind" while maintaining stable relations with Power states. China will also attract high-tech foreign companies and strengthen multi-layered ties such as economy, health, and security with developing and emerging economies. It is also expected that the U.S.-China competition and international tensions over global governance will intensify in the future.
Keywords: The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Political Report, Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics, Community of Common Destiny for Mankind, Global Governance
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Future of Poland
Doohwan Ahn
How do small states survive in a states-system shaped and dominated by great powers? Much discussion has been had about the security strategy of small states, especially in those geographically situated between great powers. This paper has two goals as an intellectual history of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Considerations sur le gouvernement de Pologne (1782). The first is introducing the Genevan political thinker’s insights on the issue. In this last political work, written against the background of the First Polish Partition of 1772, Rousseau put forward a counterintuitive answer: to guarantee Poland’s future, a policy of ‘national wealth and power’ must be abandoned. The more Poland tries to become a great power, the more neighbouring great powers, including Russia, will intervene to stop it, and she will also lose her freedom in the process, reasoned Rousseau. The second is to propose a historical approach to Rousseau’s international thought, which has been characterised as a mixture of Realism and isolationism. He endeavoured to find the possibility of liberty in a history filled with ironies and paradoxes, identifying internal crises and external threats that had impeded Poland’s development as the critical factor in protecting her freedom.
Keywords: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Partitions of Poland, Great Power Politics, Small State Diplomacy, Historical Irony
Analysis of the Laws and Institutions of Digital Information Collection of Foreign Intelligence Agencies: Focusing on Four Middle Power States
Changsub Kim · Sangpil Yoon · Sangjin Lee
The role of intelligence agency to preserve national security and interests comes to be more important and complicating since serious threats such as cyber attacks have increased all over the world due to the newly emerging information and communication technologies. Digital information collection, which plays a key role in the activities of intelligence agencies, has evolved in various forms, from passive wiretapping to active gathering methods using hacking tools. Digital information collection, on the other hand, is likely to violate fundamental human rights such as privacy. International human rights law and courts require that the rights and duties of intelligence agencies should be clearly stipulated by national legislations. Many countries have amended or reformed their laws and institutions as regards information gathering, whereas Republic of Korea has been left behind this global trend as seen the delay of cybersecurity legislations and the amendment failure of Protection of Communications Secrets Act. This article analyses the cases of four middle power states, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, who recently revised their laws concerning intelligence collection. In doing so, this article examines the ways to effectively exert the authority and methods of information collection and to design the control system preventing its abuses in South Korea.
Keywords: Foreign Intelligence Agency, Digital Information Collection, National Cybersecurity, Intelligence Agency Oversight
Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: The Implication of ‘Fab 4(Chip 4)’ as a U.S. Semiconductor Initiative
Junghyun Yoon
In recent years, the United States has been spurring the reorganization of its semiconductor supply chain centered on its own country through security considerations, even if it takes a huge cost burden, and is trying to implement it through the formation of Fab4 with Korea, Japan and Taiwan. This study argues that the Fab 4 initiative of the United States should be understood not only as a matter of competitive advantage of specific technologies or reorganization of partnerships, but also in a new geopolitical context in which technology-economy-security is closely combined. When reorganizing the supply chain around Fab 4, Korea needs strategic consideration in line with its context. ‘Strengthening the super-gap strategy in the field of technology superiority’, ‘Utilizing Fab4 as a means of protecting against external threats’, ‘Exercising strategic flexibility in the process of reorganizing the GVCRVC-TVC supply chain’, and ‘Avoiding excessive security discourse and balancing economic and security’ will be an option to secure Korea's national interests in the uncertainty of supply chain reorganization.
Keywords: Semiconductor, Fab 4(Chip 4), Supply Chain, GVC, Economic Security