National Strategy Vol. 29 No. 4 (Winter)

Structural Problems of the ROK Military & Joint Forces Command

Jaekyu Jang

The purpose of this study is to find a alternative to solve the structural problems of the ROK military. This study analyzes the structural problems of the current ROK military based on the war principles of "unity of command" and explains the background of the formation of this structure from the perspective of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the combined defense system. In addition, the options to solve structural problems are evaluated and selected based on the structural specificity of the Korean military based on the ROK-U.S. alliance and combined defense system and the structural generality of the military in advanced military countries. As a result of the study, the best way to solve the structural problems of the ROK military is to create a joint military command and the joint military commander concurrently serves as the future ROK-US Combined Forces Commander, and in order to realize the creation of the joint military command, step-by-step strategies such as discussion and consensus, creation and operation linkage of ROK strategic command, and the use of transfer of wartime operational control are needed.

Keywords: ROK Military Structure, US-ROK Combined Defense System, ROK Joint Forces Command, Transfer of Wartime Operational Control, ROK Strategic Command

Middle Power Strategies in the Age of Platform Geopolitics: Implications of the Korean Cases of Digital Platforms

Sangbae Kim

Relying on the concept of “platform geopolitics,” this article attempts to identify the recent changes of world politics and seeks a new theory of middle power strategy especially for Korea. In order to gain implications for these theoretical discussions, it was noted that Korean digital platform companies achieved in acquiring the domestic market or entering the overseas market. The concerns of the Korean digital platform companies have a lot to do with the anguish that Korea has in terms of the overall national strategy of the future. For example, the establishment of relations with U.S. platform companies as a global dominant platform, competition with Chinese platform companies as a challenger, and cooperation with local platforms in Southeast Asia or Europe are all in line with Korea’s strategic concerns from a diplomatic and security perspective. The fact that Korea is one of the few countries to have its own national platform and the fact that Korean platform companies are recently entering overseas markets and increasing their competitiveness are also meaningful as leading indicators for Korea’s middle power strategy. Based on the concept of “parallel brokerage on the platform,” this article examines the theoretical resources developed in the existing theories of middle power strategy, and further explores the nature of middle power’s platform strategies that Korea will pursue from the perspective of “application and innovation platform strategies,” “bandwagon and niche platform strategies,” and “coalition and localization platform strategies.”

Keywords: Platform, Geopolitics, Middle Power, National Strategy, Digital, Korea

A Case Study of Israel’s Preventive Strike on Syria’s Nuclear Site: Focused on Strategic Culture and Intelligence Activities

Dong-Gu Suh

In September 2007, Israel conducted a surgical strike on Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear site. Preceding studies on this case of a preventive strike have mainly focused on such areas as international regime of the NPT, international law, military and foreign affairs. However, this thesis aims to study this case from the intelligence perspective. First, to set a context, it reviews Israel’s security threat perception and strategic culture. Next, it analyzes on how the intelligence activities contributed to the minimization of operational risk, escalation risk, renewal of nuclear development risk and international risks. As a result, all the details of the nuclear site were confirmed by collection operations and intelligence cooperation with the CIA, contributing to the reduction of operational risk. With the analysis, the triangular connection among ‘Syria-Iran-North Korea’ was found. Furthermore, an innovative idea to minimize the escalation risk was formulated by the predictive analysis. Regarding North Korea’s nuclear sites, the feasibility of a preventive strike on them is almost none. However, a scenario in which Seoul responds to Pyongyang’s imminent nuclear attack with a preemptive strike could be postulated. Finally, some lessons learned from this case study are applied to such a scenario.

Keywords: Preventive Strike, Preemptive Strike, Strategic Culture, Information Collection, Predictive Analysis, Intelligence Cooperation

National Crisis Management Direction Regarding North Korea’s ‘Nuclear Escalation Threat Strategy’: Focusing on ‘Escalation Ladder’ and ‘First Strike Stability’

Jaehak Lee

South Korea and the United States analyze that North Korea is using a ‘nuclear escalation threat strategy’ by continuously suggesting the possibility of a preemptive strike with nuclear weapons, and are developing nuclear conventional integration based crisis management strategy which provide a reliable deterrent from a low-level crisis to a high level of escalation. This paper analyzes North Korea's ‘nuclear escalation threat strategy’ in terms of ‘escalation ladder’ and ‘First Strike Stability (FSS)’ in order to evaluate ROK-US crisis management strategies against the North Korean nuclear threat and suggest development directions, and evaluated crisis management scenarios according to the options that Korea and the United States can choose if the situation escalates. The evaluation results show that if the North Korean nuclear crisis escalates, the instability of the crisis will increase due to differences in escalation thresholds and escalation dominance, and there is a high possibility that it will escalate into nuclear war. In addition, the ROK-US national crisis management strategy should pursue the development of strategies and policies based on 'First Strike Stability (FSS)', strengthening international cooperation to raise the ‘nuclear taboo threshold’, and diversifying national level crisis management tools below the nuclear use threshold.

Keywords: Nuclear First Use Strategy, National Crisis Management, First Strike Stability, Escalation Ladder, Nuclear Strategy

Korean Armistice Agreement System and Conditions for Transition to a New Peace Regime in Korean Peninsula

Ki-Chul Park ･ Jae-Woo Choo

The armistice agreement system has made significant contributions in preventing large-scale military clashes between the two Koreas and deterring war on the Korean Peninsula over the past 70 years. In 2018, as a mood of reconciliation emerged between the two Koreas and the North Korea-U.S. summit took place, 70% of Koreans expressed their opinion that the armistice agreement system should be transformed into a new peace regime through the declaration of an end to the Korean War. However, experts have expressed concerns that such a declaration could undermine the existence of the UN Command, jeopardize the ROK-US alliance, and fuel public opinion in the US advocating for the withdrawal of USFK, consequently causing security instability. As of 2023, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula has become significantly more precarious compared to 2018. North Korea's nuclear threat has escalated, with an imminent seventh nuclear test, as well as continued provocations such as missile launches and drone infiltrations. Against this backdrop, this article evaluates the armistice agreement system of the past 70 years and examines its implications in light of the expanding ROK-US-Japan security alliance, particularly with the Washington Declaration and Camp David accord. Moreover, it discusses the unique characteristics of the armistice agreement on the Korean Peninsula, analyzes North Korea's claim for the declaration of the end of the Korean War, and explores the prospects of signing a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula. The aim is to ascertain the risks associated with transitioning to a new peace regime and to determine the conditions under which such a transition can be feasibly discussed.

Keywords: Armistice Agreement, End of War Declaration, Peace Treaty, Conditions for Transition, ROK-US Alliance

ROK’s Strategic Advantage in Gray Zone: “Campaigning” in Support of “Competitive Strategy”

Hanbyeol Sohn ･ Kyung-joo Jeon

This study reviews the concepts of ‘competition’ and ‘campaigning’ in the U.S. military and seeks to apply it to the ROK military to establish a strategy for the Korean military to respond to gray zone tactics of neighboring countries. The development of Korea’s competitive strategy starts with a keen awareness of changes in the strategic environment on the Korean Peninsula. Faced with intensifying U.S.-China competition and changes in the military balance between the two Koreas due to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, as well as the expansion of military domains including cyber and outer space, the ROK needs to accurately assess and respond to threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in competitive space. The so-called competitive strategy is part of the military strategy that protects national interests by flexibly utilizing military power, which was traditionally considered for wartime use. The competitive strategy aims to gain a strategic advantage in the gray zone or competitive space, including coercion against the opponent, exhaustion through cost imposition, and shaping favorable conditions. These goals are achieved through non-linear, asymmetric, and non-conforming campaigning of military forces comprising intelligent multi-domain complex systems in competitive spaces. Furthermore, it can contribute to the implementation of the national grand strategy by strategically aligning military power with diplomacy, intelligence, and economic power.

Keywords: Gray Zone, Competitive Strategy, Competition, Campaigning, Competition Continuum

Research on Korean Worker's Party(KWP) Politburo’s Function and Nature under Kim Jong Il

Junhee Lee

This study aims to enhance understanding of the North Korean political system further by reviewing the overall nature of the KWP politburo during the Kim Jong Il period(1994-2011) and offering some new answers to the question of why the politburo under Kim Jong Il had not been functioning for most of his reign. Some have claimed that the secretariat had replaced the functions of the politburo under Kim Jong Il; however, there is much evidence against this explanation. Another explanation is that the politburo stopped working because Kim Jong Il had bypassed official institutions and discussed national affairs only with his closest aides at personal parties. Although this explanation is quite reasonable, it failed to explain why Kim Jong Il used his politburo only for specific periods, such as the ‘Yuhun Tongchi(rule by the will of the late Comrade Kim Il Sung)’ period(1994-1998) and Kim Jong Un’s succession period(2010-2011). This study points out that even Kim Jong Il could not deny the political symbolic significance of the politburo, the highest decision-making body of the Marx-Leninist party, so he limitedly used the politburo to make up the regime during the most risky situation: the succession period and also used it as a ‘political nursing home’ for retired elites of Kim Il Sung era. All these were possible because of the ‘Suryong system(수령제).’ Thus, it can be said that the political value of the politburo was never denied, even under Kim Jong Il. However, no matter that the

politburo had transformed variety under Kim Jong Il, its purpose never changed even after the 3rd party conference in 2010 and until the last days of Kim Jong Il, which was to support the political needs of the Suryong with its symbolic presence.

Keywords: Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, Korean Worker's Party(KWP), The Politburo of KWP, The Secretariat of KWP, Yuhun Tongchi, KWP 3rd Party Conference​