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North Korea’s Perception of the Iran Airstrike |
| July 17, 2025 |
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Peter WardResearch Fellow, Sejong Institute | pward89@sejong.org
Bee Yun JoResearch Fellow, Sejong Institute | bjo87@sejong.org
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The recent ‘Twelve-Day War’ among Iran, Israel, and the United States, and the fact that the United States and Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities and repeatedly struck Iran’s military leaders and assets during the process, may have served as an occasion for North Korea to reconfirm its own strategic vulnerability — namely, that nuclear weapons are not an all-powerful key to survival.
Admittedly, Iran is a so-called “nuclear threshold state” on the verge of possessing nuclear weapons, while North Korea has already defined itself as, in effect, a nuclear-armed state. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such a status is not recognized by the international community or legally, but North Korea has already demonstrated through its nuclear capability and diverse missile systems that it can threaten South Korea, Japan, and even the United States. However, whether it can be considered to possess a survivable second-strike capability remains in question.
In a crisis situation, the military strategies of South Korea and the United States toward North Korea bear similarities to the principles employed by Israel in its airstrikes against Iran. For example: (1) destroying air defense networks to gain air superiority, (2) eliminating key offensive systems such as missile launchers and artillery, (3) striking command structures and other military targets on the basis of air superiority, and (4) neutralizing retaliatory missile attacks through missile defense systems.
Israel has clearly demonstrated to what extent air superiority can be employed destructively against Iran, a state allied with North Korea. United States President Trump likewise signaled his willingness to resort to military action against nuclear facilities in the event of negotiation failure. Observing this, North Korea would once again have realized the necessity of strengthening its own air defense network. The so-called “2024 Pyongyang UAV and Anti-North Korea Leaflet Incident” that occurred last year also illustrated this necessity.
In addition to securing air defense, this case would also have provided North Korea with policy implications regarding the areas on which it should concentrate more intensively in the future. Specifically, the development of new weapon systems that are difficult to intercept with missile defense networks and that possess greater survivability against preemptive strikes—particularly submarine-based weapon systems and various forms of drones. Furthermore, in terms of securing concealment and survivability of its domestic nuclear facilities, North Korea would once again have recognized the necessity of dispersing such facilities and reinforcing underground structures.
South Korea must respond to North Korea’s advancement of capabilities in air defense, submarines, and drones, and focus on acquiring new counterforce capabilities that can offset these developments. Although the possibility of North Korea rapidly developing or acquiring a missile defense system is low, the gradual advancement of its air defense network and the dispersal and continued fortification of nuclear and key facilities through tunnel systems necessitate that South Korea secure new ballistic missiles and air- and sea-based assets to penetrate these defenses and maintain the survivability and credibility of its retaliatory capabilities. -
South Korean security experts and the U.S. military both hold significant concerns regarding North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. However, while North Korea has successfully test-launched solid-fuel ICBMs that it claims can strike the U.S. mainland, it has not yet demonstrated the ability to fly them on a standard trajectory, successfully reenter the atmosphere, or strike a target with an accurate guidance system. At this point, it remains doubtful whether North Korea possesses sufficient deterrent capability to strike cities on the U.S. mainland.
According to U.S. intelligence documents leaked in 2023, North Korea sought to visualize itself as an “advanced nuclear threat to the United States,” but faced severe resource constraints in securing transporter erector launchers (TELs) necessary to implement this capability. This suggests that North Korea has a strong motivation to exaggerate its ICBM threat in order to deter U.S. military action. Various military rhetoric and displays of weapons systems originating from Pyongyang are also part of cognitive warfare, aimed at maximizing deterrence effects by significantly overstating actual capabilities. In other words, while provoking or attacking North Korea could entail a high risk of escalation, in peacetime it is likely that North Korea is not fully confident that its current capabilities alone would achieve effective deterrence in a crisis.
However, over the past two years, North Korea’s rocket units may have been deployed to the Ukrainian battlefield, and missile development may have benefited from assistance by technologically more advanced Russian collaborators. North Korea’s munitions factories have also expanded in number and production capacity, potentially enabling it to possess greater short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) technology and production capacity than in 2023, or to do so in the near future. These developments may have had a positive effect on ICBM development as well. North Korea is likely to leverage these capabilities to exert coercive influence on South Korean and U.S. decision-making in crisis situations.
In particular, short-range ballistic missiles could become a more important means in a crisis situation than expected if North Korea seeks to gradually escalate conflict on the Korean Peninsula without resorting to nuclear weapons. According to a recent analysis published by Nicholas D. Anderson and Daryl G. Press in the 『Texas National Security Review』, one of North Korea’s major conventional forces, the long-range artillery force, poses a relatively limited threat to Seoul compared to common perception. In the event that North Korea attacks during a crisis situation, civilian fatalities in Seoul are estimated at about 2,600. Even in the worst-case scenario of a highly skilled and motivated North Korean military launching a surprise attack, civilian fatalities until the artillery force is destroyed would likely amount to a maximum of 4,600. In contrast, if South Korea and the United States conduct a preemptive strike, fatalities are estimated to be reduced to the level of 700–1,100.
Although these figures are by no means small, they fall short of the level at which Kim Jong-un could feel reassured that current conventional forces provide sufficient deterrence. In other words, North Korea’s currently possessed ballistic missile and artillery forces alone are not sufficient to respond effectively in a crisis situation. Furthermore, even North Korea’s nuclear forces have not yet reached the level at which they can reliably threaten the U.S. mainland by substituting for conventional forces.
However, the North Korean military possesses various means of escalation not only at the local level but also on a global scale. Locally, the West Sea is a region where past naval clashes, the indiscriminate attack on civilians on Yeonpyeong Island, and the sinking of the Cheonan occurred, and the counterforce and countervalue threats that the North Korean navy can inflict on both South Korean forces and civilians are considerable.
Internationally, North Korea possesses advanced cyber capabilities, which it regularly utilizes to steal cryptocurrency or to obtain state secrets of foreign governments and commercial secrets of global corporations. Given past cases of successful attacks on major government infrastructure such as the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS), there is sufficient possibility that the North Korean military perceives and utilizes cyberspace as an important means of escalation. However, it is uncertain whether cyber capabilities can exert deterrent power at the same level and in the same domain as conventional military power in the event of an actual physical conflict.
At present, North Korea’s conventional forces are not at a level sufficient to effectively suppress its adversaries, and it appears that North Korea is excessively dependent on land-based nuclear forces. In this respect, Kim Jong-un is in a situation where he has little reason to possess great confidence in his country’s military position.
North Korea already recognizes the necessity of developing new defensive and offensive capabilities in order to counter South Korea’s superiority in conventional forces and at the same time secure a reliable second-strike capability. South Korea not only maintains overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, but is also developing capabilities to engage in escalation in the gray zone, psychological warfare, and irregular cognitive warfare such as leaflet distribution, based on drone capabilities. Questions still remain regarding North Korea’s nuclear strike capabilities. -
Up to 2016, Minister of People’s Armed Forces Pak Yong-sik, in a speech ahead of an artillery drill, threatened that “if the they make a last desperate challenge, Seoul will be turned into a death-ridden wasteland of ashes by the merciless retaliatory strikes of the artillery force.” However, the limitations of North Korea’s artillery power will drive it toward the development of alternative capabilities to offset South Korea’s counterstrike ability. In particular, drones—especially long-range suicide drones that can fly at low altitude, loiter for relatively long periods, and search for targets—may become a strong option, as they are difficult to intercept with existing missile defense systems. Of course, Shahed drones with ranges as long as Iran’s (1,500–2,000 km) are not necessary, but the threat through low-altitude drones, where air defense networks are vulnerable, seems possible. That said, as seen in the case of Israel, many of them are likely to be shot down by air defense networks and air force assets.
The issue of securing the parts necessary for the manufacture of such weapons systems or the problem of cost could serve as significant constraints for North Korea, and it is highly likely that North Korea would need Russian support to overcome them. The technology transfer or the provision of parts for such weapons systems is relatively less sensitive than nuclear technology, and thus can be considered more likely to be shared.
In the coming years, North Korea’s ICBM threat will further grow, but considerable doubts still remain as to whether such systems can reliably strike the U.S. mainland. Short- and medium-range conventional missiles may also lose credibility due to improvements in missile defense capabilities and South Korea’s air superiority. This situation will further increase North Korea’s motivation to develop nuclear-powered submarines and hypersonic missile capabilities that can strike the United States.
A nuclear-powered submarine would provide North Korea with a blue-water naval capability to operate covertly at sea for several months, as well as a secure second-strike nuclear capability that is virtually impossible to neutralize. Hypersonic missiles would serve as a means to bypass South Korea’s missile defense system, which is advantageous in compensating for the limitations of existing short-range missiles revealed in the Iran-Israel war. In order to prevent such assets from being neutralized in the pre-launch stage, North Korea may also pursue the development of hypersonic submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
According to recent reports, Russia has transferred advanced air defense systems (Pantsir-S1) to North Korea, which may already be deployed to defend Pyongyang’s airspace. This implies that, for South Korea to secure air superiority over the Pyongyang, it would require the use of air force assets, short-range ballistic missiles, or drones in preemptive strikes. In the coming years, North Korea is likely to pursue additional air defense support from Russia to counter the ballistic missile threat. Attention should also be paid to whether it will acquire the capability to establish air defense networks designed to protect its artillery forces. -
In summary, based on the Israel-Iran case, it appears likely that North Korea will seek to reaffirm the need to secure the survivability of its nuclear facilities and capabilities, as well as to acquire a second-strike capability, by pursuing air defense systems, new delivery means including drones and hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, and the dispersal of nuclear facilities along with the expansion of underground facilities. Considering these developmental directions of North Korea, South Korea will require intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities capable of offsetting North Korea’s concealment, as well as self-reliant capabilities in the air and maritime domains. In particular, with the prospect of wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer to the ROK military under a second Trump administration, the expansion of such independent capabilities is more crucial than ever.
In addition, the United States is expected to adjust the force composition of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in conjunction with OPCON transfer. For example, the U.S. has already planned to concentrate all F-16 fighter aircraft, previously dispersed across Osan and Kunsan Air Bases, at Osan in order to operate two “Super Squadron” (one wing has already been operational since 2024). Furthermore, it is expected that an F-35A fighter wing (one permanent and one rotational) will be stationed at Kunsan. The F-16 wings, with a roughly 100 km shorter distance to Pyongyang, represent overwhelming targeting against North Korea’s nuclear facilities and launch sites, a development that North Korea strongly criticized through the Rodong Sinmun in May 2025. These measures can be seen as exerting significant deterrent effect, offsetting the effectiveness of North Korea’s dispersal strategy. While issues of strategic flexibility inevitably accompany adjustments to USFK, if the repositioning is carried out under a second Trump administration with China containment as the highest priority, South Korea should endeavor to complete the scheduled deployment of the F-35A wing and ensure the placement of new deterrent assets against North Korea.
Furthermore, the U.S. FY2026 defense budget related to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) places an unusual emphasis on denial-based deterrence. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 report, known as a blueprint for the foreign and security policy of a second Trump administration, also identifies missile defense as the highest priority, and President Trump is actively promoting the “Golden Dome.” In this process, the possibility emerges of additional missile defense deployments within the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea. Measures to strengthen U.S.-ROK deterrence against North Korea through missile defense should also be positively considered.
Finally, in terms of strengthening South Korea’s defense capabilities, an increase in defense spending will also be required. Although it will be difficult in the short term to reach the 5% of GDP demanded by Trump, considering the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, the acquisition of air defense systems, and the gradual development of new delivery means, a certain level of increase in South Korea’s defense budget and the corresponding reinforcement of military power will be necessary.
| Concerns Regarding North Korea’s Escalation Capability
| Assessing the Implications of the Iran Airstrike for North Korea
| South Korea’s Response Direction
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
