The analysis finds that U.S. plans for regional medium-range missiles are developing not toward the fixed deployment of the MRC to a single allied state, but toward a distributed denial-defense posture in which functions are divided and linked according to each ally's geographic and military strengths. The denial defense concept emphasized in the 2026 National Defense Strategy can be understood to encompass not only defensive instruments such as air and missile defense, but also offensive denial instruments that reduce an adversary's probability of operational success by striking directly at the core military capabilities required to carry out an attack. From this perspective, the MRC functions, in forward positions, as an offensive denial instrument that constrains the operations of Chinese naval and air forces and A2/AD systems by holding them at risk through dispersion and maneuver, while, in rear positions, it sustains the durability of denial capability through force preservation, replenishment, and redeployment. In summary, the Philippines can be characterized as a "flexible forward hub," marked by repeated rotational MRC deployments and multi-node maneuver; Japan as a "forward-stocked, quasi-persistent forward hub," where rotational deployment is advancing toward in-theater storage; Australia as a "rear logistics-integration hub," combining its own long-range fires with production and logistics capacity; and Guam and the COFA states as "rear dispersal hubs" that support the dispersal, preservation, and forward redeployment of forces. South Korea, while possessing its own precision strike capabilities, a defense industrial base, and the conditions for U.S. access and reception, is assessed as a "latent hub" whose actual role in MRC deployment and regional operations has yet to take concrete shape.

From a policy standpoint, South Korea should avoid approaching the question of permanent MRC deployment in binary terms, and should instead maintain peninsula defense as the alliance's primary mission while selectively linking with U.S. regional long-range fires architecture to the extent necessary. Given South Korea's strategic circumstances, facing North Korea directly while also bordering China, this measured approach should not be read as mere policy hesitation. On the contrary, South Korea's assumption of a more leading role in deterrence and defense on the peninsula can itself constitute a meaningful contribution to overall burden-sharing, one that helps sustain the alliance's core mission in a stable manner. At the same time, to ensure that this division of roles does not result in operational disconnection, South Korea needs to maintain interoperability with the United States through combined exercises and in the areas of ISR, command and control, and precision strike, while developing a functional division of labor that draws on its own long-range fires and its defense industrial and logistics base. The central issue is not the deployment of the MRC itself, but securing options that minimize South Korea's strategic burden while preserving the ability to link with the alliance's regional operations when necessary.

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